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Abstract 
 
Supply chain management was investigated using three objectives: identifying 
how the management of the supply chain had changed, how new ideas had been 
implemented and primarily the identification of the inhibitors and enablers of 
supply chain management.  In the 1990s and 2000s research had focused on 
concepts and approaches.  When considering supply chain management it cuts 
across the whole system including: suppliers, internal company functions, 
managers, employees, customers information and material flow and services.  A 
large proportion of publications were on materials, matrices, techniques and cost 
benefits.  The literature had little written about management support and 
employee involvement to engage buy in for supply chain management 
implementation.  There was an overall lack of detail into what actually happened 
during implementation in the supply chain.  Very little was published on the 
inhibitors of supply chain management.   
 
The methodology attempted to consider all the limitations which could affect the 
outcome of the research objectives.  The researcher believed by adopting the case 
study strategy a multi level design could be adopted by analysis at 2 
manufacturing companies and 4 mini supplier case studies.  Triangulation was 
used to ensure validity and reliability of the research findings.   
 
The 2 manufacturing companies both made significant implementation changes in 
their supply chains.  New ideas were implemented using published tools and 
techniques to improve their supply chain management.  The research revealed 5 
main inhibitors of supply chain management: lack of management commitment, 
lack of clear strategy and policy, lack of understanding, lack of clear 
communication and negative attitudes of senior managers and employees.  The 5 
main enablers of supply chain management were: lead by example, performance 
management, accountability and responsibility, incentive and an open honest 
culture.  This research contributed to theory and practice by taking us beyond 
current published research in particular the significance of senior management 
commitment, the management of the supply chain changes, the implementation of 
ideas and primarily the inhibitors and enablers of supply chain management.  
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 1 
 1.0  Introduction 
 
 
Manufacturing companies face continual pressure to be more efficient and effective.  
Their customers expect continual improvement in performance to enhance: service 
levels, product quality, cost reductions, rapid delivery and reliability. For some 
manufacturing companies to remain competitive they have relocated or outsourced core 
processes to India and the Far East, to take advantage of lower cost.  For manufacturing 
companies that remain in the UK they continue to have the highest rate of redundancies 
(Heap 2004).  More than ever before manufacturing companies have to target every 
ounce of inefficiency that exists and re-define their supply chain (Hines 1994).   
 
Supply chain management is seen as the shared objective of every function in a 
company.  It is a single process which depends on strategic decision making to impact 
overall costs and market share.  It requires a completely different perspective to 
systems.  (Houlihan 1988).  This definition is used during the research for consistency 
and clarity.  A glossary of terms is also provided in appendix 1. 
 
To support competitive challenges, research has been published on supply chain 
management to guide and influence managers to improve.    The well publicised cost 
benefits of supply chain development include improving quality of product, customer 
service, reducing transaction costs, removing waste, reducing non value added 
activities, reducing supply lead times and inventory, lowering material costs and 
technological improvement. (Hartley and Choi 1996; Watts and Hahn 1993; Baily et al 
1994; Womack and Jones 1990; Hines 2000).   
 
Despite published benefits there is still a slow uptake in the UK to successfully 
implement and sustain supply chain management improvements.  (Drucker 1982; Galt 
and Dale 1991; Christopher 1992; Cox and Hines 1997).  
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This study investigates the supply chain management of two manufacturing companies.  
RHP-NSK a 3rd tier bearing manufacturer to the automotive industry.  Alstom-Siemens 
a 1st tier low volume, high capital goods gas turbine producer for the oil and gas 
industry. RHP-NSK’s strategic suppliers were also examined to provide four mini case 
studies on supply chain management.   
 
To support the uptake of supply chain management the UK government heavily invests 
in supply chain development by national programmes funded from the Regional 
Development Agencies (RDA’s) and Learning and Skills Councils (LSC’s) which 
equip small and medium companies and individuals with the appropriate tools and 
techniques for business improvement.    
 
Funded programme include:  
 
• Vision 2010 for a better future in the manufacturing industry and purchasing 
• CBI Partnership Sourcing regional and national supply chain networks 
• The Society of Motor Manufacturing and Traders (SMMT) Industry Forum  
• Supply Chain Relationships in Aerospace (SCRIA)  
• Construction Industry ‘Building down Barriers’ programme 
• The Birmingham Centre of British Manufacturing had European funding for 
supplier development programmes, known as ‘Accelerate’  
• Manufacturing Advisory Services (MAS) to improve productivity in UK 
manufacturing. 
• National Academies supporting quality in food and drink, manufacturing and 
engineering.  
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The Lean Learning Academy (2006) is funded by the London Development Agency to 
improve supply chain competitiveness across industry sectors.  The Lean Learning 
Academy believes after 5 years companies could achieve the following benefits: 
 
Product defects reduced by  90% 
Throughput time reduced by 90% 
Inventories reduced by 75% 
Space and costs reduced by  50% 
Unit Costs reduced by 50% 
Increased profits by up to 100% 
 
Academic research centres also support supply chain development.  Contributing centres 
include the Lean Enterprise Research Centre (LERC) located at the University of Wales.  
The LERC, who are part of Cardiff Business School specialise in supplier development 
and lean approaches.  The Centre for Research in Strategic Purchasing and Supply 
(CRISPS) located at Bath University which specialises in purchasing and partnering. 
Both universities have Supply Chain Development Programmes (SCDP), drawing 
innovators from retailing, automotive, electronics, clothing, process and service 
industries.  Supply chain management has become a popular subject throughout the UK. 
 
To sustain supply chain management implementation the researcher explored the 
adoption of specialist techniques such as Hoshin Kanri and the Balanced Scorecard. This 
enables the examination of the impact company policies and practices can have on supply 
chain management implementation.   It was apparent from researching different 
manufacturing companies, that the larger the supply chain, the number of departments 
and people involved, the greater the degree of complexity.  The complexity is made up of 
interface problems in communication breakdowns, bottlenecks, poor service levels which 
all impact customer performance. 
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1.1 Supply chain development 
 
From the literature key themes were important for supply chain management 
implementation.  In 2006 The SMMT Industry Forum Director noted:  
 
‘Starting the process improvement path was not difficult, 
dramatic improvements were made in individual 
activities, within a matter of days.  However, spreading 
process improvement across the plant and linking the 
island of improvement up and down the supply chain 
needed patience and perseverance.’ Director of the 
SMMT  (1996)   
(Cox and Hines 1997) 
 
This was an important message which recognised that quick hits could be easy to 
implement but long term sustainable results from implementation and continuous 
improvement took considerable effort. Changing the hearts and minds of everyone in the 
supply chain takes time and sustainable implementation is not  easy. 
 
Hines et al (1995) identified supplier co-ordination and supplier development as two 
areas needed for supplier development.  Supplier Co-ordination referred to the activities 
made by a customer to manage, coordinate and mould their suppliers into a common way 
of working.  Supplier development includes adoption of tools and techniques undertaken 
with communication with a customer to improve competitive advantage.   
 
The emphasis on co-ordination focuses on the internal systems of the company and the 
processes established to sustain developments. Supplier development on the other hand 
involves activities which are implemented at supplier companies.  
 
 
In 1998 one of the key findings of the SMMT Accelerate Programme was that British 
manufacturing did not lack innovation, but companies experienced problems in managing 
and applying concepts.  (Cox and Hines 1997). 
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Hines et al (1997) found most new management recipes ran their course without having a 
lasting impact on profitability. Employees waited for managers to lose interest and move 
to the next initiative.   Hines et al (1997) emphasised the need for managers to think and 
act with the whole business in mind.  To achieve such agility Hines et al (1997) argued a 
company must become lean.  Senior managers’ and employees’ attitudes towards change 
and how to influence employees is a prerequisite for positive results from supply chain 
management.   
 
In publications (Hines 1997, Gattorna 2005) there appeared to be a weak alignment 
between supply chain management implementation and the existing company culture. 
The company culture and people aspects are paramount for successfully implementing 
and sustaining supply chain management.  Across different industry sectors people who 
are not process conscious could perceive that they were ‘unique’ or ‘too complex’ to 
adopt proven approaches across industry sectors.  To gain buy in and commitment senior 
managers and employees ‘reinvent the wheel’ by developing their own company 
frameworks.  This seems unnecessary when there are perfectly adequate tools and 
techniques that have been successfully applied by companies. Re-inventing the wheel 
increases investment cost and time of implementation to achieve business benefit. 
 
The existing published case study research (Hines 2000) lacks evidence of inhibitors, 
inhibitors (seen as factors which prevented or stopped implementation) and enablers 
(factors which encouraged and supported implementation) of supply chain management. 
The published research references heavily focus around the tools and techniques.    One 
of the biggest challenges for supply chain management appeared to be ‘changing hearts 
and minds’ and ‘managing’ and ‘implementing’ ideas over time for sustainability, which 
are given poor attention in the literature.   
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1.1  Origins of the Project 
 
The researcher became interested in supply chain management on a two year project at 
RHP Bearings Ltd, in Newark in 1996. The researcher worked in a central purchasing 
department which had 20 people, responsible for a total purchasing spend of £19m, 60% 
of the total running costs. The researcher was a practitioner working in purchasing on a 
project focused on cost reduction and quality improvement throughout the supply chain, 
by eliminating waste and achieving total customer satisfaction.  The supply chain 
investigation was for the UK group and included establishing, implementing and 
managing the programme.  
 
The role provided exposure across all levels of a company, its politics, varying cultures 
and challenges. Existing academic research was the starting point to increase academic 
learning and review case studies, to appreciate the progress of supplier development.  
There were many research articles available in the literature on process tools and 
techniques.  (Womack and Jones 1990; Hines 2000, Bicheno 2000, Bateman 2000).  
However, there was very little coverage of the human aspect and the implication of 
change on employees.  There were also few in depth case studies which allowed a 
detailed analysis over time. Within the available literature it appeared that there were 
brief summaries and no deep coverage of how a company could approach these 
challenges and what barriers they would face and have to overcome to sustain changes.  
 
During the establishment of the project plan for the supply chain role it was apparent 
that RHP had not allocated any time for the human side of the impact of these changes.   
The researcher spent a large proportion of time on cultural issues such as supporting 
managers to think more strategically and cross functionally about their company and 
working with employees encouraging them to take ownership of changes.  This was 
essential for success and sustainability of supply chain management.  
The research undertaken for this thesis investigated two main manufacturing case 
studies, their cultures, organisational hierarchies, functions and senior management 
attitudes.  Both companies needed to become more integrated, with a cross functional 
focus on the whole system.  
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After working in procurement at RHP and Alstom-Siemans; the researcher became the 
process development manager in HR, responsible for culture change.  The success of 
this role on cultural change grew the business improvement focus and the researcher 
became the business improvement manager responsible for supply chain development 
across all the transactional departments comprising 160 people and a £25m budget.   
 
On leaving Alstom-Siemens the researcher became a business transformation 
consultant and quickly moved into managing the profit and loss account as the head of 
learning and skills for Production Engineering Research Association (PERA), 
responsible for an Innovation Programme in the East Midlands, Leadership Programme 
in London, a training provider for the Lean Learning Academy, Business Improvement 
Programme in the South West. In total these programmes covered 645 small and 
medium companies across industry sectors.   
 
The researcher established her own consultancy and training company in 2006 
supporting workplace development in supply chain management, for companies across 
the UK. 
 
 1.2 Research aims and objectives 
  
The research aims to understand the principles of supply chain management and 
investigate the application of these principles in practice by examining a number of 
themes linked to the implementation of supply chain management.   
The key factors were identified by researching the literature and identifying key areas 
heavily reported.   These key factors then formed a conceptual framework which was 
explored in the supply chain management case studies.  (Figure 1). 
The factors include: policy deployment, management support, employee involvement, 
business improvement and suppliers.   
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The research objectives were to: 
 
1. Investigate the ways in which the management of the supply chain has changed  
2. Analyse how new ideas on supply chain management have been implemented 
3. Identify factors that inhibit and enable supply chain management  
 
The research focused on how the management of the supply chain has changed by 
exploring and explaining the implementation of identified themes in practice.  To 
analyse how the new ideas on supply chain management have been implemented, this 
includes the application of business improvement tools and techniques.  Finally the 
factors that inhibit and enable supply chain management were to be identified and 
evaluated.    
 
1.3 Case studies and objectives 
 
Two case studies are presented covering management, people and processes within 2 
manufacturing company supply chains.  Firstly a Japanese manufacturing company 
RHP-NSK producing high volume bearings, primarily for the automotive industry.  
Secondly Alstom, a French manufacturing company, which in 2003 was acquired by 
Siemens, a German manufacturing company, producing low volume industrial gas 
turbines, predominantly supplying the oil and gas Industry.   The companies are located 
in the East Midlands.  Four supplier action research case studies are made to suppliers 
of RHP to examine how new ideas were implemented at supplier locations. 
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 1.4 Methodology 
 
The methodology adopted was a case study research strategy. The fundamental reasons 
were to permit multiple data sources to exist which provide detailed analysis over time 
(Yin 1989).  The case study strategy includes multiple data sources and vignettes of 
managers and employees experiences within the supply chain.  Both companies had 60 
year old histories and faced cultural change due to environmental pressures.  The case 
study strategy is felt to be the most appropriate means to provide a detailed answer to the 
research questions. 
  
 1.5 Limitations of scope and key assumptions 
 
The case studies focused on 2 UK based manufacturing companies to compare and 
contrast research.  They were located in two different industry sectors automotive and 
the heavy equipment sector. One company was Japanese owned, whilst the other was 
French and then German owned.   
 
A limitation of the scope was the ability to translate the research findings across other 
industry sectors.   The 2 case studies had a heavy emphasis on low volume 
manufacturing.  The application of this research to other types of industry such as the 
service sector, retail, leisure and tourism and high volume remained to be examined.  
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1.6 Outline of the thesis 
 
The research was divided into the following chapters, literature review, methodology, 
case studies, analysis and conclusions. 
 
Chapter 2 explores the available literature in the field of supply chain management.  
The research fields covered include quality, purchasing, logistics, operations and 
aspects of business management to thoroughly examine and explore the research 
questions. Firstly research was made into supply chain management definitions 
investigating the interpretation of existing researchers, which captured the scope and 
themes.   The themes identified in the literature were used to investigate the 
implementation of supply chain management.   Themes include customer expectations, 
policy deployment, managers support, employee involvement, supplier development 
and business improvement processes.  The themes are investigated in the case studies. 
 
Chapter 3 is the methodology.  A review of research strategies is provided.  In essence 
the methodology adopted was case study strategy which enabled a detailed examination 
of two manufacturing brown field sites’ supply chains and the stories of employees and 
management within them.  The case study research strategy includes the adoption of 
qualitative and quantitative data in the forms of unstructured interviews, team supply 
chain improvement activities and employees vignettes to enrich evidence.  The tools and 
techniques used for the supplier development case studies were the housekeeping 
technique (5S’s), set up reduction and process mapping. 
 
Chapter 4 and 5 are the company case studies of supply chain management.  These reveal 
that functional departments and tall hierarchies still exist.  Senior managers’ are found to 
be driven by vertical departmental measures, where measures and targets exist.  There is 
very a poor flow of information and communication across the supply chain and 
employees felt many initiatives came and went before sustainable improvements could be 
realised. Over time there were good examples of ideas being successfully implemented in 
supply chain management. 
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Chapter 6 provides cross case analysis and evaluates findings under the research 
objectives. Research at both companies shows evidence of big changes in the 
management of the supply chain, resource allocation, structure, roles and prioritisation.   
 
Chapter 7 provides the research conclusions.  In the current supply chain management 
literature there is little written about the implementation side and the contextual factor of 
senior management, which is heavily under valued in particular the impact this factor 
alone can have on supply chain management.  The other supply chain management 
inhibitors are lack of clear strategy and policy, lack of understanding, lack of clear 
communication and negative attitude.   
The enablers of supply chain management were leading by example, performance 
management, accountability and responsibility, incentive and open and honest culture.  
 
 1.7 Contribution to knowledge 
 
Through reviewing the available literature the researcher revealed there were a large 
number of matrices and techniques associated with supply chain management.  There 
was too little written about senior managements’ impact on supply chain management 
and implementation, strategic supply chain management and engaging employees.  
There was an overall lack of detail into what happens in terms of the implementation of 
supply chain management.  Despite published research and techniques there was a 
relatively small amount of research that looked at supply chain management 
implementation.  There was also little attention by past research to understand the 
factors that act as inhibitors and enablers of supply chain management.   
  
 1.8 Summary 
 
The research can be summarised in figure 1 by a research process framework. 
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Figure 1: Research Process Framework                            
 
 
                                     Setting the scene and strategic aims of the research 
 
Defining supply chain management 
Identifying key themes 
Systems thinking 
Conceptual framework 
 Summary of research methods 
Justification of method undertaken 
Case study strategy 
Literature 
Review 
Methodology 
Conclusions about the research 
Implications for theory policy and practice. 
Introduction 
Analysis 
RHP-NSK Bearings in Newark and 
Alstom-Siemens Gas Turbines in Lincoln 
Case Studies 
Conclusions for the research: 
- Ways in which the management of the supply chain has changed  
- New ideas on supply chain management implementation 
- Factors that inhibit and enable supply chain management  
 Conclusion 
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 2.0 Literature Review 
 
 2.1 Introduction 
 
The most fundamental area to consider, which could have formed an area of research in its 
own right, was the definition of supply chain management and clarification of its scope.  To 
explore the research questions thoroughly, five fields of research will be undertaken: quality, 
purchasing, logistics, operations and business management.  The purchasing field captures 
research into buyer and supplier relationships, partnerships, price, total cost and supplier 
development.  The quality and operations field covers continuous improvement tools and 
techniques, team working, lean thinking and six sigma.  Logistics provides information on 
materials, inventory and process flow analysis.  Aspects of business management cover 
research on policy deployment, balanced scorecards, best practice and accounting for the 
financial benefit of business improvement in the supply chain.  Systems theory is briefly 
researched to underpin the literature review.  Supply chain management considers the whole 
system, which is also the emphasis of systems theory, so research into systems theory is 
complementary to supply chain management.    
  
 2.2  Supply chain management    
 
To add to the complexity of understanding supply chain management, there is no universal 
definition for supply chain management (Croom et al. 2000). Different authors provide 
different definitions of supply chain management, which can be classified into three 
categories; a management philosophy, the implementation of a management philosophy and a 
set of management processes (Mentzer et al. 2001).   It is useful to categorise supply chain 
management into factors to simplify the research.  
 
Gattorna (2006) identifies four types of supply chain management: 1. Continuous 
replenishment – bringing customers and suppliers together for mutual benefit; 2. Lean – the 
most efficient, reliable and low cost; 3. Agile – the most responsive, competitive and quickest 
turnaround; and 4. Fully Flexible – new innovative supply chain solutions.  However, in my 
view there is little value today in Gattorna’s (2006) four types of supply chain.  This is 
because, with global pressures in competitive markets, companies should be all of these 
things – lean, agile and fully flexible.  My findings are supported by Naylor et al. (1999), 
which argues that the most efficient supply chains at any given time will be those that are 
capable of integrating the lean and agile logistics paradigms. 
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The breadth of the subject area and lack of precise definition makes it difficult to determine 
and understand the true boundaries of supply chain management.  To add further 
complication, a variety of terms are used, including network sourcing, value chain 
management, agility, lean and six sigma.  Mentzer et al. (2001) found the term ‘supply chain 
management’ causes confusion for those involved in researching the phenomenon and those 
attempting to establish a supply chain management approach.  Table 1 provides different 
authors’ published interpretations of supply chain management.  The first three authors listed 
in the table highlight the interlocking nature of the supply chain.   
 
Table 1:  Interpretations of supply chain management    
 
Authors Definition 
Forrester (1958)  Company success depends on the interactions between the flows of 
information, materials, money, manpower and capital equipment.   
The way these interlock to amplify one another and to  
cause change and fluctuation will form the basis for  
anticipating the effect of decisions, policies,  
organisation forms and investment choices. 
Jones and Riley  
(1985) 
Supply chain management deals with the total flow of  
materials from suppliers to end users. 
Houlihan (1988) The supply chain is viewed as a single process.  
Responsibility is not fragmented to a functional area such as:  
manufacturing, purchasing, distribution and sales.   
It depends on strategic decision making, it is a shared objective of  
every function in the chain, it impacts on costs and market share.  
  
Ellram (1991) A network of firms interacting to deliver products or services  
to the end customer, linking flows from raw material supply  
to final delivery. 
 
Christopher (1992) 
 
Network of organisations that are involved, through upstream  
and downstream linkages, in the different processes and  
activities that produce value in the form of products and services  
in the hands of the ultimate consumer. 
La Londe and  
Masters (1994) 
Supply chain strategy includes two or more firms in a  
supply chain entering into a long-term agreement,  
the development of trust and commitment to the relationships.  
The integration of logistics activities involving the sharing of  
demand and the sales data. 
Cooper et al.  
(1997) 
An integrative philosophy to manage the total flow  
of a distribution channel from supplier to the ultimate user. 
Lee (1997) A network of entities that starts with the suppliers’  
supplier and ends with the customers’ custom. The production  
and delivery of goods and services. 
Monczka (1998) SCM requires traditionally separate material functions to  
report to an executive responsible for coordinating the entire  
materials process and also requires joint relationships  
with suppliers across multiple tiers.   
  
 15 
Bicheno  
(2000) 
Improving the supply chain means extending the principles of  
‘lean’ and six sigma to all participants in the chain.   
There are massive opportunities from calling on the strengths of  
partners, sharing information about customers, and agility at  
the most appropriate parts of the chain. 
Tan (2002) Supply chain management encompasses materials  
supply management from the supply of basic raw materials  
to final product (and possible recycling and re-use).   
Supply chain management focuses on how firms utilise  
their suppliers’ processes, technology and capability to  
enhance competitive advantage.   
Mentzer et al.  
(2001) 
A set of three or more entities (organisations or  
individuals) directly involved in the upstream and  
downstream flows of products, services, finances, and/or  
information from a source to a customer. 
Siems  (2005) The purpose is to get the right resources and products to the  
right places, at the right times, while yielding the highest  
possible profits. 
Gattorna (2006) The supply chain is any combination of processes,  
functions, activities, relationships and pathways along  
which products, services, information and financial  
transactions move in and between enterprises.  It involves  
movement from producer to end-user.  Everyone in the  
enterprise is involved in making this happen. 
Source:  Author’s research findings 2006 
 
The definitions were invaluable as they identified the key factors that are most prevalent in 
the research.  They also highlighted areas with a weaker record of publication and which 
were given little attention.  There are more publications around the involvement of suppliers 
and customers (Jones & Riley 1985, Ellram 1991, Cooper 1997, Lee 1997, Stevens 1998, 
Brewer and Steph 2000,  Tan 2002 and Gattorna 2006). Research on the material flow, 
planning and resources is also well publicised  (Jones & Riley 1985, Ellram 1991, La Londe 
1994, Lee 1997, Womack and Jones 1996, Stevens 1998, Brewer & Steph 2000 and Tan 2002).  
There is also considerable research around the business improvement tools and techniques and 
the use of lean, six sigma and process improvement to develop the supply chain  (Christopher 
1992,  La Londe 1994, Hines 1995, Womack and Jones 1996, Hines 1997, Monczka 1998, Tan 
1998,  Bicheno 2000, Simchi-Levi 2003 and Gattorna 2006).    
 
In the current literature, little consideration is given to management support (Forester 1958, 
Simchi-Levi 2003), strategic decision making (Forrester 1958, Houlihan 1988 and Hines et al. 
1997) and supply chain management as an integrated philosophy  (Cooper et al. 1997, Tan 
2002).  Despite the slow uptake in the UK, there is ample published work on the optimisation of 
efficiency, cost reduction, market share, customer retention and competitive advantage  (Hines 
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1997, Houlihan 1998,  Stevens 1998, Bicheno 2000, Tan 2002 and Siems 2005).  Table 2 
summarises the main key factors. 
 
Table 2: Key factors of supply chain management    
Key Theme 
Material flow, planning  and control 
Process activities and alignment of the whole system  
Suppliers to end-users/customers 
Source: Author’s research findings 2006 
 
Not until the late 1990s and early 2000s did researchers start to consider information as part of 
the definition (Womack and Jones 1996, Gattorna 2006). It was disappointing that other 
researchers did not mention the strategic value of supply chain management for decision 
making.  Many of the factors appeared operational in nature, such as the tools and techniques 
including processes and waste removal.  It appears that there is weak definition and publicity of 
aligning management and company objectives to supply chain management.  Forester (1958) 
aligned management only, as did Simchi-Levi in 2003.  Hines et al. (1997) emphasised the need 
for managers to think with the whole business in mind.  The key factors are presented in the 
conceptual framework I have constructed in section 2.9. 
 
Siems (2005) took his research further by suggesting that supply chain management 
development benefits macroeconomics, lower inflation, more stable economic output, higher 
productivity growth and better standards of living. This research has shown that supply chain 
management has an impact on economic growth and community development.  
 
Houlihan (1988) provides the most in-depth definition of supply chain management.  This 
definition identifies a number of key factors, including; it is a whole process, it uses strategic 
decision making, the shared objective of every function, it impacts costs and market share 
and appreciates the need for a different perspective on inventories, which then considers the 
way that people manage systems, information and integration.  Houlihan’s (1988) definition 
is  adopted for this research as I believe all these aspects are still relevant in the twenty-first 
century.  Two key factors are process and the whole system.  Systems theory is explored to 
understand the interrelationship of operations across the whole process.  
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 2.3  Systems theory 
  
For 80 years systems theory has been the theoretical underpinning for studying organisations.  
Systems theory provides the theoretical foundation for conceptualising the organisation as a 
whole system with inputs, process, outputs and feedback (Katz and Kane 1966).  This is 
visualised in Figure 1 using a system model (Robertson and Cooper 1987).    A system can be 
defined as a collection of parts or elements that interact (Smuts 1926, Kauffman 1980).  The 
component parts may be analysed separately, but finally it should be the whole system that is 
the focus of analysis (Checkland 1990).   
 
Systems theory emphasises ‘the whole system’, the customers and their needs, the outputs of 
finished goods or a completed service and documentation.  The transformation process is the 
activities undertaken to produce the finished goods or provide the service output.  The inputs 
are the supply of products and documentation from suppliers and suppliers who provide the 
inputs.  The whole system is considered as resource management, technology and the social 
system.   
 
Figure 2: An open system view of an organisation. 
Source: Robertson and Cooper 1983 
 
The open system view shown in Figure 2 highlights the parallel with supply chain 
management which emphasises interconnectivity between inputs and outputs from suppliers, 
functions and customers and the entire system of a supply chain. 
 
Fo rm a l
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 2.4 Strategic policy deployment 
  
Policy deployment is a strategic way of communicating policy, goals and objectives 
throughout its hierarchy by focusing on the key activities needed for success.  Policy 
deployment is linked to the achievement of top management goals with daily management at 
all operational levels (Witcher and Butterworth 2001).  Two common approaches for strategic 
policy deployment are hoshin kanri and the balanced scorecard.   
 
 
Policy Deployment – Hoshin Kanri 
 
In Japan strategic policy deployment is known as hoshin kanri and is widely applied in 
Japanese international businesses.  Lee and Dale (1998) summarise hoshin kanri as an 
approach that considers; the corporation, the division, the function, the team and the 
individual.  Policy deployment is a way of aligning a company to perpetually improve its 
performance by adjusting quickly to change (Akao 1991).  Hoshin kanri is a framework for 
policy-based objectives, often translated into Quality, Cost, and Delivery targets (QCD), 
which are used daily by management to drive development.  Hoshin kanri is a participative 
approach to development and driving metrics through a review process.  The focus and rigour 
of a top-down deployment aligning strategic objectives and uniting senior managers and 
employees internally to continually improve, means that businesses can respond more 
quickly. This appears to emphasise what the whole system and supply chain is focused upon. 
 
Lee and Dale (1998) report that policy deployment was established in Japan in the 1960s and 
used a Total Quality Management (TQM) approach combining Deming’s ‘plan, do, check, 
act’ cycle (PDCA) which was produced in the 1950s (Deming 1986).   
 
At each phase consideration is given to the vision, mission, business goals, annual targets and 
critical success factors. After the corporate items are established, the resources, control items 
and priority action plans are produced.  For every element there are feedback loops and 
reviews.  However, outside Japan, the significance of policy deployment has gone largely 
unreported (Lee and Dale 1998, Witcher and Butterworth 2001).  One of the reasons the take- 
up has been slow in the UK is the reliance on a formal review process.  It is a long-term 
concept and needs continual development to sustain the methodology and to make it an 
everyday part of the working company culture. 
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Japanese companies focus on all their processes and alignment so that the whole supply chain 
works effectively. To begin the supply chain management implementation, senior 
management need to understand the organisation and its environment.  Hoshin kanri provides 
companies with focus and alignment and enables policies and high level targets to be 
integrated into operations.  
 
Balanced Scorecard 
 
The balanced scorecard enables a business to evaluate a strategic balance of hard and soft 
measures. It was developed in the mid 1990s (Kaplan and Norton 1996).  The scorecard 
drives the development and aligns individual performance.  Balanced scorecard measures are 
often categorised into; financial, customers, internal business processes, learning and growth 
(Kaplan and Norton 1996).  This approach encourages managers not to take a narrow focus 
and to look more broadly than traditional financial measures.   
 
Brewer and Speh (2000) found that many managers saw supply chain management and the 
balanced scorecard as separate management tools.  They suggest those who understand the 
interrelationship between the two concepts have a greater likelihood of leveraging their 
supply chain as a source of competitive advantage. 
  
 2.5 Senior management support 
 
The role of senior management in supporting supply chain management is considered 
important, as their commitment is seen as paramount to ensure that the implementation of  
supply chain management is aligned to the business strategic objectives for sustainability and 
continual improvement.  This is examined further by Pascale (1990) by considering the 
behaviour of managers through examining research over the last 100 years.  
 
For over one hundred years we grew accustomed to 
improving things without having to alter the mindset upon 
which the improvements were predicted… We keep trying 
to apply the tools of transformation without a 
corresponding shift in our managerial mindset.  (Pascale 
1990: 13). 
 
This is important as it emphasises that companies are applying tools and techniques to 
improve, but are not considering how their managerial behaviour and style needs to change to 
adopt different ways of working.  This also means that companies would attempt to 
implement new concepts without planning, preparing and organising a sustainable 
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management infrastructure in the supply chain to adopt new approaches.  For some 
companies this could include trying to implement the latest concepts and thinking, but 
companies attempt new concepts on top of large hierarchies, traditional structures and ways 
of managing employees (Hines 1997).  These considerations could be relevant in some 
companies in the twenty-first century. 
 
Adair (1991) highlights that if subordinates are fully involved in decisions that affect their 
work they will be committed to carrying them out.  Adair (1991) felt leadership had to win 
employees’ commitment.  This research is very clear and expresses that the involvement of 
employees in decision making is paramount.  In my opinion, this is also an important factor 
in the twenty-first century.    
 
Pascale (1990) compared scientific management and Japanese management: 
 
Hardly can a competent workman be found who does not 
devote a considerable amount of time to studying just how 
slowly he can work and still convince his employer that he 
is going at a good pace.  Under our system a worker is told 
just what he is to do and how he is to do it.  Any 
improvement he makes upon the orders given to him is 
fatal to his success.  
 
(Taylor cited in Pascale 1990: 27).  
  
Taylor’s quote is still the experience in UK practice in companies where management 
controls too much of the business and operational staff and middle management do not have 
the responsibility to solve problems.  In these cultures, management changes the processes, 
sets the improvement path and employees do as they are told.  However, all the experience, 
knowledge, breadth of understanding of those processes, and ideas for improvement are with 
employees.  Pascale (1990) emphasises this further by a quote from Konosuke Matsushita, 
the founder of Matsushita Electric Ltd (Kotter 1997):   
 
With your bosses doing the thinking while the workers 
wield the screwdrivers, you’re convinced deep down that 
this is the right way to run a business.   
 
For you the essence of management is getting the ideas out 
of the heads of the bosses and into the hands of labour.    
We are beyond your mindset.  Business, we know, is now 
so complex and difficult, the survival of firms so 
hazardous in an environment increasingly unpredictable, 
competitive and fraught with danger that their continued 
existence depends on the day to day mobilisation of every 
ounce of intelligence.  (Pascale 1990: 27). 
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This quote provides a key factor for the importance of managerial support and employee 
involvement.  Adair (Oakland 2000) concludes managers should think about the task, the 
team and the individual.  Figure 3 illustrates the areas to consider.   
 
Figure 3: Task, Team and Individual 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Oakland 2000 
 
This three-stage model provides a simple approach to ensuring coverage of various aspects of 
supply chain implementation.  Gattorna (2006) has a framework for fast and effective 
management of change.  This is illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: The Effective Management of Change 
 
 
Source: Gattorna, 2005:80 
 
In Figure 4 the pressure for change is necessary to create a need to improve the supply chain; 
these are external pressures in the market place which could impact the company.  Without 
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Clear targets 
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Achieve targets 
Systematic 
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Sense of achievement 
Common identity 
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this pressure it is unlikely that continued development will take place.  It is vital that senior 
managers communicate a clear vision; from this the capacity to change can be achieved 
through a systematic set of actions to implement changes in the supply chain.    It is 
recommended that the implementation is not long drawn out as this could provide employees 
with the opportunity to resist and rebel, in part or in full.  Evidence suggests that the faster the 
implementation the greater the chance of achieving the desired outcome in competitive 
advantage within the supply chain.  
 
Examination of the existing literature reveals that, for some UK companies, there is still an 
opportunity for managers to support and regularly give feedback to employees to involve and 
engage employees in supply chain management implementation, which will enhance 
profitability and competitive advantage.  
 
Parallels are drawn between strategic policy and key management research to compare and 
contrast these separate fields of research as part of the supply chain management analysis. 
This is because in the supply chain management literature there is only one article found 
aligning strategic policy deployment with supply chain management and only two authors 
who have discussed the need for management (Hines 1997, Simchi-Levi 2004 cited in Wang 
2004).  Nevertheless the researcher considers policy deployment and management support are 
crucial.   
 
Purchasing management and the development of purchasing is investigated.  The researcher 
felt it was important to look historically at how purchasing had changed as this could affect 
how new ideas are implemented in the supply chain. It may also contribute to the inhibitors 
and enablers of supply chain management by how customers work with their suppliers. 
 
 2.6 Purchasing management 
 
Purchasing management is receiving recognition because the relevant duties have become 
less clerical and more strategic (Baily et al. 1996).  However, during the 1980s many 
businesses were still struggling to develop purchasing from the traditional to a strategic way 
of working with suppliers.  Syson (1992) argues that new skills must be learnt and there 
should be particular emphasis on supplier appraisals for selection and negotiations.  Syson 
(1992) stressed that these approaches are not universally appropriate but used for the correct 
part of a purchasing portfolio they can provide immense power. Unfortunately he concludes 
his review by observing that many purchasing staff still remain adversarial.  
 
 23 
Too many purchasing staff have inadequate knowledge of the end-user market, which means 
purchasing is unable to relate supply characteristics to the distinctive requirements of the end 
product. According to Syson (1992), the purchasing function appears to operate in a vacuum.  
This may be due to the operation being at the end of the supply chain which means they 
receive limited information and communication flow from other functions.  There could also 
be a lack of alignment within the supply chain. 
 
Hines (1994) found that training and development needed to accelerate change and put 
particular emphasis on purchasing tools and techniques for co-ordinators and projects teams. 
This would equip employees with the necessary skills and capability to implement changes in 
the supply chain.  
 
Hines (1994) found the move to supplier development creates new roles for purchasing and 
summarises the new roles into five elements: 
1. The co-ordination of all activities between buyer and seller, including activities undertaken 
by other functions such as production, quality, design and production engineering. 
 
2. Purchasing role in seeking new areas and sources of competitive advantage from the 
supplier network and formulating strategies to maximise this advantage for the benefit of 
buyer and seller alike. 
 
3. A role as consultant in co-ordinating the cascade of developmental assistance to suppliers 
from the different internal departments through the use of a supplier association. 
 
4. A pivotal role in the two-way dissemination for strategic information between buyer and 
supplier.  This dissemination would involve keeping the suppliers fully aware of 
developments in the marketplace so that they can respond to the needs of the end consumer 
as well as adopt the best technologies and operating methods.  It would also involve the 
formulation of joint strategies with the supplier association (development) membership. 
 
5. A role in targeting and measuring the improvement of suppliers as they seek either 
collectively or individually to develop continuously. 
 
These new roles could have a great impact on purchasing departments, particularly when the 
traditional role of purchasing is to place orders with suppliers.  These new roles (Hines 1994) 
demand different tasks, competencies and capabilities due to the shift from a traditional style to 
a more collaborative way of working. Hines and Taylor (2000) enhance the research by 
identifying buyer supplier characteristics.  These are presented in four phases of 
development: no coherent strategy, piecemeal co-ordination, systematic co-ordination and 
networked co-ordination.  Table 3 shows the characteristics for supplier co-ordination. 
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Table 3: Maturity grid for supplier co-ordination  
 
Strategy/ No Coherent          Piecemeal Systematic Network 
Characteristics Strategy Co-ordination           Co-ordination Co-ordination 
 
Buying criteria Lowest price Lowest cost Maximum mutual Maximum 
   benefit network benefit 
Purpose of To supply goods To supply goods To supply goods To supply goods 
supplier                                 procedures in a cost-effective using customer   
                                                                    manner procedures network                        
Relationship Adversarial Localised Close Strategic 
type  co-operation 
Relationship Variable Variable Long Lifetime 
length 
Customer Small Some, Logistics Frequent, mainly Frequent, many 
involvement with   Logistic functions 
suppliers 
Quality Product Quality control Quality TQM spread to 
requirement specification  assurance/TQM own suppliers 
Delivery Standard lead Ad hoc projects Joint ventures True JIT 
requirement times  timed deliveries 
Cost Lowest market Lowest cost Stable reducing Target costing 
requirement              price                                                           interaction costs                share savings 
Product design  Some packaging Network packaging 
requirement  and handling  and handling  
Technology None Limited (mainly Customer sharing Some reliance on 
sharing  customer IT handling predictive scores 
  technology) technology 
Reliance on None or external Some reliance on Heavy reliance on Some reliance on 
grading  reactive scores reactive and predictive scores 
   predictive scores 
Data interchange Limited, Limited, mainly Detailed and Detailed, some 
 operational only operational frequent strategic, within 
    network 
Asset specificity None/very low Very low Medium, e.g. Medium 
   designated trucks 
   and handling 
   equipment 
Number of               High and unstable High, relatively Low and very                   Very low stable 
Suppliers  very stable                  stable 
Frequency of Frequent, Frequent, ad hoc, Very frequent at Very frequent at 
interaction expediting-based, mainly reactive operational level, operational level, 
problem-solving planned, regular spreading                    through meetings network 
Source: Hines and Taylor 2000:324 
  
Table 3 is useful for gauging performance and identifying development areas.  This snap shot 
assessment is easily achieved by identifying where performance currently is, where the 
company wants to be and the gaps in supply chain development.   
 
However a weakness in these kinds of matrices is how the company or department decides to 
establish an implementation plan to move from one phase to the next and this could prevent a 
company from being able to move forward.  A further weakness with Hines’ matrices is the 
assumption of a high level of understanding to be able to implement the necessary changes.  
Sustainable implementation appears to be one of the inhibitors.   
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Hines (2000) divides the stages into four phases;  price competition, quality competition, 
close cooperation and strategic partnerships.  Table 4 shows the strategic competitive 
positioning model. 
 
Table 4: Strategic competitive positioning model 
Stage 1:  
Price competition  
Low technology manufacturing and materials used.   
Competition on cheap prices only.   
No added value services. 
Stage 2:  
Quality competition 
  
 
Limited use of high technology manufacturing  
Techniques.  Limited use of precision materials 
Competition by high quality PPM (parts per million) or (zero defects) 
products.  Limited value adding processes available in the firm.   
Vertical integration. 
Stage 3:  
Close co-operation  
co-ordination and 
development of suppliers,  
 
Extensive use of high technology manufacturing  
techniques.  Extensive use of precision materials. 
Competition by close co-operation with  
customers, management ability and JIT (Just in  
time) deliveries and production.  Many value  
adding processes available in supply chain.  Always  
seeking ways of continual improvement.  Close proximity to suppliers 
and customers long term relations.   
Use of activity based costing.  Zero industrial relations problems.  
Vertical disintegration. 
Stage 4:  
Strategic partnerships 
development of subcontract 
network  
lean production 
 
Member of customer subcontract team,  
probably organised into a Kyoryoku Kai  
association.  Facilities available for product design  
for customers. Extensive use of own mutually  
dependent subcontract network.  Creation of firm-  
specific advantages. Active technology transfer  
with customers and other members of the subcontract  
team. Increase in product diversity and customer  
service. Real JIT production.  Maximisation of value-  
adding processes in network but minimisation by OEM or lower-  
tier customer.  Close long-term relations with low  
cost sources of finance, probably in a Keiretsu-type  
arrangement.  Extension of supplier co-ordination  
and development to lower tier firms. 
Source: Hines et al. 2000: 324 
 
The new demands placed on strategic purchasing needs greater emphasis to focus on supply 
chain management.  As well as considering the modern characteristics outlined in Table 4, 
the roles of senior managers and employees need to change.  These changes will take time, 
patience and perseverance to implement and imbed strategic methods. The next section 
considered total cost instead of price. 
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 2.6.1 Shifting emphasis from price to total cost 
 
Traditional purchasing is operated as a clerical function, placing purchase orders on a large 
supply base.  The emphasis is on the ‘cheapest price’, which was often at the expense of 
product quality, delivery and service (Hines 1994). There is little or no appreciation given to 
the hidden costs of quality. Some hidden costs include; the cost of raising an order, 
transportation, storage, obsolescence, product handling, product scrap and rework.  There is 
also the cost of vendor-rating systems, supplier visits and the cost of keeping supplier 
information up to date on internal systems and the life duration of the product at the end-use 
application.  
 
Due to the shift of increased costs with suppliers, purchasing began to be recognised as a 
strategic function.  Senior management realised purchasing could make large impacts on the 
bottom line.  There was more demand to have a global supply base or to switch supply from 
UK suppliers to localised suppliers overseas, minimising labour costs.  For example, Marks 
and Spencer were well known for partnering in the UK until the 1980s when they reduced 
local supply from 90% to less than 50% (Barker 1999).  H&M and Next purchase all their 
merchandise from China. This shift has closed many UK manufacturing production lines, 
sites and companies, which have relocated overseas.  An evident example of this in the 
published literature was the automotive and aerospace industries.   
 
More sophisticated quality cost systems would build these costs into their quality reporting 
for all products and services. This would also enable the focus of improvement projects for 
current and potential problems, dependent on the priority and risk impact of the company.  To 
identify the real cost of business improvements in the supply chain, the financial system of 
the business would need development. These strategic enhancements and emphasis on total 
cost will enable the purchasing department to be more equipped to undertake supply chain 
management.  
 2.6.2 Partnership development 
 
In the UK many new terms have been introduced: ‘Partnerships’ (Macbeth 1994), ‘Supplier 
Development’ (Hines 1997), ‘Strategic Alliances’, ‘Collaboration’ and ‘Supplier Networks’ 
(Lamming and Harland 2004). These different terms have all been used to describe the 
activities of two or more parties working together for a common purpose.   
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The literature has clearly captured the characteristics of these types of relationship 
development which are summarised as being a move away from adversarial relationships to 
working more collaboratively (Lamming 1993, Macbeth and Ferguson 1993, Stuart 1993).  
Models were introduced which summarised the key differences (Hines 1994, Lamming 1994, 
Macbeth 1994). 
 
Macbeth (1993) developed a five-phase approach for improving relationships: internal 
commitment and team building, partner selection, supplier communication and commitment, 
measurement and improvement planning, and action implementation and progress review.  A 
weakness of this research was that it did not provide any further detail or explanation. The 
further information was necessary for successfully implementing the model.  Macbeth (1994) 
presented an overview of the features of adversarial and collaborative relationships, as shown 
in Table 5.   
 
Table 5:  Adversarial and Collaborative Relationship Characteristics 
 
Adversarial Collaborative 
(Supplier Development) 
Time-span of interaction 
Discrete events 
Contracts for months 
Low switching costs 
Personal attitudes/behaviour 
Expertise closely held 
Centralise authority 
Power explicit and visible 
Buyer knows best 
Reactive suppliers 
Minimal interactions 
Customer imposed stress 
Individual focus 
Live for the moment 
Aggressive defence 
Look good locally 
Organisational processes 
Produce to drawing 
Hands off 
Limited gatekeepers 
Static systems 
Measurements 
Unidirectional  
Vendor Rating 
Unidirectional price 
Internal cost reduction  
Inspect outcomes 
Limited feedback – blaming 
Learning limited  
Transaction history 
Supplier for life 
Switching is last option 
People development 
Devolve authority 
Power two-way and hidden 
Supplier supports innovation 
Proactive suppliers 
Multiple interactions 
Self imposed stress 
Mutual respect 
Build for the future  
Open sharing approach  
Group gains sought  
Design involvement  
Hands on  
Many touch points  
Technology transfers  
Total acquisition cost  
Relationship measurement  
Supply chain effectiveness  
Control inputs and processes  
Frequent feedback  
Improvement  
Success shared and rewarded 
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Source:  Macbeth 1994 
Table 5 clearly summarises the key differences to enable the reader to appreciate the basic 
differences between the two styles.  However, it provide no framework, examples or lessons 
learnt to enable these changes in relationship development to take place.  Behavioural changes 
internally and externally need consideration if previous relationships were more traditional 
with a ‘them and us’ attitude, rather than mutual gain and collaboration (Hines 1994, 
Lascelles and Dale 1989, Macbeth 1994). 
 
In the 1980s and early 1990s the literature on partnering tended to focus on the benefits and 
characteristics of a partnership.  If an adversarial relationship exists with suppliers for many 
years and then a customer decides to start working collaboratively as outlined in Table 5, traits 
of the adversarial style could still exist (Macbeth 1994).  Consideration should be given to the 
time necessary to move from an adversarial relationship to one of collaboration and this 
transition should not be underestimated. Some suppliers may need to re-build trust with 
customers, this can make the change a slow process.   
 
Successful cases of companies working collaboratively on supplier relationships to improve 
product design, production processes and exploit innovation were primarily from the 
automotive, aerospace and computing sectors.  Examples of such companies are Canon (Japan 
Management Association 1987), Toyota (Monden 1983, 1986), Mazda (Hayes, Wheelwright 
and Clark 1988), Nissan and Matsushita (Monden 1986). Companies that adopted techniques 
such as ‘Just In Time’, ‘Quality Circles’, ‘Preventative Maintenance’ and ‘Vendor Programs’ 
included Harley Davidson, General Motors (Sepheri 1987), Hewlett Packard (Suzaki 1987), 
Lockheed (Barret 1988), Ford (Brooks and Linklater 1986), General Electric, IBM and 
Westinghouse (Schonberger 1986).  
 
The literature on partnership appeared to neglect the company strategy, culture and external 
environment, which had a direct influence on relationship behaviour that could result in 
development being short lived.  To bring partnership and relationship development into context, 
supplier development and the benefits were investigated.   
 
 2.7 Supplier development 
 
Hines (1994) carried out extensive research into creating world-class suppliers, concentrating 
his research efforts on Japan and in the early 1990s applying concepts through the Lean 
Enterprise Research Centre (LERC) and funding from the Welsh Development Agency.  Hines’ 
research findings emphasised the impact supplier development has on competitive advantage.  
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This had been clearly recognised and documented from the industrial history of Japan.  The 
success and advancement of Japanese enterprises has been largely attributed to their focus on 
developing supplier networks (Hines 1994). Sadly in the West these concepts are still not 
often understood (Hines 1994).   
 
Japanese developments have clearly been sustained over time and many case studies and 
continuous improvement tools used for operational and service improvement today originated 
from the Toyota Production System (TPS) (Bicheno 2000). 
It appears that the majority of case analysis on partnerships and their benefits is from the 
automotive industry, where this is likely to continue.  In the UK in 2005, nearly 250,000 
people worked in the automotive manufacturing sector, which contributed around 1.1% of 
GDP, with around £9 billion of added value, representing 6.1% of UK manufacturing.  
Britain was the manufacturing base for seven of the world’s leading volume car 
manufacturers, had nine commercial vehicle plants, was home to 17 of the world’s top tier-
one component suppliers and the base for 20 of the world’s leading automotive design 
engineering firms (Automotive Academy 2005). 
In 2005 the government committed up to £15m over five years to fund the development of 
the Automotive Academy, which will deliver programmes using existing providers in most 
regions across the UK, to enhance further use of lean and six sigma concepts.  The benefits of 
supplier development across industry sectors are now examined. 
 2.7.1  Supplier development benefits 
 
Academic literature and case studies on supplier development have emphasised the benefits and 
opportunities which could be achieved, such as improving quality, reducing transaction costs, 
removing waste, reducing non-value-added activities, reducing supply lead times, reducing 
inventory, lowering material costs and technological improvements, which all contributed to 
achieving competitive advantage (Drucker 1982; Galt and Dale 1991; Christopher 1992; Cox 
and Hines 1997).    
 
Customers expect more and more from their suppliers for their products, end quality, 
performance and costs (Watts and Hahn 1993, Baily, Farmer, Jessop and Jones 1994, Hartley 
and Choi 1996).  Nevertheless despite the publicised benefits of supplier development there was 
still slow uptake in the UK.  In 1990 researchers found only one article which directly 
addressed the supplier development issue (Hahn et al. 1990).  Before this time the focus was on 
partnerships and basic reviews.    
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Supplier development was slowly given attention through the tangible benefits seen through 
British and European government-funded programmes.  Nevertheless, Cox (1996) found that 
the exposure given to supplier development within the academic and professional literature 
remained fundamentally and disappointingly unchanged.   
 
Hines (1998) found the spread of knowledge and expertise in the West had until recently been 
very limited.  Hines (1994) created models for implementing supplier development in the UK.   
 
Hines (1994) developed a 10-step model for establishing supplier associations:   
1. Benchmark present competitive position 
2. Select appropriate co-ordination and development tools 
3. Gain internal acceptance and create cross-functional team 
4. Select appropriate suppliers 
5. Benchmark supplier position 
6. Jointly target improvements 
7. Focus co-ordination and development efforts 
8. Undertake group activities 
9. Measure improvements 
10. Refocus size of group and target areas 
 
Hines’ (1994) model appeared easy to follow and each area was expanded in the literature to 
provide further advice.  The model was generated based on a ‘plan, do, check and act’ 
continual improvement loop, which was a Total Quality Management approach (Deming 
1986).  Developing a continuous improvement culture within a company may take a 
considerable amount of time and effort.  To begin the process, benchmarking had to be 
undertaken and an assessment to ensure the right company measurement system was in place 
prior to benchmarking and deciding what to benchmark against. The appropriate development 
tools also had to be selected and a supplier selection process created or developed.   
 
Hines et al. (1995) provided the most useful model for supplier development positioning, 
illustrated in Figure 4.  Hines et al (1995) identified supplier co-ordination and supplier 
development as the two key areas needed for successful supplier development. 
 
Supplier co-ordination referred to the activities undertaken by customers to mould their 
suppliers into a common way of working, developing the framework, company diagnostic, 
metrics and tools and techniques.   Supplier development was the adoption of these approaches 
initially learnt with the customer to help improve competitive advantage.  The two distinctions 
were extremely complementary, supplier co-ordination and supplier development emphasised a 
common consistent system of co-ordination and development implementation of processes for 
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sustainable development.  The model illustrated in Figure 5 shows the purchasers buying 
behaviour in 4 stages.   
 
Figure 5: Stages in Buying Behaviour by Purchasers. 
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Source: Hines 1994 
Areas of development which the model excluded were the implementation activities needed to 
make progress to the next stage, for example, strategy, policy deployment, communication 
(people, processes and operations) and barriers to development which would prevent a 
company from moving to the next stage.  It would also be very useful to provide practical 
examples of what was experienced at each stage (McCartney and Massey 1996). 
 
A further consideration may be for companies’ own internal systems to be made leaner and 
more proactive before embarking on development projects with suppliers.  This was because 
the client company could have inherent noise in the existing processes, inconsistent 
communication and approaches which could cause conflicting messages and confusion to 
suppliers.    If the client company was also very reactive and heavily fire fighting this could 
impact support, commitment and long-term success.  Nevertheless, authors and practitioners 
often focused on supplier development due to the developments of both companies with the 
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efforts made to work together. Without the basic foundation and frameworks put in place 
internally, however, any quick reactive supplier development hits could be short lived. 
 
McCartney and Massey (1998) found four generic characteristics of supplier development: 
Firstly, strategy, which was the company business plan and policy deployment including 
creating it, if it does not already exist.  Secondly, communication, operations, people and 
processes.  Thirdly, barriers to development which would prevent a company progressing.  
Fourthly, practical examples of supplier development activities.  
 
To sustain a continuous improvement culture with strategic suppliers, the internal management 
structure and external activities must work in parallel to maintain the philosophy and 
standardise approaches through a system.  
  
The paper by McCartney and Massey (1998) provided academics and practitioners with a 
matrix which could be used to analyse characteristics of supplier development. This matrix is 
summarised in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: A Matrix for Supplier Development 
Management 
Approach 
 Individual  
 Stage 1 
Fragmented  
Stage 2 
Systematic 
Stage 3 
Networked 
Stage 4 
Strategy and policy 
deployment 
Individual’s 
perception of 
supplier 
development 
Departmental 
strategy  
Long-term vision  
and policy   
communicated by 
senior  
management 
Standardised 
policy and 
optimised  
System. 
UK/Europe/ 
international 
supplier 
associations 
Kyoryoko kai 
People, Processes  
and Operations  
Communication 
Functionally  
based  
development. 
Interface with 
immediate  
internal/external / 
customers.  
Basic process 
control 
Process driven  
sourcing policy  
or preferred 
supplier list , 
Strategic  
resource 
departmental 
teamwork  
which supports  
the strategy. 
Technology 
advancements 
Cross-functional 
teams established. 
Waste removal of 
non-value-added 
processes. 
Support  
participation of 
senior  
management. 
Training provided  
for new skills and 
buy in to policy. 
Strategic  
purchasing 
Continued 
investment in 
people and 
resources.  
Target setting 
Leading edge 
concepts,   
i.e., product 
development. 
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 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 
Barriers to 
development 
No agreed  
future vision. 
Lack of 
management  
buy in. 
Lack of 
understanding  
of supply chain 
development  
and the benefits 
Lack of supplier 
information. 
Fragmented 
approach. 
Lack of time & 
resource .  
Short-term focus 
Company  
structure and 
culture   
vision not  
shared with all 
Investment in time  
and resource.   
Trust and mutual 
benefit 
Ongoing continuous 
improvement 
-  Kaizen 
-  Trust 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy Deployment Suppliers who 
have IS09000 / 
BS5750, enter  
the market  
easily 
Suppliers graded 
by quality 
assessments / 
vendor rating 
Internal policy 
communicated to 
suppliers 
Between suppliers 
to suppliers  
over tiers 
Operations and 
people 
Cheapest price.  
No training in  
total cost of 
ownership. 
One-off 
negotiations. 
Short-term  
tenders contracts
Firefighting –
resolving 
immediate 
problems. 
Functional team 
projects which 
support strategy  
Proactive  
Teamwork.   
Everyone believes  
in strategic vision. 
Open  
communication. 
Information and 
feedback target 
improvements 
Aligned process  
and people  
strategies   
facilitating 
information  
flow and  
knowledge  
across  
companies  
Practical examples 
of supply 
management 
Lowest price. 
No or poor 
monitoring of 
quality, cost  
and delivery 
Product and 
supplier 
rationalisation,  
waste removal,  
set up reduction, 
lead time  
reduction, 
technology 
development, 
consignment 
stocking, 
purchasing cards, 
EDI,  
performance 
concerns quality 
and delivery 
Joint long-term  
plan focus over  
several years. 
Sisk and cost  
Sharing, technology 
transfer,  
direct line feed, 
CAD/CAM ISDN 
links, 
R&D investments  
and joint Kaizen   
Product  
Development 
DTI  
automotive 
aerospace  
and  
construction 
programmes. 
Centre for  
Research in 
Purchasing  
and Supply  
(Crisps) 
Lean  
Enterprise  
Research 
Centre (LERC) 
Source: McCartney and Massey 1998 
 
Hines et al. (2000) produced a further matrix to focus on the effectiveness of supplier co-
ordination of which the results are set out in Table 7. 
 34 
Table 7: Effectively Focusing Supplier Co-ordination  
Strategy/ External Reactive Systematic Network 
Characteristics Accreditation    Problem Solving Development Development 
   Programme 
Buying criteria Lowest price Lowest cost Maximum mutual Maximum 
   benefit network benefit 
Purpose of To supply goods To supply goods To improve continually  
supplier                                                                               mutual                          Customer does not 
                                                                                             Technical and/or          make competitive 
                                                                                             competitive                  advantage 
                                                                                             advantage 
Relationship Adversarial Arms-length Close Strategic 
type 
Relationship Short/variable Variable Long Lifetime 
length 
Customer Small Some, purchasing Frequent, many Continuous and 
involvement with  and quality functions multi-functional 
supplier 
Quality Product Quality control Quality TQM spread to 
requirement specification  assurance of TQM own supplier 
Delivery Standard lead Standard lead Customer involved True JIT 
requirement times time in shop floor lead 
   time reduction 
Cost Lowest market Lowest cost Stable/reducing Target costing, 
requirement price  product cost share savings 
Product design Customer Some joint input Significant joint Integrated design 
requirement specification or  input capability within 
 catalogue product  network 
Technology None Limited (mainly Frequent with Frequent within 
sharing  customer two-way flow network 
  technology) 
Reliance on None or external Some reliance on Heavy reliance on Some reliance on 
grading  reactive scores reactive and predictive scores 
   predictive scores 
Data interchange Limited, Limited, mainly Detailed, often Detailed at both 
 operational only operational operational and operational and 
   some strategic strategic level 
Asset specificity None/very low Low–medium High High through 
    network 
Number of High and unstable High, relatively Low and very               Very low     
suppliers  stable                      stable 
Frequency of Infrequent Infrequent, Frequent Continuous 
interaction  scheduled and proactive and 
  reactive reactive 
Source: Hines et al, 2000: 325. 
 
Hines’ (2000) models and matrices provided the individual reader or a team reviewing 
approaches with a positioning framework for a given set of critical success factors.  These 
models were powerful for teams to use to access performance.   
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 2.7.2 Business improvement techniques 
 
There are numerous publications on business improvement and continuous improvement 
approaches in the supply chain.  When investigating supply chain management improvement, 
certains tools were identified as a key contributors, with emphasis on ‘lean’ (waste removal) 
and ‘six sigma’ (reducing process variation) (Hines et al. 1995, Womack and Jones 1999, 
Bicheno 2000).  Bicheno (2000) saw that improving the supply chain meant extending the 
principles of lean and six sigma to all participants in the supply chain.    
 
Business improvement approaches that have been published included Total Quality 
Management (TQM), which holistically looked at quality efforts, both quantitative and 
qualitative. It included quality circles, where focused improvement teams solve problems, the 
adoption of the quality certification system ISO9000:2000, which included performance 
reviews, Just in Time (JIT), Business Process Re-engineering (BPR) capturing activities in a 
flowchart and then improving them, and Total Preventative Maintenance (TPM) where 
holistically production operators are empowered to take ownership of the machines and areas 
in the plant for low and medium level maintenance.   
 
Researchers who have studied business improvement in essence have found many tools and 
techniques originated from the quality literature published in the 1950s and 1960s by quality 
gurus from America and Japan.  Juran and Deming took quality approaches from America to 
Japan after World War II.  The Japanese gurus who responded and developed new concepts, 
which are still used today, were Ishikawa, Taguchi and Shingo.  In the 1980s increased 
quality awareness came from two Americans, Crosby and Peters.  Oakland (2000) produced a 
matrix (illustrated in Table 8) to compare and contrast the concepts of three ‘gurus’. 
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Table 8:  Three Quality Gurus Compared. 
 Crosby Deming Juran 
Definition of quality Conformance to 
requirements 
A predictable degree of 
uniformity and  
dependability at low cost  
and suited to the market 
Fitness for use 
Degree of senior 
management 
responsibility 
Responsible for 
quality 
Responsible for 94% of 
quality problems 
Less than 20% of  
quality problems  
Performance  
standard motivation 
Zero defects Quality has many scales.  
Use statistics to measure 
performance in all areas.  
Critical of zero defects 
Avoid campaigns to  
do perfect work 
General approach Prevention, not 
inspection 
Reduce variability by 
continuous improvement. 
Cease mass inspection 
General management 
approach to quality 
especially ‘human’ 
elements 
Structure 14 steps to quality 
improvement 
14 points for management 10 steps to quality 
improvement 
Statistical process 
control 
Rejects  
statistically 
acceptable level  
of quality 
Statistical methods of  
quality control must  
be used 
Recommends but  
warns that it can lead  
to a too driven  
approach 
Improvement Basis A process not 
programme 
Improvement  
Goals 
Continuous to reduce 
variation 
Eliminate goals without 
methods 
Project by project  
team approach 
Set goals 
Teamwork Quality 
Improvement  
teams. Quality 
councils 
Employee participation in 
decision-making  
Break down barriers  
between departments 
Team and quality  
circle approach 
Cost of quality  Cost of non-
conformance 
Quality is free 
No optimum continuous 
improvement 
Quality is not free   
there is an optimum 
Purchasing and  
goods received 
State requirements. 
Supplier is  
extension of the 
business.  
Most faults due  
to purchasers 
themselves 
Inspection too late allows 
defects to enter system 
Statistical evidence and 
control charts required 
Problems are complex  
Carry out formal  
surveys 
Vendor rating Yes, and buyers 
quality audits useless
No, critical of most  
systems 
Yes, but help supplier 
improve 
Single sources of 
supply 
-- Yes No, can neglect to 
sharpen competitive  
edge 
Source:  Oakland 2000 
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Table 8 highlights the relevance of different approaches to quality improvements.  All of the 
gurus have one main thing in common – to listen to customer requirements – but their 
approach and style in carrying out improvements vary with opposing views of sourcing 
supply, continuous improvement or a project-by-project approach.  The senior management 
approach of each guru provides a useful insight into the philosophy and implementation. 
Crosby saw senior managers as fully responsible for quality improvements, Deming 94% and 
Juran less than 20%.  Juran argued for a company-wide approach enabling greater 
empowerment of responsibility for quality to employees.  Table 8 is useful to see contrasting 
views of the theme of business improvement, which is to be examined further in the research. 
 
To embrace business improvement fully it is necessary for senior managers to commit 
resources and remove high-level bottlenecks.  However, for the full achievement of a 
continuous improvement culture I lean towards Juran’s thinking, that it is necessary to 
involve employees to increase productivity and motivation. If a company applying business 
improvement makes senior managers 100% responsible there is only a small percentage of 
the business improving while all the remaining employees are uninvolved and they would not 
be empowered to take ownership.   
 
On a project-by-project basis, different resources are involved in leading and contributing to 
teams which can create rapid results and start the continuous improvement journey.  This is 
investigated further in the case studies and includes the impact of senior management. 
 
In the late 1990s and 2000s, literature is published about lean and six sigma methodologies. 
Lean thinking is the elimination of waste and the adoption of five lean principles: (1) value 
from the point of view of the customer, (2) value stream, physical flow of information and 
product, (3) value flow, one stream flow and the removal of obstacles that prevent flow, (4) 
customer rate of demand extending to the full supply chain, and (5) continual improvement. 
(Womack and Jones 1996).   
 
Six sigma is based around process and variation linked to the bottom line.  The methodology 
covers; define, measure, analyse, improve and close.  It focuses on process quality, service 
and product (Bicheno 2000). 
 
Ultimately both are about winning and retaining customers. Lean and six sigma have a 
number of approaches in common and complement each other very well.  Six sigma includes 
the reduction of process variation and improvement in quality performance by using a 
number of recognised quality tools and techniques.  The six sigma methodology is built 
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around the Deming cycle; plan, do, check and act.  Lean removes waste and increases flow 
by reducing throughput time.  Lean uses many of the tools of the Toyota production system 
and process re-engineering which is more commonly known now as ‘value stream mapping’. 
More progressive companies have incorporated ‘Lean Six Sigma’, combining the value of 
both approaches. Other companies have kept things simple by using the phrase ‘Business 
Improvement’ in order that employees should feel continuity with the actions being taken. 
 
The lean philosophy was pioneered in Japan by Toyota (Hines and Rich 1998, Womack and 
Jones 1999).  Many of the tools and techniques commonly used across industry sectors in the 
twenty first century were developed in the 1960s. When the activities company are examined, 
it is found that they can be broken down into value added, non-value added and waste.  Value 
added is defined as something a customer is willing to pay for or the machining, forming, 
shaping and finishing of a product.  Non-value added is necessary activities which need to 
take place, such as legislation compliance and documentation, and the other activities are 
known as waste.  When examining a process or activity, a typical analysis is 5% of the value 
added, 35% non-value added and 60% waste.  (Hines 1997). Examining the full process 
across the supply chain and not just focusing on the product means there is a greater 
opportunity to improve the process and simplify and streamline operations. Commonly 
adopted tools include the 5Cs or 5Ss for housekeeping, SMED or set-up reduction, process 
mapping and the seven wastes (Hines and Rich 1998, Womack and Jones 1999, Bicheno 
2000).  
 
Housekeeping, or the 5Ss, enables a company to be organised with ‘a place for everything 
and everything in its place’. This is achieved through; sorting out an area and removing 
unused items, straightening the area out, shining and cleaning the area, standardising by 
introducing housekeeping audits, and sustaining through continuous improvement.  This tool 
is often the starting part to introducing business improvement in the supply chain, by getting 
people to work in teams and develop a prestigious-looking area with a professional 
appearance, providing a clear and clean image to customers and saving time for employees 
who can find items easily.  The first three stages are easy to achieve and very visible using 
before and after pictures. However, standardising and sustaining are much more challenging 
for companies to achieve.  This means the company has to imbed the approach into the 
company culture so that it becomes a way of life. 
 
Single Minute Exchange of Die (SMED) or set-up reduction, identified by Shigeo Shingo 
(Johansen and McGuire 1986), is focused on reducing downtime on a machine by analysing 
the activities that are taking place and adopting improvements and a new procedure to 
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minimise unproductive machinery.  This is another powerful technique which simply 
analyses every activity and organises activities into internal and external categories. Internal 
activities are those which must be undertaken whilst the machine is switched off and external 
activities are those which could be organised and prepared whilst the machine was running. 
 
Process mapping captures a visual picture of the activities under examination. The activity 
may be of a product or service, and captures the entire flow of steps, information and 
available performance measures.  Different process-mapping techniques are available, simple 
activities maps of boxes and arrows known as process maps, matrices listing activities and 
identifying value added, non-value added and waste, or a value-stream map which is a very 
detailed visual picture of all activities, information, performance measures, value added, non- 
value added and waste.  If the activities cut across departments, a cross-functional process 
map could be produced showing the movement in and out of departments.  There are three 
types of process maps; the current state, picturing what currently happens, the future state 
picturing the new system, and a blue sky map starting the process again with a blank sheet of 
paper.   The seven wastes identified by Shigeo Shingo are paramount in lean analysis and 
process mapping (Hines and Rich 1998).  The seven wastes are explained with a description 
in Table 9.    
 
Table 9:  The Seven Wastes 
Waste 
 
Description 
1 Overproduction Producing too much or too soon, resulting in  
poor flow of information or goods and  
excess inventory. 
2 Defects Frequent errors in paperwork, product  
quality, problems, or poor delivery performance. 
3 Unnecessary inventory Excessive storage and delay of information or  
products, resulting in excessive cost and  
poor customer service. 
4 Inappropriate processing Going about work processes using the wrong set of  
tools, procedures or systems, often when a  
simpler approach may be more effective. 
5 Excessive transportation Excessive movement of people, information or  
goods resulting in waste time, effort and cost. 
6 Waiting Long periods of inactivity for people, information 
or goods, resulting in poor flow and long lead times. 
7 Unnecessary motion Poor workplace organisation, resulting in  
poor ergonomics, e.g. excessive bending or  
stretching and frequently lost items. 
Source: Hines and Taylor 2000: 8 
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These approaches have been visualised as the building blocks for continuous improvement 
(Bateman 2001) which were adopted by the LERC and SMMT Industry Forum.  Figure 6 
shows the building blocks for continuous improvement. The measurement system is 
introduced or data collected from an existing system to prioritise the improvement, the 
improvement activity takes place with the adoption of a business improvement tool, and a 
standard operating procedure or form of control is produced before completion.     
 
Figure 6: Building blocks for continuous improvement 
 
 
Source: Batesman 2000:10 
 
Womack and Jones (1996) described the lean supply chain by five lean principles: 
 
1. Specify what does and does not create value from the customer’s perspective. 
2. Identify all the steps necessary to design, order and produce the product across the 
whole value system, to highlight non-value-adding waste. 
3. Perform those actions that create flow without interruptions, detours, backflow, 
waiting or scrap. 
4. Only make what is pulled by the customer. 
5. Strive for perfection by continually removing successive layers of waste as they are 
uncovered.  
 
These principles are paramount to prioritise and implement lean and to eliminate waste. 
When these five principles were formulated, they were heavily manufacturing focused. 
However, in item 2, ‘product’ could be replaced by ‘service’, which would make this 
philosophy equally applicable to service industries.   
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By aligning all the value-creating steps in a continuous flow, eliminating unnecessary steps and 
interruptions and recombining labour into cross-functional teams to run this flow, an individual 
firm can double its performance, flexibility and responsiveness (Jones 2004). ‘Leaning’ 
individual operations is not enough, the real gains only come when every step is reorganised 
(Hines 1994, Jones 2001). This emphasises the true value and competitive gain which could be 
achieved by improving the whole supply chain.  Hines and Taylor’s (2000) lean thinking 
process is illustrated in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7: Lean Thinking 
 
Source: Hines and Taylor 2000 
 
Figure 7 clearly shows the steps in lean thinking. However, it is concerning to see suppliers 
and customers becoming involved at phase 5, and gaining buy-in at phase 6.  In my view, this 
process is deficient in not allowing for earlier employee or stakeholder buy in.  Adair (1991) 
emphasised that if subordinates were fully involved in decisions that affect their work they 
will be committed to carrying them out.  By having a key stakeholder involved at the end of 
the implementation could mean less chance of buy-in and of commitment and therefore 
successful sustainable improvements.   
In my view, the process should begin with the customer and buy-in of key stakeholders, 
brought into the changes as early as possible, as well as involved at closure, to gain buy-in 
and make them feel involved in the changes for sustainability in the supply chain. 
 
EEF commissioned a report in 2001 with 352 of it members to investigate productivity in the 
UK and US (Temple 2001). The report revealed that the productivity gap between UK and 
US manufacturing plants was as high as 30%.  A lack of capital investment had hindered UK 
performance with lack of demand, concern over the future and the exchange rate. One reason 
for the better productivity performance in the US was the greater uptake and more intense use 
of lean principles.   
 
Lean manufacturers do not pursue lean with the same intensity and depth.  The US was 
getting more value from lean by applying it to every part of their business, but 40% of UK 
firms said they were not doing lean and did not plan to.  For companies pursuing lean, the 
primary motivation of over 70% of firms was to boost overall company performance in terms 
of increased efficiency, productivity, profitability and lower costs; 25% stated they 
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implemented lean as a response to competitive pressures and 15% said it was a response to 
pressure from customers. The barriers to lean included  attitudes to change (43%),  lack of 
understanding (23%),  cultural issues (13%) and  management skills (12%) (Temple 2001).   
 
From 1999 to 2001 research took place to investigate a three-day cycle time for car 
production.  The consortium included; LERC, the School of Management at the University of 
Bath, the car distribution programme and 20 industrial sponsors (3day Car 2001).  It 
investigated the supply chain complexity and what would need to change to make the vision 
achievable.  The current supply chain cannot meet customer requirements without significant 
stock holding.  The average lead time was 40 days, 34 of those were for customer order 
processing, which is the largest bottleneck in the supply chain.  A wide range of aspects were 
investigated including customer attitudes, managing customer demand, expected 
technological changes, development of information systems, impact on environmental 
systems, changes in organisational culture and financial implications.   
 
The three-day programme was an ultimate application of lean principles to the supply chain.  
Unfortunately this thorough research and analysis was not taken further as there needed to be 
a dramatic shift in the culture of the industry. It involved moving from a silo mentality, where 
each department focused on its own costs, and required all players to work together to 
optimise the whole chain.   
The initial cost would be upstream but the benefits downstream, which means some players 
losing out for other areas of the company supply chain to gain.  The focus on a holistic 
outlook would impact leadership, team working and performance metrics.   The six-sigma 
model uses Deming’s ‘plan, do, check, act’ methodology.  It takes each of the areas and 
translates them into five phases; define, measure, measure, analyse, improve and control. It 
begins by defining a business problem with a business case, measuring and collecting data to 
determine the baseline of performance, analysis is carried out until the root cause of the 
problems are identified and control for the standardisation.  Six sigma has had numerous 
publications (Harry and Schroeder 2000; Hahn et al 2000; Breyfogle 1999; Hoerl 1998) And 
six sigma projects have been adopted in operational areas outside manufacturing, HR (Wyper 
and Harrison 2000), purchasing, accounts, IT and supplier development (Avery 2001).   
 
The six sigma methodology originated at Motorola in the 1980s in a high volume 
manufacturing environment, reporting savings in five years of $2.2 billion. Honeywell saved 
$2 billion in 3 years. Savings at Black and Decker rose to $75 million in 2000 (Breyfogle 
1999).  Nevertheless to achieve these cost benefits is not a quick fix. The company must be 
committed to investing in the resource, have charismatic leadership and coaching and a 
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holistic outlook focused on long-term continuous improvement. To take advantage of 
reducing variation and standardising processes and improving quality it complements lean 
extremely well. Both approaches together, as Lean Six Sigma, provide great opportunities for 
business improvement in the supply chain. A framework of the six sigma model in the supply 
chain network is illustrated in Figure 8.   
 
Figure 8: Six sigma model in the supply chain network 
 
Source: Wang et al. (2004) 
 
Wang et al (2004) published a flowchart, illustrated in Figure 8, clearly showing the key areas 
of the supply chain and how six sigma improvement projects could be carried out in different 
areas of the supply chain.  It is a useful high level framework, but it is not very practical for a 
practitioner or researcher to be able to apply it.  
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2.8 Literature review summary  
 
The breadth of the subject area and lack of a precise definition of supply chain management 
can make it difficult to determine and understand the true boundaries of the subject.  
Houlihan’s (1998) definition is adopted to ease understanding.  In the existing literature, there 
are too many publications on techniques, matrices and multi-point plans to approach supply 
chain management (Hines 1994, Macbeth 1994, Hines 1998, Hines 2000).  These matrices 
provide high level snapshots and lack real depth and explanation.  More case studies in the 
research would provide a greater understanding of what is happening in company supply 
chains.  I found few publications on changing the supply chain culture, such as the support by 
management and involvement of employees.   
There is also a lack of detail as to the alignment of company objectives through policy 
deployment to align implementation of supply chain management with company objectives. 
 
The research undertaken by Hines is very broad and has useful positioning matrices, but to 
apply these matrices practically in the supply chain, an assumption of high-level knowledge 
and understanding is made. Hines’ (1994, 1998, 2000) research lacks detail behind the 
matrices, in particular, the development, the human aspects, and how to overcome inhibitors 
faced during the supply chain management implementation. There is still a basic focus on 
surface tools, concepts and matrices, but no deep appreciation given to the key factors such as 
strategy, policy deployment, supplier development process models, the human aspects and 
rigorous cost model frameworks, and the inhibitors that prevent companies moving forward 
with supply chain management implementation. 
 
In the UK there remains a poor uptake of policy deployment and there is still little research 
published.  However this could be an effective way to align supply chain implementation to a 
company’s strategic goals and objectives.  This will be examined further in the case analysis. 
Despite the strategic purchasing developments that have taken place over time, there remains 
little focus in the UK towards integrating employees into a whole system and the 
sustainability of supply chain management approaches.    
This is a major drawback with many of the conceptual models. There is also a lack of 
alignment between strategy, leadership, infrastructure and implementation. Gattorna (2006) 
successfully aligns behaviour and culture with supply chain management. 
 
Despite the widely published benefits, there appears to still be a low uptake in supply chain 
management implementation across the UK. Temple (2001) found 40% of UK firms said 
 45 
they were not doing lean and did not plan to, although the British government has heavily 
invested to support supply chain development.  
 
 2.9 Conceptual framework 
 
To simplify the focus of supply chain management, five clear factors have emerged from the 
literature.  These are illustrated in Figure 9.  The factors are evident in the literature as those 
which are important for supply chain management.  These factors include policy deployment, 
management support, employee involvement, business improvement and suppliers.  These 
factors will be explored in the supply chain management case studies and will help to 
understand the research aims and primarily to identify the inhibitors and enablers of supply 
chain management.   
 
Figure 9: Conceptual Framework for Research 
 
 
Source: Own research on supply chain management  
 
Prior to the case study analysis of two manufacturing companies and four suppliers using 
action research mini case studies, the methodology and research strategy has to be developed.  
This is set out in the next chapter. 
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Management  
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Business  
improvement 
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 3.0 Methodology  
 
 3.1  Introduction 
  
This chapter on methodology provides an overview of available research strategies and 
justifies the reason for selecting a case study strategy to fulfil the research objectives.  The 
case study strategy employs interviews, reports and observation of implementation taking 
place.  The stories and experiences of senior management and employees were also 
documented to elicit the impact on the company supply chain.  Methods of data collection are 
outlined including the use of multiple sources to validate and triangulate the results.  The 
potential limitations of the research are also explored. 
 
 3.2  Research questions 
  
The supply chain management research has three research aims: to identify the ways in which 
the management of the supply chain had changed, to investigate how new ideas on supply 
chain management had been implemented and to analyse the inhibitors and enablers of supply 
chain management.  The supply chain management research is operationalised by a 
conceptual framework which considers customers, policy deployment, senior management 
commitment, support by employees, operations, business improvement and suppliers.  The 
conceptual framework (Figure 9) is explored through the case studies.  
 
 3.3  Philosophical stance  
 
This section seeks to identify the philosophical stance that underpins the research strategy.  A 
number of philosophies were reviewed including positivism and phenomenology.  Positivism 
is concerned with ‘things’ and ‘facts’ obtained from numerical data about the world in order 
to achieve the research objectives.  By its nature it is quantitative and normally utilises 
hypotheses which are tested through analysis of quantitative data. The very nature of the 
research objectives, particularly their exploratory nature, meant the methodology could not 
utilise positivist philosophy.  
 
Phenomenology is concerned with ‘meanings’ and experiences’ and how people make sense 
of their worlds. By its nature it is qualitative and data is collected.  Since the research 
objectives lean more towards the phenomenological approach, this is the philosophy that 
underpins the research.  
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3.4  Research strategies 
 
A prerequisite to undertake fieldwork and produce valid findings is to select an appropriate 
research strategy.  Six possible research strategies were considered for this research.  Table 
10 identifies the research strategies and the context in which each is typically used. 
 
Table 10:  Research Strategies 
Research Strategy Context 
Experiment Certain variables are changed whilst keeping  
other variables constant to investigate the effect. 
Survey Typically a section of data and information is collected to 
investigate a phenomenon, e.g.,a UK  
National management skills survey across industry sectors 
Grounded Theory A research study of a new topic or area that has  
previously been subjected to little research 
Ethnography Interprets behaviour and meaning over time by close  
observation of the social behaviour of the research subject 
Action Research Solves a problem with an organisation in collaboration  
with the people that work there 
Case Study A detailed study carried out over time  
Source: Saunders 1987 
 
The experimental strategy was discounted at an early stage because of the difficulty of 
controlling variables.  The survey strategy was discounted because the research was carried 
out over an extensive period.  In the case of survey strateg,y it was felt that it could not fully 
explain the research objectives, as a greater degree of depth was needed than could be 
obtained from a survey.  A survey could not cover the required depth and the extended period 
over which I wanted to investigate the research objectives, providing scope for thorough 
explanations. Grounded theory was not appropriate because it was not a new subject or a 
topic which has had little research. Supply chain management is a comparatively well 
researched subject, as the literature review clearly indicates.   
  
Ethnographic strategy was considered as it focuses on interrelationships (Gearing 1958, cited 
in Rosen 1991:1149).   Rosen (1991) defines organisational ethnography as predominantly 
concerned with social relations around a subset of goal-orientated activities.  In the process 
ethnographers consider epistemology, that is, the place of the meaning of data and enquiry, 
which they bring to the forefront of activity.  As a strategy it is longitudinal in nature and is 
heavily socially focused.  Consideration has to be given to the ethnographer’s relationship to 
the group he or she is studying.  The ethnographer’s method of collecting data is to live 
among those who are being studied.  He or she tries to learn the subject’s rules for 
organisational life, to interface with them for a duration of time ‘sufficient’ to understand 
how and why they construct their social world.  After gaining a full appreciation of 
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ethnography it was felt that the researcher was not going to get close enough to understand 
the subjects’ social world or the life of the social group.  In addition supply chain 
management research includes many contextual themes which are not social.  At this point 
ethnography was also rejected. 
 
Action research is a problem-solving approach to research, where a problem within an 
organisation is investigated in collaboration with the people that work there.  Action research 
was used for four mini supplier case studies which were presented as part of the study of 
RHP. 
 
Having discussed the research strategies outlined above, the case study strategy was adopted 
for the research.  The fundamental reason for selecting a case study strategy was the scope it 
gave me for utilising a range of data sources, the depth of analysis that was possible and the 
length of time available to investigate the research questions.  Multiple data sources would be 
beneficial for exploring and explaining the contextual factors. The data gathered was largely 
qualitative but with a small amount of quantitative data. Data sources to be adopted included; 
small-scale surveys, interviews, documentation, observation, and even the collection of 
physical artifacts.   The full justification for this is detailed in section 3.5.  
 
  
 3.5 Justification of case study strategy 
  
Yin (1984) defines case study research as:  
 
An empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context; when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence 
are used.  
    (Yin 1984: 23)   
 
The focus of case study strategy is concerned principally with the interaction of factors and 
events (Bell 1987).  Case studies are complex because they generally involve multiple 
sources of data and may include multiple cases within a study and produce large amounts of 
data for analysis.   The various sources of data collection can add rigour to the research.  
Similarly the research is not static so it can provide a wide range of contextual factors.  It is 
these contextual factors that are the distinguishing features of case studies.  They provide a 
richness of detail that is vital in explaining the phenomena.  The choice of a case study as a 
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research strategy had little to do with my background, my past research having largely been 
positivist and quantitative, since my first degree was a BSc in Management Science.   
 
The case study strategy was felt to be appropriate for the research under investigation. There 
were many contextual factors that needed analysis over an extended period of time in order to 
explain fully and examine the research aims, and because the phenomenon under 
investigation was complex.  Yin (1994) recommends the use of case studies in situations 
where the real world phenomena under investigation are complex.  This was the case in this 
instance.  Supply chains by their nature are complex.  It was also a design in which the unit of 
analysis could be of more than one level.   
 
There is no rule of thumb as to how many case studies are needed.  This permits a degree of 
flexibility to alter the volume of case studies accordingly to the nature of the research and 
contextual themes.  Where only a small number of cases are employed, this provides rich 
explanations which are typical of the research objectives under investigation. 
 
A case study strategy could provide a more in-depth analysis into the problems that 
companies encounter in implementing supply chain management.  To support this, six units 
of analysis were used (Table 11).   
 
The case study framework involved four levels.  Level 1: the company, history and multiple 
data collection methods.  Level 2: the process or activity under investigation used observation 
or unstructured informal interviews with employees.  Level 3: the key internal stakeholders’ 
views were captured as vignettes.  Level 4: the impact activities had on the company and 
employees to examine fully the impact of supply chain management.   
 
A further advantage of the case study method was its applicability to real life human 
situations and its public accessibility through written reports.    
 
The task was to describe, analyse and interpret material from those involved with supply 
chain management implementation.  The use of case study research provides scope for in-
depth investigations into the research questions.  This strategy is selected to investigate 2 
manufacturing companies in depth and breadth and 4 strategic suppliers.   
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         3.6  Data collection methods 
 
The research involved formal and informal data collection methods in 2 companies from 
1996 to 2006, and 4 supplier companies.  This research utilises a number of data collection 
methods to provide the breadth of analysis.  Data gathering took place over 10 years, 
including six years of project work from 1996 to 2002 when supply chain management was 
researched with various departments.  Data gathering aimed to capture work sessions, project 
team meetings, steering committees, training courses and problem-solving workshops.  
Participant observation was also undertaken for two years, working on projects within 
organisational development which were responsible for the culture change strategy.  I worked 
across a range of industry sectors for two years whilst writing up research. 
 
Data collection included informal one-to-one discussions with different employers and 
employees.  The colleagues included: operators, buyers, secretaries, managers, team leaders, 
engineers, directors and managing directors within the two main case studies and four 
supplier companies. These discussions included listening to stories about the problems 
encountered during day to day work and discussions about team activities on specific 
problems or challenges.  The use of company data included reports, memorandums and 
newsletters, providing existing documentation on structures, management systems and 
business processes.  Quantitative analysis undertaken included an employee opinion survey, 
and data on suppliers’ production volume, quality levels and downtime. Data was also 
collected on supplier spending and cost reduction activities.   
 
A survey of 150 senior managers was undertaken to review the inhibitors of supply chain 
management.  A network of 20 independent company managers was also used to provide 
formal closure.  The principal unit of analysis comprises two case studies of large 
manufacturing companies.  However, for one of these case studies four mini case studies of 
supplier companies were also employed.  Table 11 summarises the units and data collection 
methods. 
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Table 11:  Units of analysis 
Unit Data  
Collection  
Method 
Number of people Vignettes 
Unit 1:  
RHP-NSK  
Bearings, 
Notts. 
Company  
internal and 
external data 
sources 
Purchasing 20 
Quality 10 
Manufacturing 10 
Suppliers 3 
Store Manager 1 
Engineering Manager 2 
Purchasing Manager 1 
Unit 1a:   
Desford  
Tubes, 
Leics. 
Participant 
observation 
Engineer 1  
Operators 3 
Crane Driver 1  
Quality Engineer 1  
Manufacturing Engineer 1   
Co-ordinator 1 
Production Manager 1 
Director 1 
Unit 1b: 
JRD, 
Cambs. 
 
 
Participant 
observation 
Sponsor 1 
Engineer 1  
Production Manager 1 
Quality Engineer 1  
Manufacturing Engineer 1 
Co-ordinator 1 
Director 1 
Managing Director 1 
Supervisor 1 
Unit 1c: 
Mansfield,  
Norfolk 
Participant 
observation 
Managing Director 1 
Operator 1 
Production Manager 1  
Quality Engineer 1 Manufacturing 
Engineer 1  
Supplier Development  
Co-ordinator 1 
Director 1 
Production Manager 1 
Unit 1d: 
Synthotec, 
Worcs. 
Participant 
observation 
Managing Director 1  
Production Manager 1  
Warehouse Manager 1  
Engineer 1 
Operator 1  
Foreman 1 
Process Engineer 1  
Quality Engineer 1  
Supplier Development  
Co-ordinator  1 
MD 1 
Engineer 1 
Foreman 1 
Unit 2:  
Alstom- 
Siemens  
Gas  
Turbines, 
Lincs. 
 
 
Company  
internal and 
external data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Management Board 14 
Purchasing 60 
Quality 20  
Manufacturing 600 
Suppliers 11 
Supply chain survey 94 
Managing Directors 3  
Senior Manager 1 
Head of Customer  
Support 1  
Director 2 
Operator 3  
Senior Buyer 1  
Engineer 1 
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To capture the implementation efforts of the two manufacturing companies, I used listening, 
reflecting and interpreting techniques through consultation with employees, as well as 
examining company information and reviewing relevant external and internal management 
literature.   
 
Various forms of observation were carried out by listening to the people in a wide range of 
informal situations, watching discussions, formal meetings and sales visits.  Data was also 
gathered through small-scale interviews, surveys, documentary sources including letters, 
memos, reports, notice boards, emails, project documents, brochures and company reports. 
 
The action research at the four supplier locations was undertaken at four levels.  Level 1 
consisted of a brief company overview.  Level 2 was the team collaborating in a workshop to 
solve a particular problem in which I participated to provide rich information about the 
systems and approaches undertaken.  Level 3 was the vignettes of the team members 
involved.  Level 4 was the outcome of the workshop for the supplier company for the future. 
 
Active listening and note taking were my primary tasks.  All data was captured, whether it 
seemed to have relevance or not to the research objectives.  All field notes were taken down 
immediately and transcribed within 24 hours. 
 
Reflective remarks were captured in the form of sentences, phrases, paragraphs and even a 
poem as part of the field sense-making process to interpret and support or disclaim the 
analysis. These remarks were captured as vignettes to enrich the research. 
  
 3.7  Data analysis 
 
As there are multiple data sources, multiple data analysis was undertaken.  Content analysis 
was used to compare and contrast the managing director’s speeches to identify and match 
patterns.  Pattern matching and content analysis was also used in the action research to 
explain the results and align them to how the management of the supply chain had changed 
and to identify inhibiting and enabling contextual themes.   This was undertaken by reviewing 
the field notes that were written in the words of others, which were used to help frame ideas 
and capture new understanding as the research progressed.  Coding was undertaken with the 
supply chain management survey results to cluster together all the exact findings of each 
participant and to identify all enabling and inhibiting factors by capturing all results in 
spreadsheets to create a coding reference to the main key themes.   Cross-case analysis was 
also carried out between the two main manufacturing case studies and across the four supplier 
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action research reports to identify commonality.  The analysis tools used included matrices, 
tables, process maps and graphs, where different forms displayed results visually and 
interpreted findings.  Descriptive statistics were collected from employee questionnaires, a 
supply chain management questionnaire, the supplier value interviews and the business 
network.  Table 12 illustrates the descriptive statistics for the questionnaires and interviews 
undertaken during the research.  
 
Table 12: Questionnaires and Interviews Descriptive Statistics 
 Number of 
People 
Mean  
Age 
Positions 
Employee feed- 
back questionnaire
1000 48 40% response from employees across the 
company with 2500 people in total 
Employee  
interviews 
30 
(5 females) 
47 Employees were a sample randomly selected  
across functions; 5 Purchasing, 5 Sales, 5 
Accounts, 10 Manufacturing, 2 Quality, 1 HR,  
1 IT 
Supplier values  
semi-structured 
interviews  
across 13  
companies in  
South Yorkshire  
or East  
Midlands 
13  55 Managing Director 1 
Technical Manager 1 
Quality Assurance Manager 1 
Technical Sales Executive 1 
Sales Director 3 
Production Control Manager 1 
Client Manager 1 
Business Development Manager 2 
Sales Managers 2 
Supply chain 
management 
questionnaire 
150 
(140 males  
5 females) 
46 Managing Director 1 
Directors 16 
Manufacturing Managers 11 
Engineering Managers 14 
Purchasing Managers 11 
Project Managers 15 
Sales / Business Development Managers 20 
Group Manufacturing Managers 12 
Central Managers 20  
Middle Managers 30 
Business Network 20 
(15 males  
5 females) 
44 20 senior managers across different  
Industry sectors. 
Source: Research analysis  
 
By using multiple data collection methods and analysis it was felt that the research explored 
provided authentic results. This was also enriched by the adoption of triangulation. 
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 3.8 Triangulation 
 
To ensure the research undertaken was authentic, multiple data collection methods were used 
as part of the case study strategy.  By using different data collection methods, different 
perspectives were provided to cross check and confirm explanations and interpretations.  This 
helped to provide a degree of robustness in the research findings.  In essence the case studies 
permit comparison with previous cases to confirm or contradict findings (Gersick 1988).  
This helped to address the concern over reliability, an issue for which case studies have been 
criticised (Miles 1979). 
  
 3.9 Limitations  
 
No matter how we might look at a particular set of data, another analyst, differently situated 
in time, education, gender, ethnicity, age and so on, might well highlight different patterns of 
meaning against the same background of raw data (Geertz 1973, cited in Rosen 1991).   The 
researchers education, experiences, gender and age and having been raised in the East 
Midlands, could all contribute to preconceptions.   Similarly the researcher was employed by 
the companies and directly participated in some of the findings could cause limitation.  
However, despite this, the findings were consistent with earlier studies and do provide 
plausible and logical explanations. 
 
 3.10  Summary 
 
The methodology attempts to consider possible limitations which could affect the outcome of 
the research objectives.  Adopting a case study strategy comprising 2 manufacturing 
companies will ensure the validity and reliability of the research findings.  Overall this has 
brought together robust in-depth explanations to fulfil the understanding of the research 
objectives and contribute to the body of knowledge.   
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 4.0 Case Study - A Bearing Manufacturer 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
The case study strategy was used at RHP to investigate the research questions. This 
strategy provided a thorough analysis which was used to identify changes that had taken 
place in RHP’s supply chain management, how ideas had been implemented and the 
inhibiting and enabling factors of supply chain management were revealed.   
 
The key factors identified for the implementation of supply chain management included: 
policy deployment, management commitment, employee involvement, business 
improvement and suppliers.  The factors were investigated during the case study. 
 
The case study provided RHP’s background, procurement process and working practices 
in the purchasing department.  4 strategic supplier improvement workshops were also 
documented and an evaluation into how the purchasing department needed to change to 
support supplier development activities into the future.   
 
The background of RHP was reviewed to set the scene by providing an overview of the 
Newark site and company history.  The researcher felt it was important to capture the 
history as it could support the understanding of how new ideas have been implemented. 
This history may also impact the inhibitors and enablers in supply chain management.  
The history could also assist with the analysis.  The history was documented by capturing 
available company literature.  Information was collected from employees to provide 
meaningful analysis by capturing historical developments and management changes that 
had taken place over time.  
 
The supply chain at RHP was investigated by examining and exploring the procurement 
process across each department in the supply chain, to see how the material was brought 
together to manufacture a bearing and to observe the inhibitors and enablers of supply 
chain management.  The purchasing department was examined to assess the interfaces 
and interaction with managers and employees across the supply chain.   
 
The supplier investigations were action researched into the implementation of new ideas.  
The study included the business improvement techniques used, the approach taken, short 
term and long term results of the improvement and a summary of the impact of the 
improvement to the supplier.   
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The purchasing department was re-examined after the supply chain development 
implementation to investigate further development opportunities.  Purchasing needed to 
face changes in order to sustain supply chain development and to become more up to date 
with modern purchasing practices.  (Hines et al 1997).  The case study was summarised in 
four areas senior management attitudes, traditional purchasing and quality methods, 
internal communications and interface problems and absence of key performance 
indicators.  
 
4.2  RHP  Background 
 
RHP manufactured roller bearings. The bearing had seven key components: balls, seals, 
inner rings, outer rings, clips, grease and packaging.  All the commodities were seen as 
strategic except packaging as this was for shipping and storage only.  The inner and outer 
rings were manufactured in house from bought in rolled steel.  The remaining 
components were purchased from strategic suppliers. 
 
In the late 1960s the Labour Government encouraged the merger of UK bearing 
manufacturers Ransome & Marles and Hoffman & Pollard.  This was to fight off 
overseas competition in particular from Japan. Sir William Barlow, Chief Executive of 
RHP, established a new directors’ team to investigate and make changes to the company.  
 
In the mid 1970s the directors’ team strategy was to diversify and move into the 
electronics market. Funding was taken from the bearing industry and reallocated to invest 
in the new electronics market. The decision was made to purchase MTE Limited to 
support this strategy. Despite efforts to form a strong united English front the traditional 
old management organisational hierarchy, with many hierarchical layers, remained almost 
the same. To make matters worse in 1977 the Government withdrew financial support. 
 
In the late 1980s UK manufacturing faced heavy decline owing to the strong strength of 
the pound and overseas competition becoming fiercer.  More pressure was put on RHP 
resulting in loss of market share.  The survival of the group became questionable. Huge 
site rationalisation began, resulting in the shutdown of the Northampton and Durham 
sites. Reorganisation of the commercial and engineering functions also took place.  The 
sales and drawing offices were rationalised and centralised to Newark.   
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In 1987 an entrepreneur called Alan Bowkett made a management buy in and renamed 
the company United Precision Industries (UPI).   The new management re-focused the 
strategy on bearing manufacture and acquired two European companies, WIB in 
Switzerland and Neuweg in Germany.  
 
In 1989 the turnover had dropped by two thirds of that in 1971.  This was due to few 
management changes being made to compete in the market, continuing recession, poor 
investment into the company and continuing global competition.  
 
In the mid 1990s SKF, the world’s largest bearing manufacturer, made an offer for UPI, 
but the Government and the Mergers and Monopolies Commission blocked it as SKF 
would have had far too much of the world market. NSK, the second largest Japanese 
bearing manufacturer put in an offer, which was accepted.  
 
In 1990 the Japanese bought RHP during this time there was much apprehension about 
the change of ownership and how it would affect senior managers and employees.  Many 
expressed their fears and stereotyping 8 years later.  Some of the employees thought they 
would come into work everyday and have to carry out physical exercises. Generally the 
employees were concerned about wearing the same uniforms, having their names on 
overalls. It was evident that little communication had taken place and there was poor 
understanding about the change of ownership and the impact on employees. 
 
In the 1970s NSK had already made a presence in the UK with a plant based at Peterlee. 
In the 1990s UPI was purchased by NSK and renamed back to RHP.  In total there were 
seven NSK-RHP manufacturing sites in Europe.   Across the world NSK-RHP had over 
18,000 employees operating in 25 manufacturing sites.   
 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s competition remained fierce and costs high.  As a result 
the Newark Precision site, Ferrybridge site and Ruddington Research and Development 
were closed down.   
 
In 1998 the Newark site employed 2000 employees.  By 2003 the employees had been 
reduced to 400.  In 2006 RHP employed 350 employees.  RHP used to be the largest 
employer in the Newark community.  RHP brought wealth into the Newark market town 
and even had its own brass band within the community.  In 2004 RHP made a profit and 
had completely changed over five years.   More of its former employees moved into other 
jobs in the community of Newark, including a BT call centre and a large bakery.   
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By 2004 the new companies provided more jobs and wealth to Newark.  Table 13 
summarises the history.   
 
Table 13: The history of RHP  
1900 Hoffman manufacturing and Ransome & Marles start beginning bearing 
manufacture 
1946   Pollard Ball & Roller Bearing Company created 
1969   Creation of RHP - UK quoted Company 
1970   Consolidation of three companies 
1975   Start diversification - Buy MTE Limited 
1980   Close Northampton Site, Annfield Plain and Durham Site 
1981 Reorganisation of commercial and engineering functions UPI 
       1988   Purchase WIB and Neuweg sites 
1989  Close Chelmsford 
1990  Purchase of RHP by NSK 
1997  Purchase of FLT Polish Bearing Plant 
1999  Precision site closed and Operational Purchasing integrated into factory 
2000  Ferrybridge site closed 2001 Ruddington relocated to Newark 
Source: RHP 2001 
 
4.2.1 Customer and Markets 
 
In 1997 NSK world-wide sales were in the order of £3.2 billion. SKF was the world 
market leader holding 19%, NSK-RHP held 14%.  The remaining competitors held a few 
percent each.  The market sector was divided between 64% automotive, 17% electronic, 
12% machinery and 7% other. 
 
The customer range was very broad, due to the large range of products NSK-RHP 
offered.  NSK-RHP resource for the customer base was allocated to three main areas, 
Automotive (including Rover, Nissan, Honda and Toyota), Aftermarket (including 
Caterpillar, RS Components, Uniparts) and Aerospace (including Pratt & Whitney, 
British Aerospace and Rolls Royce). 
 
NSK-RHP decided to keep market brand identities separate. Despite the fact that most of 
the bearings range had only one line of manufacture, bearings were packaged separately 
for NSK and RHP.  The branding was kept separate for four years as it was felt that 
customers had brand loyalty for English bearings and Japanese bearings. The separate 
branding caused problems for NSK-RHP, as the pricing was very different.  For some 
bearings RHP was a few pounds more expensive. For example, the cost of a cylindrical 
roller bearing at the beginning of 1997 at RHP was 43% higher than that of the Japanese 
parent company NSK.    In 1997 there were also employees at the same unit that worked 
for NSK and employees who worked for RHP.  Even though these employees were 
working for the same company NSK employees were seen as more prestigious.   
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For NSK-RHP Europe the annual sales turnover was around £450m a year with 
approximately 3,900 employees, 2,500 of which were in manufacturing. 
 
4.2.2 Policy Deployment 
 
The majority of policies and practices were kept separate due to the nature of the different 
product volumes and supporting processes.  However, benchmarking performance across 
sites and comparison with Japan was ongoing. 
 
During 1998 the company targeted a 20% cost reduction across the RHP Group 
addressing the need to bring costs in line with overseas competition (as part of the 
company globalisation strategy).  At RHP there was great emphasis on establishing an 
annual improvement policy. The policy was developed under four strategic headings; 
quality, cost, delivery and people (QCDP) and top level percentage improvement targets 
were developed for annual performance.  
 
NSK-RHP Policy Deployment included the deployment and involvement of key 
personnel in the establishment and delivery of the strategy and targets for the company.  
The Managing Director began the process by creating the top-level strategy and targets 
for the company.  Figure 10 shows the overall strategy for RHP in 1998. 
 
Figure 10:  NSK-RHP Bearings Policy 1998 
R H P  bearings  PO LIC Y  1998
 S trengthening our future  th rough Tota l Q ua lity
Policy
E xcellence in  Q uality , cost
 com petitiveness and 
delivery  as v iew ed by 
our custom ers
Enablers
 Sh aring best practices
R elease poten tial of w orkforce 
th rough investin g in  trainin g and
develop m ent of people
 Involving p eop le in  im provem ent
activ ities
U se B usiness E xcellence M odel as T Q
driver
M ake best use o f available technology
R egular and effective review  p rocess
R esultsQ uality
Im prove quality ensuring custom er satisfaction
through developing prod uct and processes
C ost
A chieve com petitiveness through im proved
productivity and focused  cost m anagem ent
D elivery
A chieve schedule adherence throughout the
supply chain
People
C apable em ployees th rough the use of Personal
D evelopm ent P lans
A chieve Investors in  People
Safety  &  E nvironm ent
Safer w orkplace organisation
Im prove health , safety and environm ental
perform ance th rough p lan s to im plem ent
B S 8800  and ISO  14001
John M cA ndrew ,        D epu ty  M anaging D irector
 
Source:  RHP Bearings Ltd 
Managers at RHP briefed their employees on the above strategy.   
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At RHP Hoshin Kanri (Lee and Dale 1998) was carried out annually beginning by the 
Managing Director determining the top level strategy and measures which were then 
deployed to the next line management.  Every employee was formally briefed annually on 
company performance from the previous year.  This line of management would then 
determine their strategy and measures to reach the business goals, which would then 
again be deployed to the next line of management.   
 
To release the potential of employees the deployment continued to be cascaded 
throughout the company.  The cascade spread to individual engineers who had to agree 
their projects and targets for the year and also had to add further stretched targets to 
processes that had already been improved. 
 
Policy deployment was carried out at all the manufacturing sites. The policies were then 
gathered together and deployed as a policy document. The policy document covered the 
top level strategy down to key projects, contact names and telephone numbers. This was 
known in NSK-RHP as the Total Management Concept (TMC). All TMC’s were made 
visible on departmental notice boards with targets and progress.  Each TMC was kept up 
to date monthly as a minimum requirement.  However on the shop floor it was 
continually updated as the culture of improvement was becoming the daily way of 
working life.  In other departments the TMC’s were out of date and not regularly 
maintained.   
 
Nevertheless, purchasing and other support groups such as site quality did not have any 
input into the policy deployment, even at senior management level. Instead the support 
departments were perceived as administration areas, with non-value added and wasteful 
activities ‘paper chasers’, and ‘questioning decisions which held up production’.  The 
emphasis was focused heavily on ‘value added’ within manufacturing. 
 
4.2.3 Continuous improvement approaches 
 
The main majority of factory changes and continuous improvement approaches were 
driven from each local site.  There was little intervention and no initiatives enforced from 
the Japanese headquarters.  The Japanese headquarters were interested in progress and 
performance and when visiting the unit spent most of their time in the manufacturing 
areas, except for presentations from the senior management team in the boardroom.   
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When NSK purchased RHP a new role for a Total Quality Manager (TQM) was created. 
This person reported to the Managing Director and was made responsible for deploying 
TQM principles across all the UK sites.  RHP drove total preventative manufacture 
(TPM) as their approach.  (Deming 1986). 
 
To support the introduction of TQM manufacturing restructured and developed team 
leader positions and all similar existing roles were closed. Employees who held similar 
positions were asked to apply for the jobs they were interested in.  Employees who did 
not accept the changes or were unsuccessful in their application for the new team leader 
positions left the company.   Teamwork principles were introduced and regular team 
briefings were established at the beginning and end of shifts.  Continuous improvement 
tools and techniques were introduced including 5S housekeeping, 7 wastes, set up 
reduction, 5 whys and the 8 steps for problem solving (Hines et al 1998; Womack & 
Jones 1999; Bicheno 2000; Bicheno 2002).  There were regular audits of housekeeping 
and notice boards, changeover reduction and data analysis such as the measurement of 
downtime on the manufacturing machines.  NSK-RHP used the European Foundation 
Quality Model (Bell et el 1994) to measure its business performance using the various 
categories and self assessments.  EFQM was an effective tool for determining the priority 
of actions and focus to move the company forward. At NSK Peterlee the EFQM results 
were made visible to all employees by displaying the results visually on large notice 
boards along with the TMC strategy, projects and progress. 
 
The TQM Manager had no direct reports but with the support of departmental managers 
identified twelve TQM facilitators’ from different departments and sites across the UK.  
The facilitator’s role was to coach, co-ordinate and help train employees on TQM 
development within their function.  This part time role was additional to each employee’s 
existing role.  Unfortunately, the TQM facilitator’s suffered as it was extremely difficult 
for those employees to carry out this role on top of their daily tasks.  Also there was a 
mixed calibre of employees with differing levels of capability.  No personal development 
plans were established to develop the facilitators’ skills and competencies.  Within a year 
these roles fizzled out of existence.   
 
The TQM Manager and HR Manager provided training by introducing a mandatory four 
day training programme to engage every employee into teamwork, total quality principles 
and continuous improvement tools and techniques.  The HR manager role was backfilled 
to free up resource for TQM training full time.  At the end of the training each employee 
was given a pocket sized tool book for TQM tools and techniques which RHP had 
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developed. Within manufacturing the tools and techniques were used daily for 
implementation.  Data was also collected to establish baselines of current performance 
levels in areas and to prioritise areas to focus improvements.  
 
Different levels of culture existed in the departments across the supply chain.  For 
example, manufacturing worked in improvement teams including managers, engineers 
and operators whilst in purchasing people worked individually on administrational 
transactions.  Departments that spent little time working in teams or on projects and rarely 
used data to improve performance struggled to see the benefits and relevance to their 
areas.   
 
After attending the training in teamwork and tools and techniques employees would go 
back to working the way they always had, without thought or consideration to the 
information they had gained on the course.  RHP invested heavily in training and 
resources to establish a total quality culture.  However managers had not thoroughly 
thought about the process and the impact the changes would have on employees. It would 
have been useful for the TQM team to regularly establish support and guidance reviews, 
coaching for individuals, teams or departments to manage the transition of change.   
 
The training lasted four days; it was insufficient to change the behaviour and working 
culture of the employees.  Departments had no support or discipline to make changes 
happen.  However, manufacturing was able to integrate these approaches into their 
existing working practices as these employees were already targeted on improvements 
and were given ongoing focus and attention.  
 
4.3 RHP procurement process  
 
A review of RHP’s supply chain management was made to gauge an understanding of the 
current state of the procurement process. The approach was to walk through the process 
from start to finish.  At each stage the transactions were examined including paperwork, 
IT systems used and communications made between each operation. 
 
The procurement process began within sales when a customer contacted RHP for some 
standard bearings. The procurement process went through logistics, manufacturing 
planning, purchasing, goods inwards, stores, assembly and accounts. Each department 
was investigated in turn across the supply chain and a review was also made with an 
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external strategic supplier. A bearing line was also included in the procurement walk to 
identify further opportunities for development.  
 
A review of activities was undertaken in each functional area. This was achieved by 
communicating with relevant managers and process users to define the key procurement 
activities within each function.  (Bicheno 2000). 
 
To start the process an external customer contacted sales for bearings and specified the 
required delivery date. Sales checked if the product required by the customer was 
available from the European warehouse, if a part was available it was dispatched.  If the 
part was not available the requirement was entered onto an electronic system (ASPAC) 
which passed the requirement to the logistics division. 
  
The lead time quoted to the customer depended on the type of bearing.  The lead time 
varied between two to nine months (dependant on stock levels). There were repeat 
customers from the automotive industry which had seven year agreements in place, or 
agreements to the life of the motor vehicle, as well as one off requirements for spares.   
 
Many bearings were made to order. This increased lead times for customers compared to 
RHP’s competitors.  In 2001 a buyer for Hovard Boilers contacted RHP for some 
bearings and found they were under £4 each but they would have to wait eight weeks for 
delivery.  An unnamed distribution company sold the same bearing for £40, but could 
deliver it within twenty-four hours.  Hovard Boilers purchased from the distribution 
company. Customers were prepared to pay premium prices to get rapid response for their 
service requirements.  A potential customer provided this example.  RHP needed to 
ensure that their business responses were in line with customer requirements to be 
competitive in the market place. 
 
All RHP manufacturing sites sold their products for a transfer price to the logistics 
department. The Newark delivery to logistics was scheduled to arrive anytime during the 
month. The logistics department then charged the external customer.  This could make 
manufacturing units very detached from the external customer as the logistics 
department were manufacturing’s end customer.   
 
Once the planning manager logged onto the system the customer requirement 
automatically appeared on their ‘things to do list’. A clerk checked the warehouse, if the 
bearing was in stock it was distributed to the external customer.  If the bearing was out 
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of stock the requirement was downloaded from their system to the Newark industrial site 
material resource planning (MRP) IT system.  The logistics department downloaded files 
to the manufacturing site for the customer requirements.  The customer requirements list 
covered a 6 month forecast.  
  
Manufacturing planning picked up the requirements from logistics.  The manufacturing 
planning scope was 3 months.   During the 3 months orders would become fixed. 
Manufacturing ran an initial print to identify all the component requirements and 
produce the bill of materials (BOM).  Therefore 3 months of additional forecasting was 
on the logistics system that was not used by other operations in the supply chain. 
Packaging was the only bought out component that was excluded from the Bill Of 
Material (BOM), which was purchased through historical usage calculations.  The BOM 
information was downloaded to a database and two schedulers completed the planning.  
A material planning schedule was produced every Tuesday afternoon that generated the 
entire computer planned orders, which were converted to works orders.  The schedule 
ran again every other Friday afternoon.  
 
Purchasing printed a schedule every Wednesday afternoon to generate order 
requirements. Therefore purchasing had used the forecasting that did not contain the 
revised dates by manufacturing planning which was produced 3 days later.  
 
This could easily lead to different dates and quantities being collected by purchasing for 
bought out components and could have caused late or early supplier deliveries.   The 
printed requirements were then compared to stock levels and the minimum order 
quantity.   
 
To follow the process through to the supplier a completed order was followed 
(NP307065).  The order was for a batch of 50,000 seals with a scheduled delivery date 
(required date) of 24 January 1997.  JRD Mouldings had a minimum order quantity level 
set at 10,000 seals, with a 49 day fixed lead time. Once the order requirements were 
confirmed planning and expediting created the requisition which was passed to the 
buyer.  The buyer checked the requirement and converted the requirement to a purchase 
order.  Figure 11 shows the activities taken to raise a production purchase order. 
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Figure 11:  Flowchart for raising a purchase order 
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Source: RHP Process       
 
Key:  MPS – Material Planning Schedule  
 
When purchase orders were raised they were issued to suppliers monthly.  No schedules 
or e-procurement methods were utilised.  Purchase orders were batch printed every 
morning.  Each buyer sent their orders to their portfolio of suppliers’, enclosing an 
acknowledgement form.   
 
When JRD Mouldings received purchase order NP307065 they returned the 
acknowledgement slip noting ‘delivery to schedule’. Once the seals arrived at goods 
inwards from JRD Mouldings the inspectors contacted purchasing expediting to collect 
the delivery note.  (This wasteful activity occurred for all bought out components).  The 
expeditor walked at least ten minutes across the factory to collect the paperwork.  Once 
the goods received note was collected by purchasing it was entered onto the IT system.  
The purchase order then became closed and a lot number was automatically created for 
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stores.  At Newark industrial inspection took place at 3 levels.  The sample and 
description of each level was highlighted in Table 14. 
 
Table 14: Inspection sampling and description 
 
Stage and Sample 
 
Description 
1) 20 batches out of 
every 200 deliveries. 
 
This will always be for a new sample 
product, or a product which previous batch 
has been rejected and thus lost 5 demerit 
points.  
2) 20 out of every 50 
deliveries. 
 
 
This will be a supplier which has not had 
any demerit points on the last batch 
inspected.  If rejections were made on the 
previous batch the supplier would move 
back to level one. 
3) Zero Inspections. 
 
At present only bought out balls pass 
inspection.  Every other bought out 
component for Newark industrial follows 
the inspection process of level 1 or 2 
outlined above. 
Source: Goods Inward RHP 1996 
 
JRD’s order was tracked and delivered in 2 batches without providing notice to RHP.  
Not only was the delivery overdue but it was also not to the required total quantity.  
When visiting JRD it was found that the fixed lead time of 49 days remained the same 
whether the quantity was for 10,000 seals or 50,000.   
 
The supplier did not have the capacity or the resource to produce the larger quantity to 
the required delivery date.  Nevertheless, the supplier noted ‘acknowledgement to 
schedule’ on the return slip, despite 2 split deliveries.  This was left unnoticed by 
employees as there were some seals in stock.  Manufacturing were fortunate that they 
did not have a material shortage.  There were 52,000 seals in stock which could fulfil 2 
months of order requirements.  
 
When reviewing the long shop it was found that no inventory policy existed.  There was 
also no management of product shelf life and traceability of parts was lost. Losing parts 
traceability was a major non conformance against the Lloyds quality standard ISO 9000.   
 
The long shop was accessible to anyone.  If there was a shortage of parts on the shop 
floor operators would help themselves to complete the assembly of bearings.  To make 
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matters worse there was a £1m discrepancy between stock held on the shelves and stock 
recorded on the IT system. 
  
Late payments caused cash flow problems for many suppliers. There was an outstanding 
dispute over six months with JRD on pricing; the site was using an old pricing list.   
 
 
The DAC2004 line was studied as it was the largest runner producing a set output of 
20,000 bearings a month.  The quality problems on this line were relatively low. In 1997 
the scrap costs for bearings and components were £3,072.   However, despite having 
regular output of 20,000 bearings a month supplier delivery problems occurred, due to no 
forecasting and adhoc purchase orders being placed on suppliers.  
 
The adhoc orders were examined by reviewing the monthly demand placed on JRD 
Mouldings over seven months.  Figure 12 shows the quantity of seals ordered from the 
supplier against the manufacturing output for bearings.  The graph clearly showed a 
smooth flat monthly demand at RHP that could be easily forecasted and delivered to the 
line frequently by the supplier.  Instead RHP replenished stock from the supplier in high 
peaks and troughs.  
 
Figure 12: Manufacturing output against supplier output 
 
 
Source: RHP Bearings 
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The assembly line which produced bearings for Ford (DAC2004) line was also 
flowcharted, highlighting opportunities in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13: Flowchart of the Ford Bearing Assembly Line 
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Bottleneck areas were identified within inspection and the weighing of the bearings.  Both 
operations were time consuming and held up the flow on the line.  Inspection was carried 
out off the line on a machine that was faulty.   
The weighing was a time consuming process because if the bearing was overweight (due 
to too much grease) the operator would have to take the bearing apart, removing a seal 
and grease and then re-assembling and re-weighing.   
 
There were many external part problems identified on the line but rigorous processes 
were not established to examine this. Therefore little acknowledgement was made to the 
hidden costs of quality. NSK-RHP had a standard cost culture. A lot of emphasis was 
made on measuring scrap on the shop floor.  Supplier information was given to group 
quality that worked with those suppliers to get to the root cause but no costs were 
recovered from suppliers or any investigations made into the total cost of quality.  
Internal scrap was measured and the costs of those parts made visible, but little resource 
was used to carry out root cause analysis and therefore internally re-occurring defect 
problems continued.  
 
At RHP there was heavy emphasis on removing costs from the product, production lines, 
scrap and set-up time.  The focus on removing costs was predominantly made to value 
added activities.  Non value added activities and waste within the supply chain was 
given little attention. Research from the Lean Enterprise Research Centre (LERC) found 
that when an entire process was examined only 5% was value added, 30% was non-value 
added and 65% waste.   Figure 14 showed value added and non value added activities at 
JRD and RHP.  The activities in black highlighted the value added activities. 
 
 70 
Figure 14: Value added and non value added activities at RHP and JRD 
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Source: Research Findings. 
Process mapping was broken down further to all operations which included distances 
and times.  The application of this technique was shown in detail in the JRD Mouldings 
case study. 
 
Summary 
 
Reviewing the procurement process across the supply chain revealed that non-value 
added activities and waste was built into the existing system.  There was excessive 
checking, duplication and poor transfer of information.  For example, poor forecasting 
took place and updates to information in manufacturing were not shared with 
purchasing. Material controllers located in purchasing used a report to create a 
requisition to hand to the buyer for them to check the information and then convert the 
requisition to a purchase order.  Traditional purchasing methods were used.  This poor 
communication between departments caused poor flow of materials and requirement it 
could impact late deliveries and penalties from external customers.  
 
There was opportunity to improve the flow of information and materials at RHP, to more 
efficiently and effectively optimise their supply chain. 
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4.3.1 RHP – the traditional purchasing era 
 
In the late 1990s RHP purchasing was carried out in a traditional way.  This section 
examined the purchasing department in more detail and provided an analysis of 
purchasing processes and the way employees interacted with each other.   
 
The purchasing structure 
 
The purchasing department had 23 people, with 1 purchasing manager and 2 senior 
buyers.  The department spent £20m a year with suppliers, representing 50% of the total 
costs of the Newark site, which had a turnover of £40m.  There was no defined 
procurement strategy for purchasing, despite RHP having a strong reputation for policy 
deployment (Hoshin Kanri). 
The layout of the purchasing department 
 
 
Purchasing was on the top floor 5 minutes walk away, from the assembly lines and main 
inventory store and 10 minutes away from the grinding areas.  The buyers and senior 
buyers had individual desks six feet away from each other but put together in an open 
plan office.  The 2 purchasing managers had separate offices overlooking the purchasing 
department. 
 
 
Purchasing employees skills and expertise 
 
The employees all had clerical backgrounds.  Even the senior buyers had entered the 
purchasing department through local agencies on temporary assignments to carry out 
basic administration, filing and mailing of purchase orders.   The majority of employees 
were not engaged in further learning and had little interest in keeping up to date with the 
latest purchasing developments.  Except 3 employees, who studied for the Chartered 
Institute of Purchasing and Supply (CIPS) Qualification and 1 buyer undertook a BSc in 
Business and Finance.  Nevertheless, the transfer and application of this knowledge into 
working practice was very poor.  Buyers did not challenge inhibitors or think creatively to 
change or create new processes.  Overall strategic purchasing was very weak. 
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Purchasing development was not encouraged when the only driver and measure on the 
department was price reduction.  There were no individual targets and measures 
established for each buyer’s development and their supplier portfolio.  Too many of the 
purchasing roles were traditional operational administration roles.  To make matters 
worse no formal skill matrices or competency frameworks existed for the roles. During 
the 2 years of research no formal purchasing training and development took place, not 
even for negotiation skills. 
   
No one had received professional training for purchasing such as contract law, managing 
contracts, negotiating, outsourcing, financial analysis, material management or supplier 
appraisals. Everyone had undergone four days of total quality training, but did not apply 
this to their work.    
 
Departmental communication 
 
Purchasing department briefings were monthly.  The purchasing manager presented price 
reductions achieved, the groups financial figures and general developments within the 
company.  Each employee was allowed the opportunity to present back on work they had 
carried out.  There was always a particular topic of focus where the leader of that project 
would present or discuss the progress.   
 
The purchasing department briefings were held regularly and were a good form of 
communication.  However the purchasing briefings were always insular in their issues, 
challenges and focus. 
 
People from different departments strongly felt that purchasing worked to their own 
agenda.  Regular comments were made in manufacturing including ‘they sit up there in 
their ivory tower and never get involved in what’s really happening’.   
 
The Stores Manager highlighted this further: 
 
‘Purchasing buy material without asking anyone in the 
factory what they need.  They buy great quantities that 
don’t even fit in my stores. I then have to struggle to get 
my people to transport the items outside the stores.  This 
can also be a health and safety hazard as we cannot use 
the crane or fort lift truck in some tight areas on the 
second floor.’ Store Manager (1996). 
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The store manager’s comments were evident by the packaging which lay everywhere.  
The packaging buyer obtained so much packaging to cover and ship bearings that the 
large quantities overflowed out of the designated store racks onto the floor.  The excess 
packaging had to be safely hand carried up to the second floor to an unused room which 
had been converted for storing packaging inventory.  
 
To make matters worse this room was not very accessible and meant that the stores 
employees had to struggle with large pallets of packaging.  
 
There was no inventory holding costs calculated and no performance measures recorded 
in purchasing or communicated by stores.  Overall there was very little interaction 
between purchasing and stores and no consideration by purchasing on the total cost 
impact of their decision.  The communication was often only made at a conflict stage 
when the store manager became annoyed because everywhere would get overstocked.  
There was so much packaging in the stores which could cover a year of requirements.  
This evidence showed a functional silo mentality. 
 
The procurement process 
 
The process to obtain goods and services was monthly orders on suppliers.  Few suppliers 
were supplied with open blanket orders, despite regular monthly order placements.  
Buyers would use traditional purchasing methods of obtaining three quotes and select the 
cheapest price and then place an order.  This could sometimes mean that they would buy 
larger volumes of components to get cheaper prices. There were no long term agreements.   
 
RHP performance indicators 
 
No specific details of the relationship, goods or service requirements or performance 
indicators were collated.  A few strategic suppliers had signed a partnership agreement 
but the content of the partnership agreement was an exact copy of the DTI partnership 
sourcing template in 1996.  None of these agreements were adhered to and the 
infrastructure to support them was never established.   
 
An engineering manager’s frustration was expressed: 
 
‘Purchasing is so busy obtaining the cheapest price they 
order parts that cannot meet our required lead times.  I 
was involved in a grinding improvement and the whole 
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programme was held up by three months because we had 
to wait so long for the grinding wheels. There were also 
poor conditions negotiated with no consideration for 
maintenance, when I tried to enhance these I got into 
trouble with the purchasing manager.’   
Engineering Manager (1996). 
 
The vignette from the engineering manager highlighted purchasing emphasis on price 
reduction.  The manufacturing and strategic objectives were driven by quality, cost, 
delivery and service.  Purchasing drove for the cheapest price at the expense of other 
operations with the supply chain.  Purchasing totally overlooked what their internal 
manufacturing customer required.   
 
Supplier delivery was not measured so purchasing introduced a pilot measurement 
system, for the most frequent twenty suppliers.  This would enable the department to 
apply for an independent Lloyd’s certification for IS09000.   
 
The purchasing department did not take service support into consideration, which was 
needed, for maintenance.  This was a problem as it indicated that quality, total cost; 
delivery and service were not taken into account or benchmarked.  As the total cost 
impact was overlooked the cheaper priced components could cost more in the long run, 
particularly if maintenance and warranty costs were not considered.   
 
The internal manufacturing lead times were reduced from 12 to 8 weeks.  However, the 
external supplier lead times all remained the same.  Steel, balls and cages had to be 
ordered in advance of manufacturing production.  To illustrate the amount of ordering in 
advance the bearing for Rover, part reference 6208=18, was examined.   
 
Figure 15 showed the lead time model for Rover and included how many weeks material 
was ordered in advance of manufacturing the bearing to compensate for higher lead 
times.  For example, the balls were ordered 19 weeks in advance and steel ordered 17 
weeks in advance.   
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Figure 15: Lead Time Model for Rover.  Week Number  
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Despite supplier lead-times being considerably higher than internal manufacturing lead 
times there was no drive to reduce supplier lead times by purchasing.  Also purchasing 
did not receive the extra demand information from logistics, (as manufacturing only used 
a three month window) delivery problems were inevitable. 
 
Departmental priorities 
 
Manufacturing employees strongly felt that purchasing had an ‘easy ride’, they did not 
get involved in the cost reduction projects and their manager left them to carry out their 
job as they saw fit.  The style of management within the factory was very different.  The 
operations director was autocratic and drove decision making and improvement in the 
factory.  He told the workforce to implement all the latest initiatives.  The senior 
engineers would implement them even when they did not believe in the ideas.  For 
example the engineering teams were measured on their Gemba (Imai), which was seen as 
the ‘added value’ time they spent on the shop floor.  The directors were keen to get 
engineers working as closely to the cells as possible so they brought in hot desk offices 
in an open planned area on the shop floor.  This annoyed and upset many engineers 
because of the volume of the radio playing through the tannoy on the shop floor.  There 
was also great concern over the location as it was the dirty and dusty grinding areas of 
the factory. 
 
However, many engineers did not comment and justify their concerns as they were 
fearful of career opportunities if they voiced their opinion.  The change went ahead and 
when engineers needed more thinking time they actually moved further away from the 
factory areas to get some peace and quiet. 
 
Purchasing department and group quality were seen as quite separate from the factory 
and worked to different agendas, carrying out activities which manufacturing felt did not 
support or align to factory priorities.   Any activity with suppliers had to go through 
purchasing.  Purchasing were the main source of contact with suppliers.  Engineers who 
spoke to suppliers directly about technical issues without going through purchasing 
would get into trouble by the purchasing manager.  The purchasing manager would often 
send complaints to the manufacturing manager about engineers.   This caused great 
problems and conflict, particularly when no one within purchasing had technical 
understanding to fulfil customer requirements. 
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Internal support system 
 
The only means of assessing supplier performance was by quality audits.  Audits were 
carried out every 3 years and were initially completed for supplier selection by the 
quality department.  Once the quality audit was completed the supplier received a quality 
rating from A to C.  If an assessed supplier had IS09000 they automatically became a 
grade a supplier.  Quality managed this whole activity and there was no involvement 
from engineering or purchasing.  However, the top 200 suppliers were reviewed annually 
with purchasing.  Engineering was excluded from reviewing suppliers despite being the 
customer who may have different needs to that of purchasing and quality.  Also the 
audits did not take continuous improvement efforts into consideration and no review of 
real data or performance was used.  
 
Very little historical information was available on suppliers.  A new MRP system had 
been installed for 6 months, but no previous spend history was carried forward into the 
new system.  Few performance measures were available except requisition turnaround 
and monthly price reductions.  Supplier scrap was also recorded in the factory but no 
process had been established to recover poor quality costs from any suppliers who were 
identified as responsible.   
 
In repeating cases if the quality defects caused too much pain to the factory the quality 
department would carry out root cause analysis with the supplier.  The action plans 
would then be held centrally in quality, very little feedback was provided to purchasing 
or manufacturing.  This situation was exacerbated as the quality department concerned 
with supplier audits and root cause analysis was located in Ruddington a village in 
Nottingham.   
 
Supplier management 
 
No process existed for capturing supplier improvement opportunities.  Supplier 
development improvement opportunities relied on the external supplier providing 
informal feedback of innovative ideas.  These ideas would be discussed with the buyer. 
If the buyer bought into the idea a team would be established for the project and it would 
be co-ordinated by Purchasing.  Two purchasing employees regularly worked with the 
factory but other purchasing employees would continue transactional activities and not 
have any improvement teams in place.   
 
 78 
The purchasing manager was responsible for procuring all raw materials that represented 
£9m of spend.  This was almost half the total department spend.  After five months the 
purchasing manager handed this over to a senior buyer to become more involved in 
people management and the strategy of the purchasing department. 
 
RHP had a very large supply base in the UK.  This was a major inhibiting factor as it was 
very difficult to manage.  Managers were aware of the need to rationalise to a more 
manageable size.  A purchasing team was established to review the 5,000 suppliers who 
provided parts for the 3 plants.  The team consisted of purchasing personnel only.  
Monthly team meetings and discussion took place. The only historical data available on 
suppliers was the most recent spend.  Available data was collected and plotted to show 
the number of suppliers. The suppliers were grouped into the following categories; RHP 
Group 1220, Aerospace 419, NSK 403 and European Headquarters 723 suppliers.   
 
The RHP group included four sites Newark, Ferrybridge, Blackburn and Precision 
(another Newark site). An analysis of 1,020 suppliers was made to review the average 
spend levels.  This was shown in Figure 16: 
 
Figure 16: RHP 
Source: RHP 1997 
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Not making changes suggested that there were no internal pressures from within the 
business for ‘the need to change’ (Gattorna 2006).  Also there was no methodology or 
framework developed to action the reduction in suppliers. For example, despite group 
purchasing emphasis on supplier rationalisation, there were still on average 2 new 
suppliers added each month by group quality, who were responsible for auditing and 
adding new suppliers.   
 
Fundamentally the team leader and team did not know how to take their supply base data 
forward to carry out the improvement project. 
 
With few performance measures and an increasingly large supply base many hidden 
costs to procurement were not captured and therefore not considered.  The hidden costs 
included monitoring suppliers, auditing, assessing, processing and transport.   
 
In 1997 RS Components used the Natwest cost of £40 to raise a purchase order. This 
meant if a buyer at RHP raised a purchase order for the price of £20 an additional £20 
would be lost in the hidden transaction costs.  RS Components were keen to encourage 
RHP to be more strategic.    In 1996 RHP place 2,539 orders with RS the total good 
value was £248,568 the processing costs for these orders was £101, 560, the total 
acquisition cost was £350, 128.  This meant there were hidden costs of 30% processing 
the cost of the order.  This analysis only examined one account with RS Components. 
During 1997 RHP purchased goods by spot orders with 2,700 suppliers. There were 
many opportunities for RHP to reduce total acquisition costs. 
 
4.4 External supplier development workshops 
 
RHP recognised the need for a structured approach across the group for managing 
supplier development.  This included establishing an internal system for co-ordinating 
supplier development across departments and carrying out the supplier development 
activities with suppliers.    
 
RHP worked with the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT) for 4 
months to support the implementation a structured approach.  The SMMT concept was 
developed in 1994 by the Government aimed at improving competitiveness. The SMMT 
were a non profit making improvement forum set up with experts on secondment from 
the automotive industry.  When RHP worked with the SMMT they already had a 
successful track record of 40 improvement workshops.  
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The SMMT supported workshop activities on the shop floor at supplier locations.  The 
‘focus group’ approach was adopted at the supplier sites, bringing a representative from 
a number of suppliers into a study team, working with the industry forum. 
 
RHP hoped that the SMMT would also assist with the internal co-ordination and 
establishment of an infrastructure to sustain supplier development. However, the SMMT 
expertise was focused entirely on data analysis (diagnostic) and workshop improvement 
activities.  
 
This was evident in 1998 when the SMMT recorded company benefits of inline rejects 
reduced by 75%, scrap costs reduced by 59%, productivity increased by 124%, 
downtime reduced by 37% and changeovers reduced by 72%. After funding was agreed 
the next step was for RHP to initiate the pilot launch to senior management and internal 
functions. 
 
It became evident that supply chain development focus enabled RHP senior managers to 
recognise the complexities of their company.  The Engineering Manager expressed this: 
 
‘A concentrated approach in process improvement is 
definitely the way forward, RHP will need to push hard 
for the disciplines and support to be put in place.’ 
Engineering Manager (1997:135). 
 
It was good that early on the recognition was made for discipline and support to be 
established.  RHP lacked a steering committee, a cross-functional team and a shared 
vision which would support the improvement drive at RHP, in order to sustain and 
embrace change. 
 
The bearing had seven key components: balls, seals, inner rings, outer rings, clips, grease 
and packaging.  The inner and outer rings were made in house.  External strategic 
suppliers were selected for some of the component ranges, which made up the bearing. 
The suppliers who were involved in the pilot were illustrated in Table 15.  
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Table 15:  Supplier Development Company Overview 
 
Desford JRD Mansfield Synthotec 
Turnover £50m £2.5m £3.2m £1.25m 
Turnover RHP £6m £0.7m £0.13m £0.2m 
No. of site employees 650 70 47 27 
Products Tube Seals Packaging Plastic Cages 
Ownership Hayhall Private Remploy Private 
Source: Pilot supplier development programme 
 
Firth Rixson was one of the selected suppliers but unfortunately they were not keen to 
participate in the workshops, as they did not see the value in carrying out a housekeeping 
activity (5S) at their forging site.   
 
Firth Rixson saw it as a waste of time and money and could not see how their workforce 
would benefit.  Despite managerial comments all employees worked in very dirty 
conditions and all the tools were scattered all over the floor.  Senior management felt the 
cleanliness of the environment was acceptable because of the nature of their company. 
 
The launch day successfully took place with five strategic suppliers.  It consisted of the 
Managing Director and the purchasing manager delivering presentations, followed by the 
SMMT providing an overview of the tools and a timing plan of when the activities would 
take place.   
 
There was initial resistance by suppliers due to a previous experience in which a supplier 
day was organised. resulting in many suppliers loosing business, as the agenda was to 
reduce price. The suppliers therefore expected a hidden agenda, but the drive was for 
RHP and the partnering suppliers to become more efficient and remove waste by 
working together. 
 
After the launch day a meeting was made with senior management at the supplier 
location. Meetings were carried out in order to discuss the supplier’s challenges and 
bottlenecks and to agree the most appropriate model area for an improvement. Before 
carrying out the supplier development workshop a reasonable understanding of the 
problem area had to be made. Data analysis took place to ensure the appropriate focus 
for the activity; this was known as the diagnostic. The resource for the activities included 
an SMMT engineer, supplier development co-ordinator, quality engineer and a 
manufacturing engineer from RHP.   Data analysis meetings were held to review existing 
data collection and to determine what information was missed in the model area to gauge 
the current performance and determine the baseline position. 
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The first stage of the diagnostic involved an examination of the existing data.  The data 
analysis would include productivity, downtime, rework and quality information. The data 
was analysed to assess the approach taken and to determine if there were any gaps in the 
existing data collection.  Some of the suppliers had useful data, which was not utilised to 
its full potential by the company. 
   
For example, some suppliers would measure downtime and not act upon the measures 
(Mansfield Amalgamated). No Pareto of the information took place and no root causes 
were identified.   Other suppliers had data sheets introduced to the model area to enable 
the team to get a focus for the activity (Desford Tubes).  Two suppliers had no measures 
at all (JRD Mouldings and Synthotec). 
 
If there were gaps in the existing data collected by the supplier a data collection sheet 
was established with the operators and faxed back to RHP to support and review the 
analysis.  Once information was available the data sheet was broken down into 
categories and a pareto analysis was carried out to establish the largest area of 
opportunity for the improvement workshop. 
 
The SMMT encouraged the adoption of seven key measures commonly known as QCD. 
Quality, Cost and Delivery, expressed in Table 16. 
 
Table 16: QCD Measures   
 Quality Cost Delivery 
None right first time O O O 
People productivity 
 O  
Stock turns O O O 
Overall equipment 
Effectiveness 
O O O 
Value added per person 
 O  
Floor space utilisation 
 O  
Delivery schedule achievement O O O 
Source: SMMT toolkit 1997 
Key:  
O primary  
O secondary impact on the process 
The SMMT were keen for RHP to adopt these measures with suppliers to ensure clarity, 
simplicity, feedback and benchmarking.  However, all the emphasis of challenges led to 
three set up reduction workshops, a housekeeping workshop and process mapping. 
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The teams selected and included an enthusiastic operator for the activity.   The operator 
had to be keen, as they would need to influence other operators when the activities were 
rolled across other areas on the shop floor.  It was also essential that the supervisor or 
manager of the cell was committed and that they had top management support.  
 
The appropriate tools and techniques were selected from SMED, 5S (housekeeping), 7 
wastes, visual control and process mapping.  The workshop timetable was then created to 
plan successful workshops. There was limited time to carry out analysis of the existing 
performance and make changes and pilot those changes, so planning and organising 
effective time management was critical. Table 17 illustrated the supplier development 
activity focus and improvement tools. 
 
Table 17: Workshop focus and tools 
Supplier & 
Product Type 
Workshop 
Dates 
Team 
Size 
Workshop Focus Tools and 
Techniques 
Desford Tubes 
Hot & Cold rolled 
seamless tube 
5-8 May 9 Mill stand changeover 
reduction 
SMED 
5S 
 
JRD Mouldings 
Bearing seal 
moulded 
assemblies 
29 Apr –  
1 May 
5 Process mapping 
Lead-time reduction 
Process Mapping 
Mansfield 
Amalgamated 
Packaging 
2-5 June 5 Cutting / creasing 
machine changeover 
reduction 
SMED 
5S 
 
Synthotec 
Ball cage 
moulding 
9-12 June 6 Moulding machine 
changeover reduction 
and housekeeping 
SMED 
5S 
 
Source: RHP 1997 
 
RHP held the first supplier focus group on the DAC2004 assembly line.  This assembly 
line was analysed and mapped earlier in the procurement process review.  A line 
balancing activity took place over 5 days.  The assembly line produced the rear wheel 
bearing for the Ford transit van (at RHP Newark). This was Newark’s biggest runner for 
1997, producing 220,000 bearings over the year. 
 
During the week the team studied the 27 foot line working closely with the operators.  
Each operation was examined and activities and times undertaken.  Each operation was 
reconfigured to align with the external customer demand.   The team examined and 
aligned the flow of parts to meet the customer needs, so that the parts were pulled 
through the processes.  The team made a full size model of the line in cardboard and laid 
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it next to the actual line on the shop floor.  All the operators reviewed and moved the 
cardboard to gauge the best positioning for equipment and removal of waste.  At the end 
of the improvement activity there were many lengths of conveyor belt disposed of. 
 
As the line was for one customer with a constant monthly demand a takt time (drum 
beat) was calculated by dividing the demand over the total available hours. A steady 
output was then known for each day.  By the end of the week the assembly line had been 
reconfigured to a U cell with the total length reduced from 76 feet to 54 four feet.  
Reducing the number of operations on the line meant that fewer operators were needed, 3 
full time operators were re-deployed within the factory, to get involved in other value 
added activities.  When speaking to the operators those that were re-deployed were all 
very positive and saw the changes necessary.  Operators that had to move onto new 
machines were a little concerned about their new role but saw the change as an exciting 
opportunity. RHP strongly upheld a no redundancy policy as a result of continuous 
improvement. 
 
By June 1998 the U cell production approach had been transferred to 3 additional lines 
which were moved from another area closer to the grinding process.  By having the U 
cell layout additional floor space was also released.  Performance measurement sheets 
were adopted on the line.   
The data analysis was given to the team leader who had not had to analyse performance 
data before.  A separate team was also established to carry out a full 5S housekeeping 
activity.   RHP superseded the written operating procedures by having photographs 
explaining each activity visually instead.  The operators found visual standards user 
friendly and they were regularly referred too.   
 
Nine months later RHP utilised this approach on the remaining 12 assembly lines and 
relocated these lines to the grinding areas.  The supplier development methodology had 
an astonishing impact at RHP and senior management were committed to improve 
processes further.  The engineering manager and total quality manager gained board 
approval to reorganise the factory to release eight senior engineers full time onto an 
improvement activity team, to continue to effectively develop improvements in 
operational areas. 
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4.4.1  Action research case study - supplier Desford Tubes 
 
 
Desford Tubes  (DT) was RHP’s main source for tubing.  The tubing was used to make 
the rings for the bearings. Desford was part of the Hayhall Group.  DT was first 
established during the Second World War and located in a small village called Desford 
in Leicestershire.  DT has been supplying RHP since 1985.  Desford’s turnover was 
£50m, £6m was with RHP.  
 
Supplier development approach 
 
The 4 day activity concentrated on changeover time reduction.  DT heavily focused on 
changeover reduction and had measurements in place to record downtime. The team 
consisted of 9 resources, an engineer, 3 operators, a crane driver from DT, a quality 
engineer, manufacturing engineer and supplier development co-ordinator from RHP and 
a production manager from Mansfield Amalgamated (RHP’s packaging supplier).  
 
Changeover reduction activity 
 
The Director at DT was very positive and excited about further process improvements: 
 
‘We have already carried out a lot of process 
improvement but welcome the opportunity of further 
improvements and support from RHP.’  
Director (1997) 
 
Despite DT already carrying out improvement activities the Director was keen to have 
the involvement of his customer in developing his company and welcomed new ideas. 
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DT was already collecting good data to understand the performance of their processes.  
A full time position was totally dedicated to the measurements of processes. The team 
used available data to graph planned and unplanned downtime and to understand what 
proportions of time were spent on each activity.  Figure 17 showed the total planned and 
unplanned downtimes, Figure 18 planned and unplanned downtime, Figure 19 
Unplanned downtime. 
     Figure 20: Changeover downtime 
Source: Desford Tubes 1997 
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This was extremely useful to funnel down and focus on the improvement activity which 
will provide the best return for the company.  There were already improvements 
underway to investigate the highest pareto on the piercer bar; the next largest opportunity 
was stand changeovers.  Table 18 showed the average changeover and frequency time to 
help focus on the appropriate changeover. 
 
Table 18: Average changeover and frequency 
 
 
Average 
Minutes 
6.13 10.00  2.49 61.3 5.15 47.3 1.46 3.91 51.00 
Frequency 278 126 376 12 118 11 279 54 3 
 
Using the standardised approach the changeover time, when first videoed, was only 10 
minutes long.  It was over so quick, there was a crane driver and 3 operators involved, as 
the stand was a very large heavy piece of equipment.  The team examined all the process 
steps.  In the old process an operator got involved half way through.  By re-engineering 
each step the third operator’s tasks were incorporated into the other two operators’ 
activities.  This safely removed the need for a third person.  There was a lot of data 
recorded within the stand change that the team were able to reduce and simplify.   
 
When the changes were put into practice and re-videoed on day 4, the team successfully 
reduced the changeover time by 50%, bringing the stand change time down to a 
sustainable 5 minutes by the new procedure. 
 
Process and relationship inhibitors and enablers 
 
The behaviour of the operators needed managing as there was no foreman on the team 
and the operators would drift in and out of activities.  The improvement team had to get 
senior managers’ to fully release the operators to concentrate on the improvement.  
Operators were concerned about production, having to do other work and no-one 
properly communicating with them after the confirmation from senior management they 
remained more focused.  At the management presentation senior management were 
overjoyed with the results.  DT had increased work coming through and did not have the 
capacity to support the demand within the plant.  Senior management were going to 
extend the plant at a cost of £250,000, but from the changeover reduction this was no 
longer necessary.  They would transfer the approach to other bottleneck areas and fully 
utilise the existing plant.  
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Short term and long term activity outcomes 
 
From the set up reduction the operators learnt the new procedure instantly and 50% 
improvement was continually maintained.  The data collection was simplified and the 
tools and techniques understood so that the engineer involved would roll out the 
approach across other areas of manufacturing.  
 
Summary 
 
Despite being an historical brown field site the senior management were open to change 
and new approaches.  The senior management never extended the plant and took full 
advantage of implementing the tools and techniques across the existing plant, for further 
company benefit and sustainable continuous improvement.  
 
4.4.2  Action research case study - supplier JRD 
 
 
JRD, a private owned company, was established in the 1950s by the current Managing 
Director.  This supplier had worked with RHP over 17 years and was the main source of 
supply for rubber seals.  JRD’s turnover was £2.5m, £700,000 of which was with RHP, 
28% of JRD’s turnover was with RHP, so they were a key customer.  
 
Supplier development approach 
 
The four day activity concentrated on process mapping.  JRD were very constrained by 
available space and were investigating the opportunity of purchasing a new warehouse.  
The mapping would assist them in understanding the current flow and provide 
opportunity for improvement.  A report was handed over on the last day as most of the 
management were out on business.  The team consisted of JRD’s engineer, quality 
engineer, manufacturing engineer, supplier development co-ordinator and a production 
manager, a representative from MA.  
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Process mapping activity 
 
The Director’s attitude was negative, when the team arrived, before the activity had 
begun:  
 
‘I can’t see how this will help us; we know our business 
and we have just outgrown this facility.’ Director from 
JRD (1997). 
 
The director clearly expressed that he saw no value in what RHP was attempting to do.  
The director inhibited supply chain development with the negative attitude.  They were 
evidently constrained with their existing facility but the director had an unwillingness to 
listen to new ideas and best practice from their key customer.  This would give a poor 
message to employees and lack commitment to support process mapping.  
 
The team had arrived to carry out the workshop which JRD had arranged with RHP three 
months earlier.  Despite this poor welcome the team continued.  To capture the detail of 
each process the team split up and walked each step, starting with the requirement 
coming through the post to parts being shipped.  
 
The process study revealed that all correspondence went through the Managing Director 
who held the majority of the planning and pricing in his head.  There was very poor 
visibility of processes and great reliance on his knowledge and input.  More worryingly 
the Managing Director was retiring that year and his son, who was currently the director, 
was to take over.  The director was supposed to be on the team but kept getting pulled 
away.  He expressed his comments that he really did not see the value or want to get 
involved.  There was so much work to do, yet the Director had one of the days off, 
despite 3 months notice. 
 
Ninety five stages where identified to the process.  The team captured distance travelled, 
whether it was an operation, transportation, inspection, store or delay.  Each stage was 
also categorised into value added (machined) non-value add (may be necessary such as a 
regulation or test) or waste. The pie chart below summarises the percentages found for 
each category.  A typical process was made up of 5% value add, 35% non value added 
and 60% waste (LERC 1998).  In JRD’s case there was a lot less waste but greater non 
value added activities, illustrated in Figure 21.   
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Figure 21:  Percentage breakdown of process mapping findings 
Source:  JRD  
 
The process steps were categorised into P types.  This helped visualise further how the 
activities were split.  The P time was the total lead time from procurement of material to 
delivery of the finished part at the customer, illustrated in Table 19.   
 
Table 19:  JRD process mapping results 
P Type Scope Hours Percentage 
P1 Procurement time – the time taken to 
obtain raw material and sub components. 
19730 41.17 
P2 Non specific process time – the time from 
receipt of materials to when a part number 
is assigned. 
310 0.65 
P3 Specific process time – the time taken to 
complete the part. 
25573.5 55.59 
P4 Storage – the time the part is held in stock 
to the point of despatch. 
1424.5 2.97 
P5 Delivery the time from point of despatch 
to receipt at the customer. 
880 1.84 
Source: RHP 1997 
 
Table 19 revealed that 42% of the time was taken up by the procurement activities to 
obtain raw materials and subcomponents.  Also 56% of the time was used for 
manufacturing.  Separate workshops could be organised to reduce the times taken up by 
these activities.   
 
Process and relationship inhibitors and enablers 
 
JRD was a traditional British engineering company, which had been in existence since 
the 1950s.  Most of the management team had been there for many years and were 
approaching retirement age.  The company faced some major decisions with regard to 
Non value  
added
62%
Waste
32%
Value 
Added
6%
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expansion and the Managing Director retiring.  The process mapping investigation 
provided some useful information that could assist in strategic decision making and 
improving the process.  However, the behaviour of the director heavily influenced the 
lack of buy in to using the process mapping material.   
 
The director clearly did not want to carry out the activity and saw little value for it.  As 
there was no senior management commitment JRD employees could not understand the 
value of the process mapping workshop.  All the hard work of the improvement team 
was never applied.  The improvement activity made the RHP employees and business 
planning manager aware of the constraints of not having access to information for 
decision making purposes.  The Managing Director held all the pricing, material 
information and procedures.  The management were not interested in process 
improvement implementation. 
 
Short term activity outcomes 
 
The team applied process mapping to JRD and gained a good understanding of the 
company.  The MA representative had applied this tool and could take this knowledge 
and application back to his company.  The employees at JRD had an appreciation of the 
impact of over reliance on a person, rather than that information being readily available 
from the process.  The employees needed to create pricing and material procedures. The 
management also had awareness that most of the value added work was outsourced.  For 
example, the entire trimming process was undertaken outside the business.  There was a 
great opportunity to manage this in house and remove some of the non value added and 
wasteful activities. 
 
Summary 
 
In the past JRD had been very involved and supportive with RHP.  During the workshop 
senior management saw little benefit to the process mapping workshop.  After the 
process mapping workshop JRD never prioritised or undertook the developments, despite 
RHP’s encouragement.    As few processes were mapped and the Managing Director was 
involved in a lot of decision making activities, the Managing Director had to stay past his 
retirement.  His management team did not have the confidence that they could run the 
business without him. For JRD it was ‘business as usual.’ The senior management 
attitude at JRD was a major inhibitor for RHP’s supply chain development.   
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4.4.3  Action research case study - supplier Mansfield Amalgamated 
 
 
Mansfield Amalgamated Ltd (MA) was RHP’s main source for packaging. MA was part 
of the Remploy Group, who was formed by the Government to provide disabled people 
with work. MA had a close working relationship with RHP, it had been supplying 
packaging for over 10 years and management were very pleased to be involved in this 
supplier development activity.  
 
MA had 47 employees and a turnover of £3.2m, £130,000 of which was with RHP.  
 
Supplier development approach 
 
The 4 day activity was a changeover reduction (SMED) on the cutting machine which 
included a presentation to the management team on the last day.  The 5 member team 
consisted of an operator, production manager, quality engineer, manufacturing engineer 
and supplier development co-ordinator. 
 
Changeover activity                           
 
MA regularly collected data and produced graphs on the business, but no actions or 
workshops took place from the data.  The Production Manager was relieved to see the 
data analysis being used:                        
 
‘We have been collecting this data for many years it is 
good to see it being put to practical use to get the benefit 
from it.’ MA Production Manager (1997) 
 
MA collected very good data on their machine utilisation, this made it easy for the team 
to produce graphs and quickly agree the focus.  MA had not implemented changes before 
as they were inhibited by a lack of understanding for the tools and techniques.  The 
Managing Director had an excellent rapport with employees on the shop floor as he 
would often take the time to got and talk to them and listen to what they were doing and 
their ideas, the shop floor found him very approachable.   
 
Figure 22 showed the production analysis displayed as bar charts, 34% of the downtime 
was due to changeovers, MA calls this ‘make ready’.  The team quickly chose the 
machine and changeover which would be the focus of the improvement. 
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Figure 22: MA production hours analysis 
Using the standardised approach the changeover time was reduced from 141 minutes to a 
final video result of 27 minutes.  By MA implementing the longer term improvement  
ideas they could benefit with an overall 83% reduction.  This improvement result would 
enable MA to effectively utilise their existing cutting machines, increasing the available 
production capacity.  Figure 23: showed the results of the improvement at MA. 
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Figure 23: MA Changeover Reduction Improvement  
Source:  MA workshop 1997 
 
Process and relationship inhibitors and enablers 
 
Because MA’s materials were used to package bearings the management felt they were 
not often invited to get involved in strategic opportunities with RHP. The focus was 
always on parts supplied to make up the bearing.  MA management team had many cost 
reduction ideas they wanted to discuss with RHP and never felt they got the 
opportunities for this to happen.   
 
The MA management team also expressed that too much of the packaging was over 
specified and for many customers the packaging was for transportation and would be 
discarded very quickly.   
 
Despite the buyer and purchasing manager being aware of this they continued to 
purchase packaging material which was higher priced as the product was over specified. 
 
The behaviour of the foreman on the set up reduction team made the activity very easy.  
He was very hands on and encouraged the operators and put them at ease when they had 
any concerns.  
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Short term activity outcomes 
 
From the set up reduction the team produced a standard operating procedure.  If the 
procedure was used MA would maintain a set up of 27 minutes.  All employees grasped 
the objectives; in particular the production manager and Managing Director who were 
keen to drive this forward.  Problem follow up sheets were also created with short term 
and long term ideas that needed further investigation. 
 
Long term activity outcomes 
 
If the set up operating procedure was maintained and the long term follow up was 
implemented, MA would be able to achieve the long term target of 83%.  If the resource 
commitment and SMED technique were re-applied the approach could be taken to all 
appropriate areas on the shop floor. 
 
Summary 
 
The MA Management Team was very keen to develop these approaches.  The team were 
encouraged by the presentation at the end of the week.  Senior management were 
impressed with the outcomes and wanted to make these approaches part of their 
production culture.   
 
MA wanted to have more activities like this with RHP.  The Managing Director arranged 
to present this approach and results to the rest of the group in the UK, to influence senior 
management in other units to adopt these approaches. 
 
4.4.4 Action research case study - supplier Synthotec 
 
 
Synthotec (S) was RHP’s main source of plastic cage supply.  S was formed from a 
management buy out in the late 1980s.  S had become a successful business, which had 
seen steady growth throughout the last ten years.  S was privately owned with a turnover 
of £1.25m.  Almost 40% of the turnover was from NSK-RHP.  The researcher felt this 
amount of spend with one supplier was very high risk.  There were 27 employees located 
at Malvern.  S had invested heavily in automated injection moulding machines but was 
constrained by a lack of floor space. 
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Supplier development approach 
 
The four day activity had two areas of improvement, a change over reduction and a 
housekeeping activity.  The team was divided into 2 to carry out activities in parallel.  
Progress on each activity was reviewed together at the end of each day and a presentation 
to management on the last day.  The team resource included an engineer, operator, 
foreman, process engineer, quality engineer and supplier development co-ordinator. 
 
Despite only having 27 employees everybody worked individually and carried out their 
roles as they saw fit.  This approach was encouraged by the Managing Director: 
 
‘I have highly qualified specialists running my business 
they are the experts in their field and are left to get on 
with what they know’. S MD (1997). 
 
This comment from the Managing Director was concerning as there was no strategy, key 
performance indicators, standard processes or competencies identified.  It was therefore 
difficult for the Managing Director to see how his business was performing except for his 
financial reports.  The Managing Director had recently appointed a senior engineer from 
Canada.   
 
The Senior Engineer expressed his concerns: 
 
‘It’s like working in a mental hospital here, everybody 
has really strong overbearing personalities, nobody works 
together and nothing ever gets done’. Senior Engineer 
(1997) 
 
It was a shame that after all the investment taken to recruit this senior engineer, he was 
de-motivated and frustrated as the small workforce did not work together as a team.  The 
strong personalities and fixed individual opinions were highlighted further from the shop 
floor foreman: 
 
 ‘This is all theory and fluffy sky thinking.  We are 
working in the injection moulding business and none of 
this talk is relevant to us’ The Foreman (1997) 
 
The foreman chose not to listen or learn from RHP and the application of best practice 
tools and techniques to S.  Instead the foremen chose to believe that these approaches 
were not relevant. 
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Using the standardised approach, the changeover time was reduced from over 80 minutes 
to a final video result of 20 minutes.  The long term improvement would provide S with 
almost an 80% reduction in changeover times.  This implementation would enable S to 
more effectively utilise their existing moulding machines and increase their available 
production capacity.  This would also enable S to increase their flexibility allowing them 
to run with smaller batch sizes and in turn free up valuable floor space.   
 
Figure 24 shows the reductions at S. Level 2 was achieved during the improvement 
activity. 
 
Figure 24: S Improvement Results. 
Source:  Synthotec Workshop 1997  
 
The housekeeping activity 
 
The housekeeping team cleared the work area of unnecessary clutter, which provided 
much better visual control on the shop floor.  Items that were not regularly required were 
stored away from the immediate area.  This created much more space around the 
machines.  All other equipment was identified, labelled and allocated to a place within 
the workspace.  The team completely cleaned one machine and red tagged any technical 
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problems.  When the cleaning was complete the cleanliness on the machine was even 
higher than that of a recently purchased new machine. 
 
One exercise was housekeeping a large toolbox.  A matrix was marked in tape on the 
floor to put tools in boxes marked ‘daily’, ‘frequently’, ‘infrequently’ and ‘never used’ 
boxes.  The ‘never used’ tools were removed; duplicated tools of more than two were 
also removed.   
 
The changeover tools were then located in their own new box, which could be taken to 
the required machine when a changeover was to take place.  These simple activities 
enabled operators to have better and quicker access to the right tools when they were 
required. 
 
The team marked out designated areas on the shop floor for each job so that there was ‘a 
place for everything and everything in its place’.  This was simply achieved through 
temporary markings using coloured sticky tape.  A hand written template was also 
created for the shop floor to carry out housekeeping audits.   
 
Process and relationship inhibitors and enablers 
 
At S they did not work with Microsoft compatible I.T. systems, this caused difficulty 
with data and access to information. The company had to decide where to allocate the 
designated areas for work in progress (WIP) and for empty pallets and finished goods.  
Nobody appeared accountable to make decisions. 
 
The behaviour of the foreman on the set up reduction team made the activity difficult.  
The foreman felt threatened by the programme and was very resistant to any changes or 
ideas.  The foreman often took team ideas as personal criticism on his existing work 
practices and was against any new ways of working 
 
From the management presentation at the end of the week it was disappointing that 
Senior Management were not impressed with the outcomes.  Management missed the 
point of the activity.  The team workshop was to learn and apply two successful tools to 
improve their business.  These tools could then be applied across the whole shop floor.  
During the four day activity the team removed waste, improved efficiency and 
contributed to greater productivity gains through very little or no cost.   
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However, management at S were heavily influenced by the Foreman, they did not see the 
full potential of the application and particularly felt it was ‘theoretical’ and based on an 
‘ideal situation’, even though the changeover was videoed, analysed and the 
improvements carried out and re-videoed before Friday’s presentation.   
 
Senior management appeared happy to continue investing capital for new machines, 
despite other machines not realising full capacity, which was evident through the data 
analysis presented.  They over produced for customers months in advance and stored 
components on the shop floor, taking up a third of the area.  Rather than moving towards 
JIT they were interested in looking at purchasing a warehouse which would incur further 
inventory costs and larger overheads.  
 
The S Managing Director was happy to leave his managers and employees to continue 
making their own decisions about their parts of the business.  The foreman was left to 
run the shop floor and the planning manager could plan the business as they liked.  
Delegation was effective for empowering employees.  Nevertheless, their decisions were 
never challenged or questioned and no cost benefit or capital expenditure proposals were 
undertaken.  The decisions could be made on managers gut feel. 
 
Short term activity outcomes 
 
The team produced a standard operating procedure from the set up reduction.  If the 
procedure was used S would maintain a set up of 39 minutes, which was achieved in the 
trial.  If they did not use the procedure the set up would stay at the original time of 111 
minutes.   Two of the employees grasped the objectives, the quality manager and the 
champion who was the new senior engineer.  Problem follow up sheets were created for 
both activities.  When the team departed S began to designate product areas for the 
housekeeping activity to progress. 
 
Long term activity outcomes 
 
If the set up operating procedures were maintained and the long term follow up 
implemented S would be able to achieve the long term target of an 80% reduction in set 
up times.  If the resource commitment and technique was reapplied the approach could 
be taken to all machines across the shop floor. 
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If the workforce maintained the level of cleanliness on the shop floor, by housekeeping 
audits, a very high level of housekeeping standards would be achieved.  This would be 
very impressive to the workforce, visitors and customers. 
 
Summary 
 
The tools and techniques provided small step change improvements to S. If the approach 
and initiatives were not maintained there would be no affect on their culture.  The 
engineer assured RHP he would encourage the operators to adopt the discipline of using 
the procedure to maintain the short term benefit.  S displayed negative feedback at the 
presentation which gave RHP great concern.  Ultimately it was their decision as to 
whether they wanted to carry this kind of approach forward.  S management were more 
interested in purchasing a warehouse and new machines, 2 at £500,000 each, when their 
old machines were are not fully utilised.    Other companies were moving towards a 
leaner approach and moving away from having too much cost absorbed in material and 
storage.  The S company was also in a high risk situation having 40% of its turnover with 
NSK-RHP. 
 
4.4.5 Supplier development cross case analysis 
 
This section compares and contrasts by cross case analysis each supplier development 
workshop, the key themes and the outcomes.  Three of the supplier workshops used the 
same timing plan and tools and techniques however, very different results emerged.  The 
difference in results was because of the attitude and commitment of senior management 
at each supplier location. 
Results were also affected by the behaviour of different personalities within the team and 
the level cultural evolvement and environment of each business.  Comparing and 
contrasting each supplier workshop explored these findings further. 
 
Supplier case analysis 
 
Desford and MA had positive senior managers’ who embraced change and were very 
keen to adopt tools and techniques that were new to their business.  Both companies 
already collected and reported data and had a team atmosphere.  Desford already carried 
out regular improvement workshops on their shop floor. MA were keen to carry out 
actions from the data but were unclear on how best to approach it prior to the workshop.  
As a result, Desford saved money by not needing to invest in a further plant costing 
 101 
£500k and also increased productivity by £250k annually.  MA gained productivity 
improvement for the machine of £150k annually, which would be rolled out into other 
areas of the factory by the production manager. At MA the Managing Director took these 
approaches to the Group and established a network with other sites across the UK for 
productivity improvement.   
 
S executive management left their senior management to run the business.  The 
executive team and senior management were not prepared to learn about new approaches 
and did not listen to what their customer said or care to understand best practice.  Senior 
management choose to see their company as ‘unique’ by thinking of the products and not 
process.  The executive management took their senior management comments at face 
value, so when the foreman said this was ‘blue sky and theoretical’ executive 
management believed him.   As a result S did not benefit by rolling this onto other 
machines, instead senior management chose to continue to reinvest in new machinery, 
when existing machines were sub optimised with downtime as poor as 60% and the 
rental of a warehouse to store finished parts.  JRD was a family business heavily directed 
and controlled by the Managing Director. All knowledge and pricing information of the 
business was held in the Managing Director’s head.  Unfortunately, none of this 
information was captured in processes and was therefore a risk to the business.  JRD did 
not continue to adopt new manufacturing approaches but fortunately maintained a steady 
production output. Because there was so much reliance on the Managing Director he was 
not able to retire, as planned. 
 
Overall negative attitude and lack of commitment were two of the main inhibitors of 
supply chain management.  A positive senior management outlook, leading by example 
and openness to embrace change was two of the main enablers of supply chain 
management. 
 
4.5 Strategic purchasing development  
 
The purchasing field in the UK had to face a transition of change across many industry 
sectors.  Purchasing (also known as procurement and sourcing) had all undergone, or was 
going through change to support supply chain development.   Outside RHP there was 
emphasis on supply chain management by process improvement using lean and six sigma 
methodologies. 
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More advanced purchasing departments’ assigned full time resource to strategic 
purchasing, supplier development and supply chain management.  These companies made 
strong links with universities or consultants for medium term support.  As an example, RS 
Components had created a strategic purchasing support team who provided support to 
cross functional process teams established rather than functions.   
 
The automotive industry had supplier development managers assigned to co-ordinate 
activities.  Purchasing goods and services were also bought on behalf of sites.  Purchasing 
stretched across the whole of Europe or for advanced companies global purchasing, where 
a central country managed procurement for companies across the globe.  More companies 
were taking advantage of information technology, e-procurement utilising methods such as 
auctions, product development and bidding on the internet. 
 
At RHP management and control of suppliers was made by purchasing for UK parts only.  
This included supplier selection and rationalisation without technical manufacturing 
involvement.   
 
Each industry attempted to move away from sole management and control of suppliers by 
purchasing and got relevant employees across the company involved in supply chain 
management.  
 
RHP did not organise the internal supplier co-ordination prior to the supplier development 
activities.  The management team at RHP was very ambitious about their expectations. 
They attempted to deliver so many activities in one year which realistically could take up 
to 8 years to fully implement.  Whilst the supplier development activities took place, 
awareness training and education had to be made with purchasing and quality.  This was 
extremely important to educate and challenge the mindset and attitude of employees within 
these departments.   
 
It was important for purchasing and quality to share a vision of what they expected the 
departments to be like in the future.  This was brainstormed and is shown in Figure 25:  
RHP procurement dimensions. 
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Figure 25: RHP procurement dimensions 
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Source:  RHP 1997 
 
After the vision was developed it was categorised into short, medium and long term 
goals.  The purchasing management set strategic objectives aligned with the  company 
strategy, to deliver business results.  
 
The policy was communicated across sites in the UK.  This raised the level of the 
purchasing department and aligned them with other departments across the company.  
For the first time purchasing would become involved in the company total management 
concept (TMC).  Quality had already been integrated.  The top level TMC for sourcing is 
illustrated in Figure 26.   
 
Figure 26: Purchasing TMC 
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Purchasing TMC 1998
 Through enablers:
To continuously meet agreed 
customer requirements 
at the lowest total cost.  
Whilst actively pursuing 
environmental goals.
•  Supplier Management
•  Development of strategic suppliers
    selected from the sourcing policy
•  Continuous improvement of the
    efficiency of the purchasing operation
•  Releasing staff potential 
   through an ongoing program 
   of training, education and 
   personal development.
Goals: QCDPS Quality, Cost, Delivery, People, Safety & Enviornment
Purchasing Cards
IT Development
ISO 9002 Accreditation
Supplier Development
Group Supplier Rationalisation
Target
Q  Achieve Departmental ISO9002                   March 1998
Measure internal customer complaints         Feb. 1998
Measure core purchasing service to internal customers  Jan. 1998
Improve supplier quality (with group quality)             
Strategic Supplier Quality Improvement        50%
C   1998 Departmental cost reduction       -3.5%
      Containment of supply market inflation        0%
D   Improve supplier schedule adherence          Feb. 1998
      implement vendor rating
P   To improve relationships with suppliers     Intro. of
                   supplier mgt.
techniques
S   Publish purchasing environmental policy   End of 1998
Mission:
Approaches:
 
Source:  RHP 1998 
A sourcing policy was developed to identify strategic suppliers and RHP’s goals and 
approaches.  This was essential to focus developments on key suppliers.  In total there 
were 20 strategic suppliers, which made supplier development more manageable.   
 
A selection criteria was used to review and monitor other production suppliers. Joint 
agreement and deployment to senior management and internal departments were targeted 
for the end of 1998.  Overall the policy allowed time and resource to be focused on 
strategic suppliers. 
 
To drive delivery of the TMC the purchasing manager made the buyers become 
champions for supplier development activities.  The champions were put in place, even if 
they were not involved in the supplier development projects, as the purchasing manager 
wanted buyers to feel involved in project co-ordination. 
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A working model was created which provided a visual diagram of the internal 
management system areas and external supplier development activities.  This was 
produced to ensure an internal management system was in place to support the external 
supplier development activities.  Figure 27 shows the supplier development model for 
internal and external activities. 
 
Figure 27:  Supplier development model 
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Source: Research findings. 
A supplier profile was created to obtain more information on all suppliers and to build up a 
portfolio of their business. A supplier development policy statement was developed; the 
template is in Appendix 2.  The next progression was a joint business plan between RHP 
and individual strategic suppliers to ensure commitment between both parties for 
commercial planning, risk sharing and continuous improvement activities.   
 
Business process waste removal was an area which RHP did not focus on.  RHP was out of 
touch with the latest thinking on scheduling, JIT and Kanban. The standard cost culture 
constrained a total cost of ownership approach.  However a framework or checklist should 
have been developed to review the total cost of suppliers.  To support deployment of the 
supplier development model a flowchart was created to bring the process together.  This 
was shown in Figure 28.   
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Figure 28:  Supplier development process framework 
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Source: RHP 
 
PL - purchasing leader  PM - purchasing manager  
ST - short term   LT - long term    
QCDP -     Quality, Cost, Delivery and People  
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Sustainability of the supplier development process at RHP was concerning.  Production and 
non production purchasing resource had become heavily constrained by administration, 
order placing and chasing. The supplier development programme was progressing to a 
point where the purchasing department would have to manage supplier development.  The 
purchasing manager did not want an individual to co-ordinate and drive the activity after 
the pilot.    The purchasing manager restructured and reviewed roles and responsibilities to 
meet the changing needs for strategic purchasing.  Purchasing was in a position to 
proactively work with other departments on supplier development and other strategic 
purchasing issues.    
 
Previous to the supplier development pilot workshops with the SMMT, RHP was 
reactive with their suppliers and very few supplier development activities took place.  
Supplier management only existed by the quality assessments carried out every three 
years and supplier demerit ratings on quality performance measured continually from 
incoming deliveries.   
 
Although these systems were still in place for all suppliers, a new tier level had been 
created for further focus to be made on strategic suppliers and the creation of a sourcing 
policy and selection checklist.  The profile of purchasing was also raised and they had 
become an integral part of the RHP TMC culture.   
 
It was clear that processes should be developed for the department to become more 
involved in strategic purchasing activities.  There were varying levels of skills and 
capabilities with the buyers.  Those that had potential to be more strategic were too 
heavily tied up with administration and order placing.  If a separate group of strategic 
specialists supported buyers and drove changes through, more development work and 
changes could be implemented. 
 
The purchasing manager closed the supplier development co-ordinator role to encourage 
buyers to co-ordinate supplier development approaches.  Unfortunately, due to lack of 
time and resource and the ability to adopt and apply supplier development, all the 
processes were put on hold.   
 
Nevertheless, the workshop activities on the Newark RHP shop floor continued. After 
the success of the supplier development projects the manufacturing director pulled eight 
of his best senior engineers into a full time improvement team.   
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The team was made responsible for carrying out improvement activities across the shop 
floor.  The team maintained the philosophy across all of the manufacturing groups. 
 
During the establishment of the supplier development programme and workshops, the 
purchasing department remained overstretched with order placing and high 
administration.  It was clear that the supplier development programme was being 
introduced too early in the purchasing department.  The supplier development 
programme was established as a result of a customer complaint.  After five successful 
workshops the purchasing manager saw the need to integrate the supplier development 
co-ordination between the buyers existing activities. After 14 months of keeping supplier 
development on hold a re- organisation took place.  The re-organisation decentralised 
operational purchasing back into the factory and a strategic purchasing unit was formed. 
 
The changes were significant as operational purchasing had always been in a central 
department and now these employees would be part of the manufacturing company. 
There was a shift in direction of material planning and operational purchasing at Newark, 
these activities would report directly to manufacturing management. The changes already 
started at Ferrybridge and Blackburn would now include material planning.  
 
The purchasing manager stepped outside the box of focusing only on purchasing and 
price and had clearly changed his emphasis to look at the company as a whole. This was 
also evident by his department adopting the same critical approach to customer measures 
of quality, cost and delivery. 
 
The Purchasing Manager expressed the need for closer relationship with manufacturing: 
 
‘As a continuation of the drive to improve service levels, 
lead time to customers and manufacturing output it is 
vital that the Purchasing units reporting to manufacturing 
are given the full support of all concerned. They have an 
extremely important part to play in QCD improvements 
and this unit has a dual role of closer working 
relationships with manufacturing and involvement in 
supplier improvements driven by the strategic unit.’ 
Purchasing Manager (1997). 
 
The purchasing manager appreciated that purchasing and suppliers needed to work very 
closely with manufacturing and develop working relationships with technical people. 
The purchasing manager had made a big step change in his thinking, previously he 
worked in isolation with his team placing spot orders and measuring price.   
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This change was positive for the company and the employees working within the supply 
chain as it would bring operational purchasing and manufacturing together.  The people 
would be aligned to deliver shared targets and performance improvement.  On August 9 
1999 a letter was cascaded throughout the business explaining the new strategic 
purchasing team.  The Purchasing Manager expressed key points: 
 
‘Supplier costs represent 60% of our manufacturing 
product cost, and it is essential that our current initiatives 
on manufacturing cost reductions are supplemented by an 
intensive programme of supplier cost reductions.  The 
team will be focused in driving continuous improvements 
and cost reduction projects with suppliers.   
 
The immediate task will be to plan and co-ordinate the 
transfer of the current operational purchasing activities to 
manufacturing and to establish rules of engagement i.e. 
roles and responsibilities and levels of authorisation in 
conjunction with all concerned at the 3 sites.’   
Purchasing Manager 1999. 
 
This was a dramatic change for the company and as it took 4 years to be implemented.  
The de-centralisation of operational purchasing would enable the strategic procurement 
team to concentrate fully on strategic purchasing, without day to day operational and 
administrational distractions.  The initial focus of strategic procurement could enhance 
supplier management and supplier development policies, system developments, group 
purchasing potentials and supplier rationalisation. 
 
Operationally manufacturing would be responsible for day to day supplier issues and 
purchasing.  This meant that suppliers and manufacturing would have a much closer 
relationship and become more closely aligned to understand each other’s challenges and 
priorities. 
 
The strategic purchasing team would continue to work closely with people operationally 
involved in the supply chain, understand the process problems and regularly receive 
feedback about supplier performance in order to optimise strategic decision making. 
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4.6 Case analysis of RHP 
 
RHP supply chain management case study revealed there was a lack of integration and 
focus on the whole system. Functional departments existed, at each interface between 
these departments and communication, information and accountability were lost. The 
four main factors which impacted supply chain management were: senior management 
attitudes, traditional purchasing and quality methods, internal communication and 
interface problems and an absence of key performance measures. 
 
4.6.1  Senior management attitudes 
 
 
RHP had been purchased by NSK, a Japanese company and the employees expressed 
concern about the Japanese culture being imposed on them.  Employees concerns were 
left unattended as communication between management and the workforce regarding all 
the changes remained poor. 
There were different types of management style evident in the same company.  There 
was the engineering director who was autocratic and dictatorial, his employees got told 
what to do and did it, even if they did not agree with the changes, as they were worried 
about their careers.  This was highlighted further by the engineering offices being closed 
and their desks being put on the shop floor with noisy music being played through the 
tannoy.    The purchasing manager treated everybody as equal and involved his 
department in all of the ideas and decision making and changes which needed to be made 
to the department.  This style of leadership went too far as the employees felt they had no 
leadership or direction.  
 
RHP managers lost focus on improving the business as a whole and concentrated their 
efforts on their own functions.  This could often be at the expense of supply chain 
management particularly when purchasing was focused on price reduction and the 
company was driving quality, cost, delivery and people improvements. 
 
The strategic supplier workshops achieved different results due to the senior managers’ 
attitudes and commitment to change.  The DT and MA senior managers’ were very 
positive and welcomed changes to their companies and supported the teams to carry out 
improvements.  Senior managers’ at DT and MA were encouraged not only to implement 
the long term ideas and sustain the results from the workshop, but also to roll out the 
improvements to other areas. 
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At JRD and S senior managers’ had negative attitudes towards change and chose not to 
listen to their customer, as they felt their businesses were ‘unique’ and their customer did 
not understand.  Their senior managers’ focused on their product and did not think in 
terms of processes and were not convinced of the benefits.   
 
Senior management attitude was the largest inhibitor of supply chain management.  The 
supplier case studies revealed if senior management led by example, set a vision and 
engaged employees’ greater productivity was achieved. Senior management attitudes 
impacted other factors, traditional methods, communication, interface problems and lack 
of key performance measures. 
 
4.6.2  Traditional purchasing and quality methods  
 
Analysis of the procurement process showed that the supplier base was very large 
compared to industries focused on supplier management and development.  This created 
major difficulties for effectively developing systems and managing suppliers.  NSK-RHP 
had a total of 9,000 suppliers registered on the system for the UK, 5,000 of which were 
active.  Current partnership agreements had not been maintained and supplier 
development was not effectively communicated.   
 
There were no formal criteria for selecting strategic suppliers.  For non production 
suppliers, there were no controls or monitoring processes and no preferred supplier list. 
For purchasing supplier visits, whether production or non production there was no 
standard template or systems for recording findings and storing information.  The 
management of supplier development activities was at the time of research unplanned 
and reactive.  No supplier development process existed until the pilot workshops took 
place and an applied process was created. Only one purchasing manager was found 
working proactively with the manufacturing engineers.  However, project management 
was poor, milestones were continually missed and no designated time was regularly 
scheduled for the team to meet.  The resources were constrained between the day to day 
manufacturing needs and the project. 
 
Suppliers were managed separately purchasing for price and quality for the audits.  
These two departments kept manufacturing away from suppliers’ and were keen to be the 
face of RHP on their specific issues.  Despite manufacturing being the customer their 
voice was not often listened to.  This practice was not in conformity with existing 
literature which commonly published that for strategic development and competitive 
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advantage it was essential that manufacturing be involved with suppliers for selection, 
development, resourcing, and most importantly for suppliers to understand the customers 
needs on technical issues (Hines 2004). 
 
There was concern over the time and information transferred using a central person.  
RHP engineers were not permitted to speak directly to suppliers’ engineers.  More cross 
functional team activities were to be encouraged. 
 
Purchasing and manufacturing employees generally felt there was insufficient data and 
visibility for forecasting.  To compensate for the lack of forecasting, purchasing carried 
out spot ordering with suppliers.  RHP was pressured from the logistics department and 
outside customer pressure to shorten lead times. Within a year manufacturing lead times 
were reduced from 6 to 2 months by process improvement. 
    
However, raw material suppliers had much longer lead times and the forecasting data 
was available in the logistics department.  There were 7 year business plans or life of 
the vehicle contracts with automotive customers.  More strategic information was 
therefore available from sales, but that information was not passed down the supply 
chain. 
 
To compensate for higher supplier lead times high buffer stocks were placed throughout 
the supply chain to ensure RHP did not run out of parts.  Unfortunately for RHP this 
meant a £9.5m of stock for sales.  The stock value was almost 1 year worth of RHP’s 
profit.  
 
The control of production suppliers was covered by a quality document (TI9).  Group 
quality was responsible for management of the supplier review system.  The supplier 
review system was managed by approving and grading suppliers from A-C.   Once the 
supplier reached a grade A the system went no further. There was poor feedback of 
information to suppliers, particularly for positive results. No information was passed 
unless the supplier had been dropped by a grade.  The current inspection system was so 
strict that it was virtually impossible for most suppliers to reach no inspection.   
 
The supplier control system had no commercial or technical information included. For 
example, there were no processes for capturing joint improvement programmes, product 
development and process capability.  
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The supplier control system was heavily targeting ‘rejection’ and ‘demerit’ points that 
caused a negative drive. The only supplier measurement system undertaken was quality 
rejections monitoring.  Group quality was responsible for collating this information from 
around the UK group.  The supplier rejection process was manually paper based and 
therefore took additional time and resource.  
 
4.6.3 Internal communications and interface problems 
 
RHP had a 30% cost reduction drive across the company.  The majority of cost 
reduction projects and teamwork was functionally structured.  Internal communications 
between other functions often arose to overcome problems.  Poor communications 
resulted in functional areas having negative attitudes towards each other.  RHP 
functional areas had become heavily involved in ‘fire fighting’ and blaming each other.  
 
Where functional interfaces existed, inherent inefficiencies would always be apparent. 
Responsibilities fell in the gap between purchasing and manufacturing departments for 
example high ownership over stock levels and high volume purchases of inventory.  
When problems arose blame was transferred and conflict took place between 
departments.  Within the company employees often said: ‘it’s not my job’.  Across 
functions little ownership was taken for key processes such as material management. 
For example, the ownership of inventory was unclear.  It was not purchasing 
responsibility as the order was closed out when the GRN was created.  It was not 
responsibility of the stores as they were responsible for issuing booking and putting 
goods away.  Manufacturing were not involved until a requirement was needed for 
components and the store was contacted for picking and distribution.  
 
When reviewing RHP supply chain management there was poor transfer of data, 
information and a lack of focus on the whole system. It was evident that three 
information technology systems were used.  These systems had varying levels of 
capability.  Having many I.T. systems caused data and information to be lost as it was 
transferred down the supply chain.   
 
It was difficult to obtain information from other functions. For example, a meeting was 
arranged to discuss the automotive customers’ supplier development programme with 
RHP Sales.  Sales were involved with Nissan on their quality, cost, delivery, 
development and management programme (QCDDM).  However, the sales manager 
would not allow any copies of information to be taken, despite Nissan’s supplier 
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development programme being well documented in the public domain.  The sales 
manager would not even provide the framework without RHP’s results.  
 
Purchasing never communicated with sales or logistics unless an external customer 
specifically requested to see purchasing. Purchasing was invited to a business review 
with Rover where the Rover purchasing manager expressed concern that RHP starved 
the company of information.  He emphasised the supply chain and that when 
information was not transferred suppliers and customers suffered.  If communication 
was proactively taken at RHP and included forecasting and long term agreements with 
suppliers greater strategic decision making could happen in the supply chain. 
 
4.6.4 Absence of key performance measures 
 
There was a lack of performance measurement systems in place. This made the total 
quality costs remain hidden and the standard cost culture continued to drive the 
company.  Within sales and marketing there were numerous performance measures 
enforced by external customers.  There were very few performance measures in place 
across the supply chain.    In manufacturing there were measures placed on quality, 
scrap and delivery.  There was ongoing benchmarking made with other manufacturing 
sites in Japan, with emphasis on process times, set ups, quality and delivery.  For 
example, stock turnaround, delivery dates and delivery quantity were never regularly 
measured.  Sometimes performance measures were made for one off projects.  The lack 
of visible performance measures was concerning as decision making would be made by 
gut feel instead of using performance measures to benchmark, prioritise focus and 
manage development.  
 
Without measuring it was also unclear whether an improvement had been made and it 
was then difficult to determine whether the company had benefited on the bottom line.  
There was one performance measure used within purchasing.  The purchasing manager 
measured monthly price reductions, which were reported to the finance manager. The 
monthly price variation was displayed graphically on the notice board within the 
department.  There was no appreciation of the delivery performance of suppliers.  
Inventory figures and quality grade measures were seen as the responsibility of other 
functional areas and total costs were overlooked.  There were no supplier measures for 
delivery and suppliers had a 5 day window in which they could deliver goods.    
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RHP established a clear policy that was deployed and communicated across the UK with 
annually enhanced targets.  Managers across the supply chain needed to establish key 
performance indicators and deliver activities that would bring company benefit.   
Without key performance indicators performance management was poor and it was 
difficult to establish the state of the company.  (Batesman 2000). Most of the 
management and their departments continued to ‘fire fight’. 
 
4.7  Summary 
 
RHP’s supply chain management was complex, there was a general lack of understanding 
in the procurement process that affected communication internally and created functional 
boundaries and sub optimisation.  (Hines 1994, Hines 1997). There were few cross 
functional team activities.  Functions carried out development individually, which isolated 
activities and could cause duplication of effort.  In purchasing there was clearly a 
competence and capability issue with 80% of the employees having clerical backgrounds.  
(Hines et al 1997).  All procurement methods were traditional but the company attempted 
to develop a modern supplier development approach.  (Hines and Rich 1998, Womack and 
Jones 1999, Bicheno 2000). Traditional purchasing methods and administration needed to 
be changed, so that employees could be educated and trained to focus on strategic 
purchasing and supply chain development.  (Hines et all 2000).  Overall senior 
management and employees attitudes were repeating factors throughout the case study.  
The evaluation also revealed traditional methods, communication, interface problems and 
outlook on utilising key performance measures.  (Batesman 2000). 
 116 
5.0 Case Study - A Gas Turbines Company  
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
The case study strategy was used at Alstom to investigate the research questions. This 
strategy provided a thorough analysis to identify changes that had taken place in supply 
chain management, how ideas had been implemented and to reveal the inhibiting and 
enabling factors of supply chain management.   
 
The themes identified for the implementation of supply chain management included 
customer expectations, policy deployment, the whole system of processes, managers, 
employees, suppliers, business improvement and operations.  The themes were investigated 
during the case study. 
 
To understand the past, present and future changes of the gas turbine company located in 
Lincolnshire, this case study firstly provided an overview of the site company history.  The 
researcher felt it was important to capture the history as it could support the understanding of 
the research questions.  The history could also help with the analysis of the themes in 
particular operations, senior managers, employees, processes, suppliers and customers.  This 
historical research covered the last sixty years and revealed technical information only.  
 
To capture further changes in the supply chain historical research was captured by 
communicating with long service employees about company changes that had taken place 
over the last thirty years.  The employees consisted of directors, managers, office staff and 
operators.  Data was collected from various internal information and external information 
sources including internal and external company surveys, emails, articles, reports and 
interviews.  
 
5.2  Lincoln site background 
 
For more than 60 years gas turbines had been manufactured at Lincoln.  The gas turbine 
engine was a complex product with over 8,500 components in a single engine. The Lincoln 
site designed, purchased, manufactured, assembled, tested, packaged and commissioned gas 
turbine engines providing a ‘total solution to customers’, including  the option for 
maintenance service contracts.   
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In contrast with the automotive industry that produced high volumes annually, this Lincoln 
small gas turbine company was described as a low volume, high value capital goods 
manufacturer, producing a maximum of 120 engines per year and overhauling and 
maintaining a further 80 engines. 
 
Once a gas turbine engine was installed at a customer site, with regular maintenance, it could 
reliably operate for over 30 years.  There was 2 customer markets the  oil and gas industry, 
who used gas turbines for providing power generation for light, heat and pumping oil or gas 
offshore and Combined Heat and Power (CHP). The CHP plants used gas turbines for back 
up power generation. The high temperature exhaust of the generator passed through a waste 
heat recovery unit or boiler and achieved a 95% overall thermal efficiency. The steam or hot 
water generated can be used in industrial processes or district heating schemes. The steam 
may also be used in small scale combined cycle applications in conjunction with a steam 
turbine. The exhaust heat may be utilised for drying industrial products. This makes the CHP 
an excellent application for hospitals, breweries, television studios and any large buildings 
that wanted to create their own power and heat. 
 
5.2.1  Lincoln site technical history 
 
The available Lincoln site technical history was reviewed to understand what changes had 
taken place in supply chain management over time.  
 
Following pioneering work by Frank Whittle on jet engines, in 1946 Ruston & Hornsby Ltd 
set up a small team known as the combustion development group.   
The team investigated the feasibility of designing long life industrial gas turbines. Detailed 
design work on the first Ruston industrial gas turbine began and by 1949 initial trials began 
with a prototype two shaft, open cycle engine.  
 
In 1950 the engine was demonstrated to engineers of the leading British and overseas 
technical press which proved successful.  By the 1950s full scale production took place for 
the twin-shaft engine, named the TA. The first order was received for an oil field application 
from the Kuwait Oil Company for gathering centre pumping. This engine was still 
operational in 1991 and had completed 170,000 operating hours, including a non-stop run of 
10,800 hours.  Following the initial success with the TA gas turbine Ruston’s began to 
design and develop a gas turbine of 500bhp, the TE.   
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In 1956 Ruston’s was awarded a design and development contract by the Admiralty for a 
more advanced version with a rating of 750 kW, which became known as the TF.  The first 
TF was installed in the USA in 1957, and was used to drive a booster pump for the Williams 
Brothers’ Pipeline of Tulsa. The unit was still operating satisfactorily until it was 
decommissioned in June 1980, having completed 100,000 operating hours.   
 
In 1959 a Ruston TA gas turbine was put to work in the first Total energy installation in the 
USA, at the Park Plaza Shopping Centre in Little Rock, Arkansas.  The TA gas engine 
provided the lighting, heating and refrigeration requirements of the centre. 
 
In the 1960s the first TF gas turbines were installed in guided missile ships of the Royal 
Navy.  The engines were firstly used as emergency and salvage generating sets and 
subsequently as base loading generating sets. The single-shaft TF gas turbine produced 
1,300bhp at 60°F.  
 
In 1963 a decision was taken to enter the larger engine range of gas turbines.  These engines 
incorporated aerodynamic and thermal design for several frame sizes. In 1966 the TA 1500 
was introduced, capable of producing 1,620bhp at 60°F.  In 1967 a single-shaft turbine 
producing 4,000bhp was developed.  This engine was known as TD4000, incorporating four 
combustion chambers mounted around the engine.  Three years later the shop tests were 
completed on the first TD4000 unit. 
In 1970 the TA1750, developing 1,833bhp and using new blade materials was introduced. 
Further developments were made upgrading the engine to 2,500bhp, by improving 
component efficiency and increasing the air mass flow. It became evident soon after the 
successful introduction of the TD4000 gas turbine that an engine of 3,000bhp would be 
attractive to the oil and gas industry, particularly for driving pumps and compressors. 
 
To achieve compactness the concept of four combustion chambers angled back over the 
compressor was adopted.  Also a two-shaft bearing system using an overhung turbine was 
incorporated.  The design was also influenced by the trend towards packaged sets, which 
could be pre-tested to reduce on-site installation costs. This new engine was designated the 
TB.  Other features incorporated to meet market requirements included standard or 
alternative arrangements for control of auxiliary equipment in modular form to simplify 
servicing.   A further requirement was a flexible solid state control system to satisfy 
increasing demand for automatic and remote operation. Above all, the design had to achieve 
the high reliability associated with the earlier TA design that contributed significantly to the 
success of the Ruston gas turbine.  
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Following satisfactory experience with the TB engine rated at 3,300bhp, the power output of 
this engine was increased to 3,920bhp, then 4,900bhp. This later increase was achieved by 
changing to cast and by increasing the compressor speed by 4%. The power output was again 
increased to 5,200bhp ISO by incorporating proven technology used on other Ruston 
turbines, and to 5,400bhp on gas fuel only.   
 
In 1981 an 8,500bhp gas turbine named the Tornado, was introduced. Available as a single 
or twin-shaft machine, it combined new technology, metallurgy and design factors with the 
traditional Ruston characteristics of reliability, endurance and minimal maintenance. It had 
an efficiency of 30% and a maximum cycle temperature of 1000°C, although the life of 
critical hot components was comparable with those of other Ruston engines. Cooled blades, 
using proven technology, were introduced to limit mean metal temperatures of the first stage 
compressor turbine rotor and stator blades to 780°C. 
 
In 1984 Ruston began packaging large engines at Lincoln, initially with 15 and 25MW units 
using Rolls Royce gas generators, and later with the RLM range which use gas generators 
built by GE of America. Ruston and GE collaborate on a number of ventures involving 
industrial engines and component parts for Aero engines. 
 
In 1987 Ruston announced development work on two new engines, the Hurricane rated at 
1.5MW(e) and the Typhoon rated at 4MW(e).  In 1989 the Typhoon, designed for electrical 
power generation, was formally launched into world markets.  
 
To achieve 32% efficiency of the single-shaft Typhoon, Ruston engineers took advantage of 
substantial technological gains made during recent years in the analytical and experimental 
fields.  The technological advances made to the Typhoon were to maximise performance and 
reduce capital and maintenance costs.  The first orders for the Typhoon were received for 
three units for CHP installations in the UK and Spain. 
 
An improved microprocessor based control system, available for all engines in the Ruston 
range, was introduced. The Rustronic MKII system offered improved features including 
increased performance, quicker response time, increased reliability and it was more compact. 
 
In 1992 following successful operating experience in the field at its introductory rating, the 
Typhoon’s power was increased to its design rating of 4.55MW(e). This was achieved by 
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increasing the speed from 16,570rpm to 17,384rpm and increasing the turbine inlet 
temperature from 1050°C to 1100°C. 
 
The company developed a dry low emissions (dle) combustion system in 1993, which was 
available for use on the Typhoon.  A twin-shaft version of the Typhoon was introduced in 
1994 which was designed specifically for driving pumps and compressors for the oil and gas 
industry. Having an output of 6,500bhp and a thermal efficiency of 33%, the twin-shaft 
Typhoon incorporates a high level of gas turbine and package commonality with the single-
shaft machine and uses a two stage free power turbine of high efficiency design. 
 
Following improvements within the sealing system of the engine, the hot gas path and 
optimisation of compressor mass flow, the output of the single-shaft Typhoon was increased 
from 4.55MW(e) to 4,91MW(e) at ISO conditions on natural gas fuel. The Typhoon was also 
offered at the lower rating of 4.2MW(e) under the same conditions. 
 
A more powerful version of the Tornado twin-shaft was introduced which delivered 
8,900bhp from the output coupling. Total Tornado experiences exceed 250 units sold and 6.4 
million operating hours. 
 
The Tempest, a single-shaft gas turbine with a thermal efficiency of 33% and a output of 
7.50MW(e) was launched in 1995. Based upon the proven technology of the Typhoon gas 
turbine, the Tempest is a scaled design which achieves higher output and complements 
European Gas Turbines (EGT) existing family of turbines. The HP turbine blades were 
investment cast and incorporate dual triple-pass cooling technology. 
 
The first production Tempest was displayed at the NEC Birmingham in 1986. The first 
orders were received for eight units for cogeneration installations in Belgium, Turkey and 
Japan.  EGT announced NOx emission figures of 25ppmV on natural gas for Typhoon, 
Tornado and Tempest fitted with a DLE combustion system. 
 
An 18,000 hp gas turbine named the Cyclone was introduced in 1997. The Cyclone was a 
twin-shaft machine suitable for power generation and mechanical drive.  The Cyclone 
utilised proven technology evolved through the Typhoon, Tornado and Tempest gas turbines 
and had simple cycle efficiency in excess of 35%. The Cyclone was an extension of the 
Tempest gas turbine, with the addition of a zero stage to the air compressor, a two-stage 
compressor turbine and a two-stage free power turbine.    
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The Cyclone entered into commercial operation. This milestone was achieved in less than three 
years from product launch to the gas turbine running providing power in parallel with the 
National Grid from the Company’s facility. This DLE only unit builds on the 750,000 hour 
experience accrued on the same systems adopted by the Typhoon, Tornado and Tempest gas 
turbine. 
A more comprehensive line-up of the Typhoon was offered with ratings of 4.35MW(e), 
4.70MW(e), 5.05MW(e) and 5.25MW(e). The higher rating was  achieved by a higher mass 
flow compressor, improved turbine materials and optimised cooling flows, with no increase 
in temperature. 
 
The Tornado rating was increased to 6.75MW(e) for electrical generation that was achieved by 
a small increase in firing temperature, material improvements and component development. 
The twin-shaft machine received an increase to 10,300bhp using proven technology and 
materials from the Typhoon and Tempest.  Table 20 summarises the product history. 
 
Table 20:  History of Alstom  
 
Year   Activity 
1946      Ruston and Hornsby Ltd worked on the first industrial Gas Turbine 
1952 First TA Gas Turbine was produced for Kuwait Oil  
  And was still operational in 1991 
1950  TE, TD and TB engines produced. Initial engine 500 to 1970  
 bhp up to 5,400 bhp 
1961 The first TF Gas Turbine was installed for the Royal Navy,  
 producing  1300 bhp 
2002     Typhoon, power generation (4,922 kW, 6,600bhp) 
                Typhoon Mechanical drive (4.35, 4.70, 5.05 and 5.25    
  MW(e) Tempest, Tornado (7.75 MW ) 
  and Cyclone still in production 
 
Source: Alstom 2002 
 
 
Summary 
 
After reviewing the available company history to understand what changes had taken place 
in supply chain management.  It was highly evident that the company had captured only the 
high technological advancement of the product range.  The technical history highlighted the 
huge investment the company made into technological innovation, research and development 
and the history emphasised the incredible amount of servicing hours which were achieved 
from an engine operational in the field.   
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The company historical information had not captured strategic changes such as aims and 
objectives, company ownership, company initiatives to examine the business improvement 
theme, processes, operational restructuring and redundancies.  Each of these areas was 
examined to provide a full overview of the supply chain management.  As the strategic 
objectives were difficult to identify, to appreciate the company direction the Managing 
Directors’ speeches were reviewed over the last 15 years. 
 
5.2.2  Managing Directors speeches 
 
In 5 years there had been four Managing Directors’ that had provided a different style of 
management for driving the company forward.  An examination was made of three speeches 
to compare the executive management messages.  1989 was the first Managing Director 
speech: 
 
‘Ladies and gentlemen in two years time half of you will 
be redundant.  Our products are 20% more expensive 
than Solar, our lead times are 50% larger than Solar, our 
new products take too long to bring to market, our quality 
is deteriorating, our costs are soaring.  We are 
uncompetitive in many areas of manufacture.  We are 
disorganised, we don’t work as a team, we are losing 
good employees’, we are failing to attract new ones.  All 
of this adds up to decline.  So what are we going to do? 
(Pause)  
 
What we are not going to do is carry on as we are.  We 
are not going to keep our company performance a secret 
from our employees’.  We are not going to have an 
atmosphere between January and March, where no trust 
exists.  We are not going to have protectionism or 
compartmentalisation.  We are not going to have our 
employees’ saying no one ever asked me. What are we 
going to do? What we are going to do is change.  
Managing Director European Gas Turbines 1989.    
 
 
This speech had an extremely shocking opening for employees’ and a very concerning 
message on company performance.  The first sentence, in two years time 50% of you will be 
made redundant would have stopped employees’ listening much further, as they would have 
all thought about the impact of this harsh abrupt statement to themselves.   
 
What the Managing Director had communicated was that he recognised there was a major 
problem with service levels, in particular long product development lead times, poor quality 
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and increasing costs and he saw the company really needed to change.   The next speech was 
taken by the Vice President of the site 13 years later: 
 
‘To start with, both our on time delivery performance and 
our non-quality costs levels are unacceptable and through 
addressing them we have an opportunity to double our 
profits from today’s level of activity.  If we continue with 
our current delivery performance and product quality we 
will see a decline in our sales with obvious consequences 
– I am receiving regular customer feedback that their 
patience is running thin.’ Vice President Small Gas 
Turbine Company November 2002. 
 
 
This speech had the same message of quality, cost and delivery service to customers, but was 
communicated in a very different way to the other Managing Director in 1989. It focused on 
doubling profits, but then closed out with if our sales do decline ‘obvious consequences’ 
implying redundancies. A year later a further Vice President stated: 
 
‘The next order from SBM will not go to us, we have 
since found out the order has gone to Solar.  The reasons 
for their decision (taken at the highest levels in SBM) 
were because of our product quality, our on time delivery 
record and our safety record.  All of which have fallen 
below their expectation.’  Vice President Demag. January 
2003 
 
 
Over 15 years the underlying message from three different Managing Directors’ was; 
product quality, cost and delivery which were unacceptable to external customers. It was 
very difficult to visually identify the quality, cost and delivery company performance in the 
supply chain.  
 
In two of the speeches, 1989 and 2002 if the company did not efficiently and effectively 
manage to address the problems it was clear redundancies would occur.   
 
When the Managing Directors’ were communicating performance they implied or stated jobs 
would be lost, it was unnecessary to say this as it is quite clear what will happen, if the 
company does not prosper.  It was unfortunate that the head of the company who 
infrequently spoke to employees when they did mentioned potential redundancies; this could 
unnecessarily make employees feel disengaged, unvalued, affect their confidence and 
performance.  In the last speech safety had became an additional problem.    
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 5.2.3 Site ownership and company changes 
 
Up until the late 1970s the company was known as Ruston Gas Turbines.  At the turn of the 
century Ruston Gas Turbines (RGT) was still a reputable name across the world.  However 
in the 1970s the site became European Gas Turbines (EGT) up until the late 1980s when it 
became Alsthom, part of Alcatel. 
   
In 1998 the site became Alstom, a French company.  A year later Alstom became ABB 
Alstom Power a joint venture with ABB.  Nine months later Alstom bought the ABB part of 
the joint venture and the company became Alstom Power.  In 2003 Siemens purchased the 
Alstom site and the site became part of the German company.   
 
The site was then given the name Demag Delaval Industrial Turbomachinery Limited (DDIT 
Ltd).  From the 1st October 2004 the site was renamed Siemens Turbomachinery 
Technology. 
 
Over 6 years the name changes were very sudden and confusing for employees’, who felt all 
the name changes, except Siemens, had been poorly communicated.  Each time the Lincoln 
site changed ownership the name changes were in the public domain before they had been 
officially announced to the workforce.  When ABB Alstom, a joint venture, took place an 
operator found the public notice on the internet and communicated it prior to management 
announcements, which took place over a week later.   
 
The company vision for Alstom was very difficult to find, as most senior managers did not 
know what it was.  The Alstom Vision was: 
 
‘Through the innovation and inspiration of our 
employees’, customers and suppliers we will create the 
passion in our company to deliver world leading 
technology and company performance.’ Vision 1997 
 
The vision was very compelling and picked all the key areas of the supply chain including 
innovation and inspiration of employees, customers and suppliers to create ‘passion’.  There 
was little successful evidence of this happening in the company except for some operational 
improvements in manufacturing with operational employees only.  The strategic objectives 
were also reviewed. 
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Alstom strategic objectives 1997 were: 
• To capture 25% market share within the next 5 years of the 3-15MW market in oil and 
gas and CHP 
• To develop and successfully launch at least one new market product within the next 5 
years 
• To develop our position as the preferred service provider by securing critical aftermarket 
company for the installed fleet 
• To achieve industrial gas turbine technology leadership within 5 years 
• To be the industry leader in profitability and cash generation  
 
There were no annual targets set and the strategic objectives for 1997 were product 
development and marketing specific.  It would be difficult for other senior management and 
their departments to align to the company needs.  This strategy was presented annually to a 
selection of senior managers by the executive management team.   
 
There was no facility on site large enough to cater with communication.  To cascade 
information and communication across the supply chain directors cascaded to senior 
managers, senior managers to their line managers and line managers to their teams and so on.  
There were hundreds of managers on site and many lines of hierarchy; employees further 
down the company knew little of what was happening.  Managers would often provide 
information on a ‘need to know’ basis. As such, the plan for information cascade on the 
company strategy never materialised.  
 
Company initiatives were investigated to examine the business improvement efforts of the 
company.  The improvement efforts were made under different initiative banners. There were 
2000 employees on site and many employees had experienced most of the history.  The 
average age of the workforce was 48 and employees had at least 15 years of history with the 
company.  They had seen many supply chain management initiatives start and stop, with very 
little return.  Most employees felt that the company initiatives had failed or had not got off the 
ground before being changed.  
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Ideas on supply chain management approaches included ‘Double the Business’, ‘Liberating the 
Workforce’, Total Productive Manufacture (TPM)’, Kanban and Continuous Improvement 
Through Teamwork (CITT), Stretch 30 (cost reduction), Lean, Six Sigma and Value 
Generation Programme (VGP, cost reduction).   
 
These changes left a lot of cynicism among the employees across all operational structures of 
the company.  The cynicism was stronger when employees did not feel part of the change or 
understand why they had to change and they got overwhelmed with coloured slides and 
company abbreviations.  The cynicism began by employees telling stories about a lock out in 
the 1970s.  In the 1970s senior managers’ and employees could not agree on a pay negotiation 
which had ended in a lock out for employees for seven weeks.  Some employees who were not 
at the company during this time had heard this story and explained the story to others.  The 
company had come a long way since the lock out in the 1970s the work between managers and 
the union became  more closely involved. 
 
In the early 1990s managers used the phrase “Liberate the Workforce” this meant that 
operations and processes could be improved by employees that were empowered to change 
anything they wanted.  The initiative enabled employees to make changes that were totally 
outside existing policies or processes to complete company activities.  However as there was 
no guidance from senior management or policy determined on how to implement new ideas, 
so nothing happened.  Employees felt that many of the barriers to change were outside of 
their control so the company remained unchanged.   
 
Employees who went on continuous improvement training listed all the challenges that they 
were facing.  After this they had identified improvement opportunities that were within and 
beyond their control.  This exercise revealed that employees felt only 20% of their 
challenges were within their control and the other 80% were managements responsibility. 
This was very alarming as employees felt they were not in a position to change anything.  
Efforts were made to get employees to break these challenges down further as a means to 
demonstrate that some of these challenges could actually be within their control.  This was 
very difficult due to their mindset, which unfortunately had developed over several years of 
their experience within the company.  The negative attitude of employees was a large 
inhibitor to supply chain management. 
 
In the late 1990s the managers introduced ‘Breakthrough Thinking’ this meant stepping into 
the future and looking back at what activities were taken to achieve the end result.  This was 
a creative way of thinking but it was too radical to put this approach on top of nothing.   For 
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example if the company had spent time on continuous improvement or total quality 
management, a foundation would have been in place for breakthrough thinking to be 
effective and evolve.  Instead the breakthrough concept was far too off the wall as it was 
difficult to look into the future and let go of day to day problems. 
 
In the late 1990s Boston Consulting Group (BCG) supported the company to develop a cost 
reduction process. The cost reduction process was established for the purchasing and design 
departments rather than operationally across the whole supply chain.   In 1999 standard costs 
were used as the baseline.  All the purchasing buyers and the re-design to cost team were 
measured against reducing the standard cost of components, by 10% annually over three 
years.  This metric was incorporated into the financial process and was reviewed by 
developing an IT system.   
 
This approach got the purchasing department only to think about cost reduction using price.  
Employees who were involved did not consider the total cost impact of their decision.  For 
example, if a buyer saved a reduction of £20 for a blade but it took longer to deliver and it 
perished more quickly in the field, it could actually cost the company more in total life cycle 
costs.   
 
Also the 10% drive for every commodity to be reduced in the same way meant no 
consideration was given if the commodity could achieve more or less savings.   Overall the 
‘Stretch 30’ concept caused managers outside of purchasing and design to complain about 
the lack of total cost focus across the supply chain, particularly for the project management 
department.  The full time design team struggled to gain an input from the departmental 
managers as their efforts were on operations.  ‘Stretch 30’ continued for three years.  After 
two years the redesign team was shutdown and the project leader remained to drive the 
operational management heads. 
 
In 2000 an Automotive Director came to manage manufacturing and introduced Lean 
thinking.  The Operations Director aspired to make Lean a way of working life across 
manufacturing.  As a result ‘Kaizen Blitz’ activities took place in every cell over a year and 
every manufacturing employee went through a one day company simulation for them to 
quickly experience the benefits of Lean improvements.  The cost benefits of lead time 
reduction, process flow enhancement, reduced inventory and transactional activities.   
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In 2001 Alstom Head office, in France, instructed that all units globally must pursue the Six 
Sigma methodology.  This caused confusion within manufacturing as employees did not 
know what would happen to Lean.   
 
It was important that senior managers kept a consistent and clear message to show how both 
approaches complimented each other. Instead the operations company continued to use the 
lean approach and any six sigma projects were known as projects only.  The rest of the 
company carried out six sigma projects only. 
 
By the end of 2002 the Alstom Lincoln unit invested in the training of four black belts and 
sixty greenbelts, from which only two black belt projects were closed out, which delivered 
£115,000 annually.  No green belt projects were completed.  This was primarily due to a lack 
of departmental head support and commitment for green belts to spend time and resource on 
the projects.  The history of Alstom Six Sigma deployment globally was summarised in 
Table 21. 
 
Table 21: Alstom Six Sigma deployment 
 
Year  Activity  
 
2000  July six Sigma was introduced in six power sector units 
       2001   October  Power sector launch six sigma for all segments 
2001  Executive workshops attended by management, six segments 
        twenty nine companies and sixty unit teams 
       2002   Six sigma deployment commenced with segment executive workshops     
       2002   Six sigma deployment continues with unit executive workshops     
       2002   Six Sigma projects identified (Y=f(X)’s)  
       2002   January Black Belts and Green Belts selected and trained 
       2002   October awareness sessions started for everyone 
2002  Power sector management team confirmed that Six Sigma was the  
                   change programme for the sector and wished to continue the deployment   
                   of  the system at maximum speed 
 
Source: Alstom 2002 
 
 
Once Siemens purchased Alstom further investment was made into Six Sigma, by having a 
site master black belt (seconded from America), a programme manager and an additional 9 
black belts and 36 greenbelts.  Siemens also provided a one day awareness course, company 
excellence staff training and a two day leadership course.  However the completion of 
projects was very slow, typically taking one year.   
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Primarily this was due to a lack of process owner accountability, senior management 
leadership, support and discipline.  Far too much bottom up driving was evident through the 
black belt project leaders.  Nevertheless the cost benefit increased to £1m in a year. 
 
Lincoln internal processes 
 
In the mid 1980s Lincoln had over 700 processes documented and the company converted all 
the written procedures to process maps.  These processes were produced functionally by 
each department.   Each department set their own inputs and outputs to the processes.  No 
cross functional teams were used and the customer and supplier of each process was not 
consulted. Processes were silo based and sub optimised as most processes went across 
functions, but they were produced in isolation to the rest of the company and internal 
customers.  This created the whole supply chain process to become more complex and 
contributed to problems upstream and downstream.  
 
Despite process mapping starting in the late 1980s there was insufficient re-engineering 
taking place with the information.  Managers created many of the process maps and those 
created by process users had little process review, except if Lloyds were coming to do an 
audit. At present all the performance measures for the company were not aligned to 
processes.  There was also poor visibility of measures across the company. The cost of poor 
quality was heavily measured but little deployment was made across the company.  
 
The quality department and the finance department produced the monthly quality costs 
report.  The report was circulated to head office and the executive board.  It was difficult for 
the company improvement teams to gain access to the information which was critical for 
project selection and prioritisation. 
 
In 2001 the cost of poor quality was recorded at 4% of turnover.  High poor quality costs 
meant the site worked for six months to make a profit and then threw the rest away in hidden 
quality costs.  In 2003 the cost of poor quality increased to 12%.  The cost of poor quality 
had increased as nobody acted upon the data and implemented new ideas into the supply 
chain.   
A Senior Manager summarised the poor process: 
 
‘Smash the plate, sometimes it is better to start again with 
a new plate than to put the pieces of the old plate 
together.  Too many of our systems and processes are 
pieced together.  Current systems lead to rubbish in and 
rubbish out.’  Senior Manager 2003 
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All the processes were developed using the existing systems with a couple of changes.  
Managers which had no targets were left to run their areas of responsibility as they saw fit.  
This finding was validated by the Head of Customer Support: 
 
‘No one can ever tell whether you’re doing a good job or 
not as they only ever look at your budget costs.’  Head of 
Customer Support (2003). 
 
Senior managers were left to carry out their role as they saw fit and provided their budget 
was in control or even slightly over they were left alone to manage their own operation, no 
further performance measures existed.  Despite having a strategy in place it was impossible 
to tell whether the activities managers carried out were aligned to deliver the company 
strategy. 
 
The quality department was seen as remote from the actual running of the company.  Quality 
employees worked heavily as audit police and were seen to stay in their offices in isolation.  
Some operational quality staff were located in manufacturing, but with no central co-
ordination or guidance and heavily focused on concessions and raising inspection reports.  
 
No root cause analysis was carried out.  The quality department produced cost reports, 
internal audits and carried out quality checks.  In 2004 the traditional quality department still 
remained.  
 
 5.2.4 Management at Lincoln 
 
In 2002 feedback from a senior quality management course was that managers had lost their 
charisma and focus on their own budgetary objectives and the running of their own 
departments or teams.  Most managers wanted to stay in their own comfort zone and 
continued to do so.  Overall across the company there was too much resistance to change by 
managers and little acknowledgement for the need to change.  This departmental operational 
focus sub optimised supply chain management despite business approaches to support the 
entire supply chain. 
 
When ABB purchased Alstom as part of a joint venture in 1999 a new infrastructure and 
reporting processes was communicated to the company. The main competitor was Solar who 
had 80% of the market place.  A director wrote a poem about the competition. This was 
shown in Figure 29.  
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Figure 29: Directors notes - paddle your own canoe 
 
 
Once upon a time, ABB Alstom UK Ltd and Solar decided to have a 
competition boat race on the Brayford. Both teams practiced long and hard to 
reach their peak performance.  On the big day they were as ready as they 
could be. Solar won by a mile. 
 
Afterwards the ABB Alstom UK Ltd team became very discouraged by the 
loss and morale sagged.  
 
Senior management decided that the reason for the crushing defeat had to be 
found, and a project team was set up to investigate the problems and 
recommend appropriate action. Their  conclusion: the problem was that Solar 
had eight employees’ rowing and one person steering. ABB Alstom UK Ltd 
had one person rowing and eight employees’ steering. 
 
Senior management immediately hired a consultancy company to do a study 
on team structure. Several months later and after spending billions of pounds, 
the consultancy company concluded that too many employees’ were steering 
and not enough rowing.                            
 
To prevent loss to Solar again next year, the team structure was changed to 
Four Steering Managers, Three Senior Steering Managers, and One Executive 
Steering Manager.  A new performance system was set up for the person 
rowing the boat to give more incentive to work harder and become a key 
performer; ‘We must give him employment enrichment. That ought to do it.’ 
 
The next year Solar won by two miles. The ABB Alstom UK Ltd team laid off 
the rower for poor performance, sold off all the paddles, cancelled all capital 
investments for new equipment, halted development of a new canoe, awarded 
high performance bonuses to the consultants, and distributed all the money 
saved to the senior executives. 
 
Source:  Alstom 1999  
 
This was a very controversial poem.  It was surprising to find that a director had written it to 
highlight his frustration with the way in which the company was being managed.  The poem 
was very close to the truth and the changes that the company had undertook.   
 
 
When the internal project team was set up to find out why they lost the race they reached the 
conclusion that they had ‘one person rowing and eight employees steering.’  They then hired 
consultants to look at the structure.  This implied that they did not have the understanding to 
implement these changes internally.   
 
However they did not involve the rower to ask his ideas.  ‘Several months later after the 
company had spent billions on consultancy fees they agreed with the conclusion.’  In reality 
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the site spent a significant amount of money with large consultants to undertake tasks cross 
functionally.  The consultants would drive successful implementation by instructing senior 
managers’ what to do; this often de-motivated employees’ as they were not involved or able 
to take any responsibility. During the time of the poem BCG had restructured purchasing 
with senior managers and established a cost model for ‘Stretch 30’ and KPMG introduced 
the VGP cost system with the executive team. 
 
The poem said: ‘We must give him employment enrichment. That ought to do it’. During 
that time senior management were saying ‘Liberate the Workforce’ but there were no tools 
and techniques or training and support behind the statement, so it was just words to 
employees.   
 
The poem expressed the disappointment of the only rower being laid off whilst the 
consultants and senior executives received a bonus.  In 5 years there had been four periods of 
redundancies.  Some directors felt there was too little investment in the business for product 
development and long term growth and the senior executive team had too many bonuses.  On 
the site there were 160 senior managers who reported to the senior executive team, so the 
poem implied there were too many managers and no clear direction. 
 
Overall the poem implied poor management.  The senior executives, senior management and 
employees did not effectively communicate.  There was no plan or clear targets and direction 
to win the race.  There were too many senior managers steering and not enough rowers to 
win the race.  
 
Redundancies 
 
From 1990 to 1996 there had been 5 periods of redundancies.  In 1999 500 employees within 
the workforce were made redundant due to high overhead and labour costs, this caused high 
inertia and low moral amongst the workforce.  Workers had known about the redundancies for 
over 3 months, prior to the formal management briefings.  The day of the management briefing 
the workers went out for lunch and found the redundancies headlined on the front page of the 
local newspaper, The Echo.   
 
The direct reports (operators) were assessed by a last in first out policy and the indirect reports 
(staff) had a scoring performance matrix that was completed by managers.  This matrix 
included sickness, performance and years of service.  If the employee had worked for the 
company for over 10 years they automatically got 10 marks allocated to their score, which 
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gave them a higher score which meant a higher chance of continuing to be employed.  These 
separate redundancy systems caused resentment between the shop floor and office.  Some 
employees were concerned as they did not regularly meet or know their managers.  Most 
employees had no targets and measures and never regularly had meetings with their managers.    
In one case a clerk had not met with her manager for almost a year. 
 
The senior executive team made an announcement a year after these redundancies in June 
2000, “Save us £6m by August or 350 of your jobs will go.”  It was not from a member of the 
board but the whole senior management team. During this time no leadership or action plan 
was used and no training or education was provided to enable employees to work with data to 
analyse and recover costs.  Also there was no explanation given for where the cost reduction 
opportunities could come from as no further information was provided.  This announcement 
made employees complacent as they felt redundancies would take place.  This threatening 
adversarial management approach highlighted poor support and leadership to assist employees 
in improving the supply chain.   
 
Sadly in August 2000 the process began to make employees redundant and Alstom hit the front 
page of the local newspaper The Echo:   
 
‘Workers sombre as job cuts start. Morale was very low 
as the first employees’ to be hit by a double wave of 
redundancies left. A senior shop steward reported it’s not 
the shop floor which has caused the problem, it’s the 
management and getting rid of workers isn’t going to 
solve the problem.’  
The Echo April 2000. 
 
During this process every department had to make 10% of their workforce redundant.  For the 
customer service managers the whole department was shut down, as it was felt that this 
department did little to deliver to the bottom line.  This was extremely difficult to measure as 
the teams were ensuring customer satisfaction.  An experienced Blade Operator shared his 
thoughts: 
 
‘Its all doom and gloom in ere, it’s the worst I ‘ave ever 
seen it.  We’ve ad nothin but bad management for a long 
time and when they need to blame someone it always 
comes back to us workers.  I have mates who ave gone to 
work in the offices and some who ave been sent home.  
But some of us ave no work and are just standin ere, coz 
our supplier is off so we aven’t got any work comin in 
and then wot appens to the next customer along?’  
Blade Operator 2000. 
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It was interesting that the operator was clear about his customer and supplier interfaces and 
thought about the supply chain. This operator had been in the company for over 30 years.  
The morale in his whole area was very low.  Operators would come to work and just sit at 
machines as they had no work to produce.  This continued for over two months.  Sadly this 
operator took voluntary redundancy and left the company very disappointed after all his 
service. It was upsetting to see operators were not put on improvement projects within 
production. Finally some of these operators were sent into the offices chasing unpaid 
invoices and carrying out administrative tasks.   
 
Less than 6 months later the order book was very productive and Alstom recruited again, some 
staff which had been made redundant were recalled.  Some of the experienced operators said 
this would happen, they had bet a couple of beers on the fact that production was there and 
management were cutting overheads before the year end, but would recruit again in 6 months 
time.  This operator knowledge would have come from their previous history on the gas turbine 
site. 
  
 5.2.5  Annualised hours 2000 
 
In 2000 the operations senior management team introduced annualised hours, the objective 
was to save money.  This was achieved by removing shift allowances, overtime and 
introducing flexibility which meant employees would be sent home when no production 
work was available.  For the workforce this meant smaller salaries, no overtime and poor 
visibility of working hours.  Many operators had a reduction in their salary.  The feelings of 
two Operators were captured: 
 
‘None of us are signing that contract.  They’ll ave to sack 
us.  Most of us just don’t care anymore it’s the same old 
thing.  Why don’t they get us some sales and look at 
other parts of the company.   
If they get rid of us why don’t they ever get rid of any of 
the office staff, there’s just too many of em’.  
Shop Floor Operator 2000. 
 
The operators often got frustrated as they felt they were treated differently to the office staff. 
In particular because the annualised hours did not impact on the office staff and there were 
typically five office employees to every direct employee. 
 
‘We all got issued contracts for annualised hours.  I think 
it will benefit us in Spares and would have signed it but 
they said in the last sentence if we don’t sign and return 
 135 
the new contract by Wednesday 2nd August 2000 then our 
jobs will be terminated!  Most of us are not signing to see 
what happens.’  
Precision Grinder 2000. 
 
The operators felt mistreated by the threat in the letter and how it was communicated 
because most of the operators had been in the company for so long.  
They were shocked by the cut off date and threat of terminating their contracts.  This made 
them resist the change to ‘see what would happen’. 
 
A third ballot was carried out on 17th June 2000 which found the majority of employees were 
against annualised hours.  70% opposed annualised hours.  Workers felt that redundancies 
were on the horizon and once they had been squeezed to agree poorer contracts, 
redundancies would embark once more.  An extension was made on the contract termination 
date to 2nd September 2000.  Three days before this date the secretaries were assigned to call 
every shop floor worker within the company.  The operators were told if they did not return 
their contracts by Monday morning they would be sacked.  After 200 jobs were made 
redundant the workers signed the new contract.  
 
At the end of 2003 when the company became Siemens 99 redundancies were made.  During 
this redundancy many voluntary offers and early retirements were made, leaving only 8 
compulsory redundancies.  
 
There was a huge drive on cost reduction during 2003.  However management had changed the 
focus to strip overhead costs, excluding labour costs, due to the effect the redundancies had on 
staff morale. 
 
Employee feedback 
Every year the company sent an employee survey to all employees with a covering letter 
from the Managing Director.  The same employee survey was used for the last five years to 
gauge an understanding of how employees felt about nine key areas.  The feedback note for 
2001 was illustrated in Figure 30.  The researcher felt it was important to consider the 
content of the employee survey to consider the affect on supply chain management. 
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Figure 30: Employee feedback note 
Dear Employee, 
 
The objectives were clear finding ways to achieve them took a little longer.  What emerged 
six months later was a set of interlocking plans, the building blocks for a world class future. 
 
The beginning of the new millennium has proved to be as challenging to our company as the 
end of the last one.   
 
Some very difficult decisions have had to be taken to ensure that we have a successful 
company for the future, and as a result I recognise that morale is low in our company.   
 
It is my job, along with the rest of the management team, to do what is necessary to improve 
this as it is an essential factor in achieving our long-term growth. 
 
Your input from the employee survey is a valuable source of information that not only 
guides us in making development decisions but also for the training and development of our 
managers in the future. 
 
Managing Director 
Source: Alstom 2001 
 
The note started the objectives were clear, they may have been clear to the executive team 
but they were evidently unclear to senior managers and therefore their employees 
(5.2.3:125).  The remaining of this note was well written recognising low morale and 
emphasising the survey will be a valuable source of information to achieve growth. 
 
Alstom received a 60% response rate from 2,500 employees, which was very good.  It was 
important the Managing Director and team captured the challenges and developed plans to 
improve performance.  Figure 31 illustrates the employee survey results for the Lincoln site.  
Figure 31: Employee survey results for Alstom Lincoln 
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There were no high performing areas 68% was the highest for quality of worklife and goals 
and target setting, praise and recognition was very poor at 44%.  The results were also 
displayed by department and by team using department budget codes.    Over the past five 
years the bar chart had followed the exact same shaped pattern.  Praise and recognition, 
training, development and creativity were the lowest areas of performance every single year.   
 
After 6 years the employee survey was removed by the HR Director as no actions were ever 
taken.   The Managing Director and his team continued not to deliver the commitment to 
employees, by using the feedback to improve.  The senior management attitude and lack of 
commitment not valuing employees’ feedback and using it to improve supply chain 
management were once again an inhibitor. 
 
In 2002 the training and development department interviewed a cross section of 30 
managers to understand how they felt about the company adopting 9 values.  Table 22 
shows the results.  
 
Table 22: Alstom employee interviews 
 Rated 
% 
1. Provide training and development opportunities for all  62.5 
2. Create a supportive environment 59 
3. Operate an equal opportunities policy 68 
4. Communicate openly and honestly at all times 42 
5. Ensure contributions from  in a team environment 53 
6. Provide the opportunity for personal growth and career progression 60 
7. Review performance and recognises achievement 50 
8. Involve all  in company development 40.5 
9. Create an environment where innovation and creativity are encouraged 51.5 
Source: Alstom 2002 
 
Despite 30 interviews, representing a small number for 2500 employees the value 
statements compared to the employee survey had similar results.  For example encouraging 
creativity was 55% in the survey and 51.5% in the manager interview 2 years later.  More 
concerning was that only 40.5% of managers felt they were involved in company 
development.  As managers in a company each and every one of them should feel involved 
in some level of company development.  42% felt communications were open and honest at 
all times. 50% felt performance was reviewed and achievement recognised. 
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 5.2.6  Supplier feedback on Alstom values 
 
Strategic suppliers’ were asked about 9 value statements that covered the relationship 
between the company and themselves.  Each of the 13 strategic suppliers was given 
opportunities to create further statements.  The value statements were discussed in an 
interview with the employee development manager. Each strategic supplier read each 
statement and scored accordingly. Table 23 shows the value statements. 
 
Table 23: Value statements 
 
 Agree 
strongly 
Agree 
slightly 
Disagree 
slightly 
Disagree 
strongly 
1 Alstom was open and honest in  
our dealings with suppliers 
6 6  1 
2 Alstom always invest time to  
understand its suppliers capabilities 
1 6 6  
3 Alstom  was always clear and  
consistent in their communication  
with suppliers 
3 6 3 1 
4 Dealing with Alstom was a  
satisfying experience  
7 5 1  
5 Good supplier performance  
Received  appropriate recognition 
5 3 5  
6 Alstom were committed to  
mutual profitability and growth 
5 5 3  
7 Alstom  were committed to  
Continuously develop their suppliers 
5 7 1  
8 Alstom honoured their  
commitments as established  
within the contracts 
7 3 3  
9 Alstom valued long term  
company relationships 
11 1  1 
Source Alstom 2003 
 
 
Eleven companies strongly agreed that Alstom valued long term company relationships.  All 
contributors apart from one agreed that the company was open and honest.    Statement 2 
above “Alstom always invests time to understand their suppliers’ capabilities” provoked the 
most discussion.  The consensus of opinion was that Alstom did not invest sufficient time to 
understand suppliers’ capabilities. The majority of the strategic suppliers said that there was 
a lack of ‘technical’ involvement. 
 
The next statement “Alstom was always clear and consistent in their communication with 
suppliers” produced the greatest spread of responses.  Some suppliers commented by 
discussing their most recent experiences whilst other suppliers based their feedback over the 
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duration of their supply.  The experience of the ‘Double the Business’ initiative produced 
most of the consistent comments.   
 
Suppliers felt there were high levels of communication to increase productivity and the 
opposite when orders were drastically reduced.  Generally the initiative known as double the 
company was a bad experience for suppliers.  Many suppliers had over produced to meet the 
needs of their key customer asking for more stock.  For these suppliers it meant they had 
inventory on their shelves which took a long time to sell.  Sadly for other suppliers it meant 
they went out of business. 
 
The fourth statement “dealing with Alstom was a satisfying experience” was similar for all 
suppliers taking part in the survey, except one.  Most suppliers felt they had developed good 
working relationships with their contacts at Alstom. The main concern of one supplier was 
about the frequency of personnel changes and dealing with inexperienced workers. 
 
Two thirds of the respondents were satisfied with the recognition received for good 
performance.  In some instances strategic suppliers were still waiting to receive quality 
certification to display in their reception areas. 
 
Suppliers felt that without Alstom having a strong commitment to invest time to understand 
their suppliers’ capabilities (statement 2) and commitment to continuously develop suppliers 
(statement 7) there would be little strength in this statement. Most suppliers opted for the 
slightly agree to continuously improving and developing suppliers statement with, some 
referred back to the ‘Double the Business’ experience. This statement prompted several 
requests for a supplier conference. 
 
The statement Alstom honoured their commitments as established within the contracts 
received a positive response in most cases.  The negative responses came from suppliers who 
had experienced rapidly changing situations.  Some suppliers had one contract quickly 
replaced by a second and even a third. 
 
The statement “Alstom value long term company relationships” generated the highest 
response of all of the statements.  One exception was a supplier who believed relationships 
with his company were at their worst for 10 years and expressed concern about the 
relationship with key personnel in the sourcing area. 
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Suppliers were also given the opportunity to add any statements that they believed should 
feature in company values.  Different suppliers suggested the following statements in Table 
24. 
 
Table 24: Supplier statements 
 
No.  Agree 
strongly 
Agree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
slightly 
Disagree 
Strongly 
10 Alstom operate a team  
working approach in the  
interface between us and  
our suppliers 
  
1  
11 Alstom always involve  
suppliers in the development of  
products within their areas of  
expertise 
  
 1 
12 Alstom always give feedback  
on supplier performance 
  
 1 
Source: Alstom 2003 
 
Alstom never leveraged the power of the company as a whole, instead each unit carried out 
its own purchasing transactions individually.    
 
When Siemens purchased Alstom in 2003 the competency frameworks, processes and 
policies were very evolved and aspired to create a standard global approach.  Siemens used a 
process house framework which went down several process levels for every site globally.  
The make buy process became a global framework and purchasing buyer decisions for 
strategic commodities were leveraged by volume.  Strategic commodities were negotiated 
through the head office, in Germany, to create power over suppliers.  This was achieved by 
consolidating the cost base of multiple site usage together and thus getting stronger terms 
and conditions.  Siemens worked towards key commodity management globally harnessing 
power and leverage of many units and their commodities combined.   
 
5.3    Manufacturing  
 
Up until the late 1980s the company carried out piecework and time and motion studies on 
the shop floor.  Operators worked hard to hit output to get more money.  Operators abused 
the system by booking time to scrap and rework when their output was low as they still got 
paid anyway for whatever they booked.    This meant the scrap and rework data was 
inaccurate and as a result management removed the measurement system.  In 2003 only 
scrap times were measured.   
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In the late 1980s the company launched a ‘Double the Business’ initiative but it was unclear 
whether management wanted to double the production or double the profit.  This lack of 
clarity remained throughout the initiative as managers provided different messages.  This 
also caused lots of problems and caused high inventory levels for Alstom and its suppliers.  
This confusion could have been prevented by an agreed consistent and common message by 
the executive management team. 
 
Over the years a strong working relationship had been formed between management and the 
Union.  The relationship had evolved strongly since the relationships in the 1970s.  In the 
late 1990s the Union brought total productive manufacture (TPM) to the company.  The 
deputy works convenor, who was previously an operator, became the continuous 
improvement co-ordinator for the site.  He arranged for part-time TPM facilitators to be in 
place within each manufacturing group. The TPM facilitators were all young graduate 
engineers who volunteered.  Each TPM facilitator faced opposition from group managers 
and operators. The two day continuous improvement training course was also voluntary to 
operational staff. 
 
Many operators were not keen that the deputy works convenor was the improvement co-
ordinator.  One Operator expressed his opinion by saying: 
 
‘The convenor is running with the foxes  
and hunting with the hounds’. Operator 1997.   
 
The operators felt little loyalty for themselves, they also thought TPM approaches were time 
and motion studies they had had before.  There was not enough education or training made 
for employees to understand the concept. 
 
 5.3.1  Operational supply chain focus 
 
The employees’ did not think in terms of a process, where the output of the process would be 
measured, instead they strongly felt that they were personally being examined.  This attitude 
was not helped by managers disciplining or sacking operators for scrapping parts.  This was 
evident when a high performing young apprentice received a final written warning for 
scrapping a part, and an operator due for retirement was dismissed for scrapping a part.  
Instead of investigating the process and identifying the root cause to take the appropriate 
action the manufacturing managers blamed the operators.  The autocratic management style 
would have to change to bring about an improvement culture. 
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In the late 1990s the Union introduce business improvement into the company and attempted 
to drive it, there was no commitment from senior management or the executive team.   The 
recoveries went against the kanban principle as recoveries encouraged over production.  To 
make matters worse the bonus system for all operations was on the recovery measure.  In 
2003 the recovery measure was still in place but the bonus system was changed and linked to 
company profit.    
 
 5.3.2 External operations director recruited 
 
In 2002 a new operations director was appointed from the automotive industry.  Three 
months before ‘Six Sigma’ was introduced to the company he brought in the Lean 
manufacturing philosophy.  The operations director had a completely different approach to 
leading.  He communicated his expectations and behavioural traits to the workforce, in 
particular an approach for ‘openness, honesty, commitment and a can do attitude.’  The 
operations director worked hard to improve communication; to achieve this he flattened his 
hierarchical structure, which had an unbelievable 40 layers and reduced work teams to a 
maximum of 20 in a department.   
 
There was little understanding of processes and supply chain management, except from the 
operations director who found that a set of typhoon blades travelled 8,500 miles in the 
supply chain to get completed.  The blades flew to America twice and actually only had a 20 
minute value added operation in the factory on a viper grinding machine. 
 
The operations director took his group managers offsite to create a shared vision prior to the 
lean rollout. To support the rollout of the lean philosophy a team of 8 employees were pulled 
together to carry out a 9 month programme across all cells in manufacturing.   The 
operations management team raised 3 issues during the day influencing and gaining buy in 
from employees, the supporting infrastructure and the financial cost benefit model to support 
and recognise lean cost savings.   
 
 5.3.3  Influencing and gaining buy in from employees 
 
Many initiatives were introduced into Alstom that overloaded the employees.  Management 
needed to drive out fear and complacency to change and needed to convince operations 
employees that it was worthwhile.  Every operations senior management attendee thought 
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the average employee felt no threat whatsoever from current company performance. Gattorna 
(2006) expressed a company should have identify what the need is to change. If the 
employees did not feel the need to change it would be more difficult to introduce and 
implement new concepts in the supply chain.  
 
Infrastructure 
 
The operations management needed to agree clarity over drivers. Some felt it was “cash” 
whilst others felt it was “lead time”.  There was also a need to examine incentive and reward 
and develop a recognition process.   
 
A lean support team would be there to support the change working for the group manager, 
cell manager and lean implementer responsible for a designated area.  The lean implementer 
role was created for them to work closely with the group manager and cell managers to 
further deploy the lean philosophy.  A cell manager role was created for each cell to have a 
manager working closely with employees from the cell. Once the team of 8 moved into 
another area the cell manager drove changes whilst the lean implementer coached the cell on 
business improvement tools and techniques.  (Hines and Taylor 2000). 
 
Financials and cost benefit model 
 
The management team needed to agree and develop a policy for redeployment.  There were 
inconsistent measurements and cost models (ie. recoveries were in conflict).  The 
management of direct and indirect costs needed to be examined, 40% of the costs were 
variable and this needed to increase.  The management team were concerned about whether 
they should action future state or blue sky value stream maps.  Management also expressed 
concern over the importance of realistic cost savings, when the current standard cost model 
poorly captured total savings.   
 
Senior management felt they had attended many away days to look at the future of the 
company the same concerns and barriers remained.  Senior management attempted to 
introduce new approaches or initiatives but did not overcome the barriers to change or 
embrace employees in why these changes had to happen.   
 
The operations management team brainstormed the inhibitors and enablers to make lean 
happen.  There were more enablers in operations to support and drive changes forward.  
Table 25 shows the inhibitors and enablers to making lean happen. 
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Table 25: Making lean happen – inhibitors and enablers 
 
Inhibitors to Change Enablers to Change 
Lots of change 
Employees’ don’t care 
No faith in the ability to change 
Apathy and complacency 
Lip service 
No co-ordinated plan  
Not delivering 
Distraction by other company issues 
Poor leadership 
Lack of resources 
Not tackling the big thorny issues 
Reluctance to change 
Unstable drivers 
Lack of follow up 
No task culture, not results driven 
Tied in bureaucracy 
Remove roadblocks 
Co-ordinated approach 
Clear, concise strategy 
Lead by example 
Common language 
No jargon 
Benchmarking 
Buy-in “benefit to employees 
Visible actions 
Recognition 
The need – consequence of not  
doing anything  
facts or reality of Solar 
Accept there will be pain in changes 
Achievable goals 
Robust models (finance, make/buy) 
Passion manage group as your  
small company 
Replace what we’re doing today with lean  
as a way of life “empowered”. 
Enthusiasm 
Training / knowledge 
Communication ongoing 
Resources 
Commitment 
Release resource and time 
No blame culture 
Delegate responsibility and authority 
Clear plan, objectives and vision 
Definitive milestones delivered 
Recognition of success 
Focus – part of the company 
Fix roadblocks quickly 
Work as a team 
Constancy of purpose 
Source: Siemens 2005 
 
 
It was comforting to see from Table 25 that there were many enablers for lean to succeed in 
the supply chain.  The focus was on quick results achieved by developing pilot areas, 
consolidated plans and actioning future state maps, change management and team building 
were considered.  For rollout it was intended that the group managers and lean implementers 
delivered lean awareness training.  This was to instil commitment and support from the cells.   
 
In practice the lean implementers worked very closely with the cell managers and operators.  
Facilitators did less coaching and mentoring and more driving and co-ordinating.    Cell 
managers did not air their concerns in public.  Instead they communicated amongst 
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themselves and the more confident ones raised their concerns in one to one meetings with 
their manager.  The cell managers wanted more support and felt that their group managers 
were too detached from their operational cells and were always in meetings.    
 
The group managers kept to their old behaviours and actions and continued to be away from 
the shop floor in meetings.  They would collect their cell action plans for monthly reporting 
to the operations director. 
 
Feedback was given to the operations director that more work needed to be done with his 
group management team to get them aligned to share the same vision.  The operations 
director was extremely sensitive to this feedback and annoyed it was felt that his team were 
not aligned.   
 
‘Lean is not an option they have to be aligned, as  
       I’ve told them.’ Operations Director 2005 
 
It was clear that his operational management team needed further support and understanding 
in order to delegate to their team.  There was a fundamental difference in being told to do 
something and being convinced that it was the right thing to do.  It was concerning that the 
operations management team did not talk the talk and lead by example which made the lean 
change process slow down.  To support the lean change programme, lean managers from the 
automotive industry were recruited to take over managing and improving two of the 
perceived difficult operational groups.  In three years the deployment of lean principles 
reduced inventory by £11m.  
 
5.4 Purchasing 
 
In 1998 there were 3 purchasing departments’ core engine, packaging and turbochargers.  
Turbocharges was run as a separate company located on the same site.  Packaging and core 
engines were accountable for £160m of external spend with suppliers against a £300m 
turnover.  The purchasing departments were each supported by a purchasing manager and a 
purchasing director across the departments. 
 
Alstom had over 10000 suppliers 8 years ago. This was reduced to 1700 (including service 
and production suppliers) through a major rationalisation programme.  During this time each 
department remained totally separate.  There was some duplication with supplier accounts, 
uncoordinated improvement projects, with different processes being used for the same 
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purpose.  The only formal communications which took place were purchasing managers and 
the purchasing director who met weekly. 
 
At the end of 1999 Boston Consulting Group came into Alstom to review the purchasing 
approach.  BCG interviewed the purchasing managers’ and revealed that not enough focus 
was spent with strategic suppliers, the spread of supplier portfolios was not evenly 
distributed across the buyers and finally each purchasing department were doing little to 
achieve effective cost reductions. 
 
BCG worked with purchasing for 6 months to position commodities, review the make and 
buy policy, establish a cost reduction system and support in the reorganisation of the 
department.  This was a very difficult time for purchasing employees; over the previous 2 
years there had been 2 sets of redundancies and now the purchasing staff where faced with 
total uncertainty about their future.   
 
The feelings of a Senior Buyer were revealed: 
 
‘You feel like a pawn in a chess game.  Everything is 
changing around us and nobody even cares to ask about 
your opinion.  My team are asking me what’s happening 
and I have no idea.’  Senior Buyer 1999 
 
Nobody knew what was going to happen to his or her position and how their job would 
change.  However, nobody talked to the managers about how they felt and the opportunities, 
instead individuals gossiped amongst themselves. In manufacturing there were rumours of 
purchasing moving into the same area.  After 4 months of purchasing employees not 
knowing what was happening, an announcement was made to present the new department 
structures and teams’ structures.  Purchasing was renamed sourcing, to fit in with the 
corporate terminology.  All jobs had a new portfolio with a set of new internal customers and 
new external suppliers.   
 
All suppliers were clustered into 6 commodity team head by a sourcing manager.  Six 
sourcing teams were established; packaging, combustion, control systems, production, 
facilities and rotor. For example the rotor team had all components that fitted to form the 
rotor, discs, bearings, blades etc. A sourcing support team were created to provide coaching 
and guidance to 6 sourcing personnel on purchasing processes, training and development, 
quality costs and global sourcing. 
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Unfortunately sourcing did not re-locate with operations; instead everybody was moved to 
sit with their team.  Buyers who previously had experience with certain commodities were 
all moved to handle entirely different commodities.  There was little time for handover as 
employees were in their new roles within 2 weeks.  This big bang approach impacted the 
professionalism portrayed by sourcing internally and externally.  The buyers in new 
positions hardly knew anything about their commodities. 
 
In 2003 when Siemens purchased the Alstom Lincoln site sourcing was restructured.  Many 
of the strategic commodities were taken from Lincoln and procured from Germany.  
Commodity account manager positions were appointed to negotiate global contracts, 12 
positions were created.  Operational purchasing remained but only 2 purchasing manager 
positions remained, 1 for packaging and 1 for core engine.  All the buyers’ commodities 
were re-arranged and each buyer ended up with a different portfolio again. 
 
 5.4.1 Order fulfilment 
 
A group of engineers were involved in supporting the operations company groups with lean 
manufacturing.  This involved them going into a group for a maximum of 8 weeks to 
improve the processes and material flow.  This often meant they would have 1 or 2 weeks to 
improve a cell. 
   
If the lean support team needed any purchasing requirements they would have to write a 
requisition to get it approved and take it to purchasing to convert into a purchase order.  On 
this particular occasion the requisition stayed in the buyer’s in tray.   
 
The feelings of the Continuous Improvement Engineer were expressed: 
 
‘I was involved in a 5 day improvement blitz within a cell 
we wanted some standard storage racking.  We could 
have got this off the high street but it took 2 months to 
come in through sourcing.  They are working to a 
different priority list to Operations’.   
Continuous Improvement Engineer 2004. 
 
Often the support team would move on to another group whilst the group they left waited for 
external materials to arrive.  After many complaints from manufacturing to purchasing about 
the service being too slow the team escalated due dates to the operations director.  The team 
finally got sourcing to agree to provide the lean team with a purchasing card. 
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There were only 15 purchasing cards allocated to employees’ within the company with a set 
budget and suppliers to purchase non production items only.  This had been frustrating for 
engineers.  In 2003 electronic vendor schedules were introduced to 300 suppliers. In 2002 a 
weekly print out used to be sent to suppliers in the second post, which meant each supplier 
had to manually check what requirements had changed.   
 
 5.4.2  Purchasing skills and competencies 
 
The competence and skills needed to carry out the strategic purchasing role were similar to 
the skills needed for a consultant.  Further investment was needed in training and education 
to support the new and developing role.  Sourcing employees would be equipped with the 
right level of understanding in tools and techniques to deliver results and to become more 
facilitative. There was often a generalisation that everyone could fulfil these new roles and 
skills. Nevertheless when the skills and competencies required were reviewed it raised 
questions as to whether the capability of some employees would be adequate. 
 
A sourcing job family tree was available which provided the grading structure and job 
description for the sourcing department.  Table 26 shows the 4 sourcing grades. 
 
Table 26: Summary of purchasing staff grades 
Role Grade 
Clerk 13 
Trainee Buyer 14 
Buyer 15 
Senior Buyer 16 
sourcing Manager 17 
Source: Alstom 2001 
 
When assessing grades within sourcing there was a high amount of employees’ with a grade 
13 at a clerk level and a few experienced operational buyers at a grade 15.  It was clear that 
despite a grading structure being established management rarely used the range of payments 
available within the job family tree to award employees efforts in cost reduction and delivery 
of strategic objectives.   This was highlighted in minutes from the sourcing managers 
meeting.   
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Minutes from the management meeting  
 
 
There is increasing evidence that we are falling behind the market rate for sourcing staff.  
Specifically, we are finding it difficult /impossible to recruit at the levels we pay to our 
current staff.  We are losing key staff for financial reasons, employees’ of comparable ability 
transferring into sourcing from other functions within the company are paid more than our 
existing / experienced staff and sourcing has one of the lowest average salaries in the 
company.   
 
Source: Alstom 2001 
 
The sourcing department was driven by price instead of total cost.  Everyone needed to take 
further responsibility to consider the hidden cost of quality such as transportation, storage 
and life of produce, processes as a whole system and the supply chain to proactively drive 
improvements. 
 
 5.4.3  Purchasing development – comparing Alstom units 
 
A quick purchasing comparison was made between Lincoln and 3 other Alstom units.  This 
was to compare purchase development and identify approaches.  A summary was made for 
each unit’s current purchasing processes Table 27 summarises findings.   
 
Table 27:  Alstom supplier site supplier development comparison  
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Courneuve 
QCD 6 Q Y No QC 
DS 
150 238m  
Euro 
Y 
Finspong No 4 QC 
ET 
In Audit Y D(QC) 
*** 
1700 
**** 
300m 
Euro 
Y 
Bruno No 7 total 
5 used 
Q No No QCD 200 15m  
Euro 
Y 
Lincoln** QCD 
TE 
9 QET In Audit Y QC 
DT 
800 450m 
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Y 
Source : Alstom 2001 
Key:  Q - Quality, C - Cost, D - Delivery, S - Service,  
 T - Technical, E - Environment. 
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Common areas were non conformance systems for suppliers and performance rating systems 
for suppliers.  Each site was at different levels of advancement in the purchasing and 
supplier development processes. Bruno’s process had been in operation for 4 years and was 
regularly updated based on development of commodities.  Two sites had QCD. Lincoln 
carried out supplier self assessments for audits and performance measures on suppliers.  
Finspong did not measure suppliers but planned to introduce cost and quality measures using 
existing tools and databases.   The number of suppliers for Finspong was significantly larger 
as they had all their suppliers grouped together.  
 
This illustrated that some good purchasing processes existed for supplier classification and 
audits.  There were varying levels of coverage and supplier performance ratings.  Each unit 
except Finspong covered delivery.  Quality, cost and delivery were the only categories for 
Bruno. Lincoln included a technical assessment and La Courneuve a service assessment.   
 
Only Finspong and Lincoln used tools and techniques to improve, the other 2 units did not 
use anything.  Due to resource and time constraints some of the processes were applied in a 
fragmented way and were not reviewed regularly.  The processes were predominantly 
created manually and there was a fundamental need for a more automated database.  The 
database would then provide data and information to compare units’ performance and carry 
out benchmarking. 
 
5.5 Senior management view of their supply chain  
 
In 2001 a strategic review day was held with 150 senior managers.  All attendees completed 
a questionnaire which asked from their experience what they felt were the inhibitors and 
enablers of effective performance in supply chain management (appendix 3 shows the supply 
chain management survey).                                                                                                                                       
For the purpose of this research all the comments were added into a database to carry out 
conceptual analysis. There were 795 inhibiting comments made by the senior managers’ 
whilst for enabling comments there were 519.  These results were not weighted which 
revealed that there were many more inhibitors preventing effective performance in the 
supply chain.  Once all the inhibitors and enablers and their associated comments were 
entered into the database every comment was captured and all comments were clustered into 
themes. The findings were presented as inhibitors and enablers.    
 
The key inhibiting themes identified were: negative attitude, fear, lack of priority, lack of 
commitment, lack of understanding and lack of openness and honesty.  The key enabling 
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themes identified were: open performance, accountability, incentives and lead by example.  
The comments given under each theme were those expressed by the senior managers using 
their exact comments.   
 
Inhibitors for supply chain development 
 
The six inhibiting themes: negative attitude, fear, lack of priority, lack of commitment, lack 
of understanding and lack of openness and honesty were explained with the actual senior 
management feedback which was provided from the survey. 
 
Negative attitude   
 
An ingrained attitude existed that was negative, this meant asking managers and employees 
to do something they did not believe in was impossible from the outset.  The preconceived 
views and the company history did not help the situation. A “so what” attitude existed, “why 
should I do it when they’re not” or “even if I do it, others will let me down, so what’s the 
point”,  “well last time….”, “I’ve been here 25 years and its never…..”.  As a result past 
experiences and failures created a “how it’s always been” mentality. 
 
Fear  
 
Fear fell into three categories; fear generally, fear of failure and fear of change.  The 
continued change from department restructuring and new company names had caused 
employees to become reluctant to accept change.  Many of the senior management and their 
employees had also become afraid of failure.   
 
The site history and memories of past experiences and the baggage caused from previous 
failed initiatives such as “Double the Business” prevented them from moving forward.  
Employees’ feared company failure from product quality, faults and delivery performance. 
 
Lack of priority   
 
There were too many requests and their work was becoming overloaded and overstretched. 
Employees were afraid of saying ‘no’, some had good intentions but continued to take on too 
much work and would not prioritise accordingly.  There was no ranking process for 
commitments and a lack of acceptance of targets and objectives.  There were also 
diversionary activities.  Overall this created a domino affect of broken commitments. 
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Lack of commitment  
 
It was too easy to give a commitment and then not deliver, as too often management and 
employees’ were presented with unachievable targets.  There were conflicting demands, 
interests and requirements, some employees’ believed that others were not committed and so 
did not see the point to be committed themselves.  Managers also gave commitment of their 
employees to do other managers activities without prior knowledge to the employee.  
 
Lack of understanding 
 
Lack of knowledge and understanding existed for management and employees.  There was a 
lack of understanding and knowledge of individuals, customers and personal values and poor 
appreciation that everyone had an input.  Lack of respect for each other was often due to a 
lack of understanding.  They did not understand the size of commitment and what was 
involved.  Many felt that the objectives and goals were unclear.  There were unrealistic 
objectives and expectations; there was project overload and promise of many major new 
projects to come.  
 
Lack of openness and honesty  
 
Managers and employees’ contrived answers by telling others what they wanted to hear.  
There was a culture of “it’s ok not to be honest”. This included communication internally 
and externally with customers and suppliers.  Employees’ avoided conflict, embarrassment, 
confrontation and bad news. They provided limited information and told others what they 
wanted to hear, as they did not want to ‘rock the boat’. There was also an inability to value 
criticism as it was seen as ‘exposing weaknesses’.  Alstom needed to stop the blame culture, 
backbiting and hidden rules. 
 
There were insincere and dishonest employees’ who cheated for personal gain. There were 
unpalatable truths, especially from sales and customer perspectives.   Many did not know 
what honesty meant to the company. There was too much use of statements like ‘with all due 
respect’ and ‘I hear what you say, but’, which showed a disregard by some managers for 
some employees. It was more a case of “do as I say and not as I do”.   
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Enablers for supply chain development 
 
The enabling themes were: open performance, accountability, incentives and lead by 
example and were explained by senior management comments.   
 
Open 
 
An open approach encouraged more debates and enhanced transparent requests.  Managers’ 
and employees’ needed positive and negative feedback.  This was achieved by open 
communication, forums, reporting and an open book policy. There was a need for ongoing 
relationship building to encourage an open society where everyone’s ideas were respected 
and listened to.  Managers’ needed openness to accept different views and explanations, 
without ridicule.  Employees’ would then be treated fairly, know where they stood and 
would become more informed.    
 
Performance  
 
The company needed to become customer orientated and build customer confidence, both 
externally and internally. Decisions and performance development should be based on fact 
and the use of strategic measures.   
 
Employees’ performance would include realistic strategic objectives and the ability to meet 
targets.  Performance improvement would impact greater efficiency, productivity, output, 
reduced cost of poor quality and delivery on time.  Only then could the company meet 
customer, supplier and employee expectations. Employees’ would continue to carry out step 
changes to continuously improve performance.    
 
Greater focus and prioritisation of objectives and publishing completed and finished actions 
were required. Senior management and employees’ needed to be more disciplined and 
deliver commitments. 
 
Accountability 
 
Managers’ and employees’ needed to be empowered to have a greater sense of ownership 
and accountability.  Individuals needed to take the authority and ownership to make 
decisions.  Employees’ accountability meant they would need to determine acceptable levels 
of work and drop activities, which took their workload over the top.  Big tasks needed to be 
 154 
broken down into individual manageable bite size pieces, with understanding of limits, 
realistic targets and priority settings. 
 
Incentives  
 
To make change happen the company needed to motivate employees’ through rewards and 
recognition.  For example recognition for milestone achievement and visible rewards clearly 
linked to success. Employees’ should be praised and recognised for having a ‘can do 
attitude’. 
 
Trust  
 
Trust needed to be two way between employer and employee and vice versa.  The company 
and the employees’ needed to give and receive a greater degree of trust.  Creating a 
trustworthy culture meant there would be no hidden agendas.  Senior management and 
employees needed to build complete trust in the supply chain.   
 
Understanding  
 
Managers’ and employees’ needed to understand positions and pressures of others and 
demonstrate respect.  Managers needed to be able to show empathy and appreciate diversity.  
This would include fair consideration of different views, cultures, beliefs, age and gender.   
 
Understanding skills, roles and responsibilities would assist understanding. Employees 
would need to take interest, nurture understanding and give constructive feedback, be it in 
agreement with their views or not.  This would provide the company with professional status 
and image. 
 
Lead by example  
 
The Managing Director needed to set example by ensuring a “top down” approach.  Respect 
should be demonstrated by how managers’ and employees’ behaved.  Employees needed to 
get on with their job and follow through on actions, not just listen and forget.  Managers’ 
would then be able to get the company back on track, lead by example and develop robust 
relationships with stakeholders.  
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Actions taken to develop the company  
 
After the strategy day questionnaires were collated. A large lever arch file containing all the 
results was handed over to the executive board and no actions were taken.  This was very 
disappointing as the survey contained valuable findings. After the results were used to 
produce a summary report these findings were presented to the Managing Director to agree a 
way forward.   
 
Although most of the management feedback was inhibiting factors the Managing Director 
was pleased that senior managers had honestly written how they felt.  It was interesting to 
reveal that the majority of the results were behavioural and impacted how senior 
management wanted their managers and employees to operate at work such as trust, 
openness, honesty and understanding.   
 
The new approach could be to create an environment in which managers could operate 
differently.  Senior management would need to lead by example for their employees to feel 
they could operate openly and honesty with clear targets, leadership and support.    
 
Unfortunately because there were so many behavioural inhibitors the Managing Director felt 
that these inhibitors were not something that he could change.  The Managing Director 
strongly felt the inhibitors came from his managers’ personal values.    By linking all these 
inhibitors to personal values he felt the inhibitors were innately part of what somebody lived 
for, which rarely changed.  The researcher appreciated this view but felt managers could take 
some responsibility to challenge and break the mindset of complacency in the company. 
There was the environment in which employees operated, how employees were managed, 
how targets and priorities were set.   Unfortunately no action was taken.   
 
5.6 Siemens impact on the unit 
 
In 2003 when Siemens purchased Alstom, the communication was different.  Three formal 
briefing presentations took place for everybody prior to the company becoming Siemens.  
The football pitch was hired for everybody to receive communication together for the first 
time in company history. 
 
In 2003 when the site became Siemens the cascade of information was more difficult, as all 
information was marked ‘strictly confidential’. Even the quality cost information, which was 
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public knowledge to the entire company before, was now communicated to senior managers 
who were accountable for reducing the costs. This was dangerous as it isolated senior 
managers, project managers and teams from the real company issues and performance this 
also increased complacency.  Employees’ may think there was no longer need to change, 
which could not be further from the truth. 
 
In 2003 the community of Lincoln still referred to the Siemens unit as Rustons.  Siemens 
remained the largest employer for Lincoln with a workforce of 2500. It also provided the 
highest salary levels in the community, compared to agricultural companies and telephone 
call centres.  In 2003 the average salary was £18,500 compared to the UK average of 
£21,000.  Companies in Lincolnshire were able to take advantage of the lower cost of living.  
 
When company name changes had taken place, the operational activities and organisational 
structures and roles were never impacted.   However, Siemens globally were very process 
orientated and drove standard harmonised systems.  Siemens were very keen on the 
application of high level standard processes and an integration plan was established for the 
company to implement the Siemens processes.    
 
The Siemens processes begun with the introduction of a company Balanced Scorecard to 
assist in delivering the strategy and in the near future the site would adopt the Siemens 
process house.  This defined high level processes for supply chain management, relationship 
management and supporting processes such as HR, Finance and I.T.   
 
Value generation programme 
 
In August 2004 the Lincoln management team introduced value generation programme 
(VGP).  VGP was a tool created by KPMG consultants; it was developed to close a company 
cost gap between themselves and their main competitor.  The tool baselined all the company 
costing data for the first year and projected the costs four years ahead, assuming an estimated 
cost calculation for economic costs, overhead costs and cost of sales.  The tool then assumed 
that if all costs remained the same over the four years the company had a cost gap between 
them and their competitor.  The huge cost focus drove everything in the company.  As a 
result in one year over 30% cost reduction was achieved. 
 
Siemens found standardised reporting and controlling of financial and quality information 
important.  Many changes were made internally to fulfil corporate reporting requirements. 
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5.7 Summary case analysis of a Gas Turbine Company 
 
The Lincoln gas turbine site had undergone considerable change including 5 company name 
changes in 6 years and 4 new Managing Directors over 5 years.  This had made a significant 
impact on senior managers and employees, which had enhanced business improvement to the 
internal infrastructure of the supply chain.   
 
There was a significant drive to reduce costs. Initially all cost reduction was focused on the 
labour costs and heavy savings were made through redundancies and annualised hours.  
However, regular end of year redundancies over a 5 year period placed considerable strain 
on employees’ morale and motivation.  The executive management team finally changed the 
approach to focus on all other overheads.   
 
The continual pressure and drive to reduce costs meant that the strategic objectives were 
delivered extremely quickly.  The speed of implementation to reduce cost meant that the 
resource was heavily constrained.  There was no time for accepting and embracing change.  
This was experienced when Siemens drove a 30% cost reduction in 1 year for hard tangible 
cost savings. The strategic objectives were realised, nevertheless high pressured, stressful, 
confused and disengaged employees’ remained.  Too many short term approaches like could 
have a catastrophic affect on supply chain management. 
 
The supply chain management at the gas turbine company was heavily focused on internal 
improvements and external cost reduction with suppliers.  Improvements were heavily 
functional.  The feedback of 150 senior managers’ experiences of the enablers of supply 
chain management revealed a soft emphasis was needed.  The soft emphasis was because 
openness, honesty, leading by example and a positive outlook, were factors which would 
enable impact to optimise supply chain management. 
 
The main areas affecting the gas turbine company which heavily affected supply chain 
performance included; little service drive, management commitment, lack of ownership and 
accountability and no total process drive or focus on the supply chain.  The five main areas 
which affected supply chain performance were examined further.  
 
Little service drive at Lincoln 
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There was heavy conflict between a service focused company, concentrating on rapid 
response to customer needs and a make to order manufacturing unit concentrating on 
production and not the end customer.  Despite Lincoln providing service support to oil and 
gas customers there was very little customer focus and understanding. In particular if a 
customer needed an urgent replacement part the following day, there would be no value in 
sending it months later.   
 
It was evident from the company history research that the manufacturing plant was heavily 
technologically and manufacturing focused. This was emphasised by the history captured by 
the company which was technically biased.   
 
The Lincoln site supply chain never felt a burning need to change.  The company had existed 
for over 60 years and the majority of employees’, who had a long service history; felt that it 
would continue to be there.  A culture of historical complacency and negativity had evolved.  
Employees’ had experienced a lot of initiatives and suffered fatigue.  Management did not 
receive regular information or communication for the customer base and external 
environment.  The information and communication of the key customer base was held within 
sales and marketing or the strategic development department.  Little communication and 
information was transferred within the supply chain.   
 
Management commitment 
 
Management commitment was by far the greatest area of opportunity and this alone could 
drive the enablers of supply chain management.  Management commitment was made 
through leadership, clear performance targets, accountability and disciplining employees that 
did not perform, when clear of their expectation. Every area in the supply chain could 
perform more effectively and the departments would become more closely aligned.   
 
Unfortunately the company ownership, internal re-organisation, redundancies, cost reduction 
pressures and initiatives meant senior management would race ahead without taking time to 
communicate changes and get employees to embrace change.  Many of the employees’ 
continued to operate in chaos and heavy firefighting.  Employees were not clear of what was 
expected or truly needed by their managers or customers.   
Lack of ownership and accountability 
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There was great concern over the lack of ownership and accountability.  Processes were 
mapped but ownership of processes and the effectiveness on processes were poorly 
measured.  The company significantly struggled with delivery problems however the 
delivery measure was never fully examined or understood across departments and 
bottlenecks never appreciated. Employees provided examples of poor delivery and costs 
spiralling out of control where managers did not take ownership. 
   
No total process drive or focus on the supply chain 
 
The process maps reflected functionality and there was little ownership and accountability.  
The processes were slow to respond and had little flexibility.  For example all purchase 
orders for Aberdeen were posted to Lincoln to be authorised, adding unnecessary time to the 
process as authorisation could have been made by a manager at the Aberdeen unit.  Another 
example was buyers focused on cost reduction.  They may select a cheaper supplier, but the 
supplier may have a longer delivery time, causing the total costs to be higher.  At the 
beginning of the research each operation transacted their work for their part of the process 
with no consideration to the whole process or the supply chain. 
 
Summary  
 
There were considerable changes being made to the company to take it forward.  There was 
significant investment in lean, six sigma and cost reduction systems to develop excellence in 
supply chain management.  (Bicheno 2000). 
 
However, there were a lot of negativity and fear of managers and employees who needed to 
overcome barriers which had remained untreated in the company.  These were heavily 
highlighted in the employee opinion survey as were poor training and development, 
creativity, praise and recognition.  (Hines and Taylor 2000, Gattorna 2005). 
 
The company had introduced the Balanced Scorecard however further soft measures could 
be used as a driver for employees to value and respect each other and their management.  
(Kaplan and Norton 1996). The soft measures could include values for leadership, managing 
change, praise and recognition and effective communication.   
 
The next chapter compared and contrasted the bearing company and the gas turbine company 
identifying parallel themes to answer the research questions. 
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6.0  Cross Case Analysis 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The chapter on cross case analysis looked for commonality in the case studies to answer the 
research objectives.  The research objectives were: to identify the ways in which the 
management of the supply chain had changed, to investigate how new ideas on supply chain 
management were implemented, and to identify the inhibiters and enablers of supply chain 
management.   
 
The supply chain management research was conducted using a conceptual framework (Figure 
9) which drew its key factors from the relevant literature. These factors included; policy 
deployment, managerial support, employee involvement, business improvement and 
suppliers.  These factors informed the analysis. The contextual factors were summarised 
within the cross case analysis under the research objectives. 
 
RHP-NSK and Alstom-Siemens were compared as were 4 supplier companies.  Both of the 
main case study companies had a 60-year history and were located in historical market towns.  
RHP-NSK (case study 4.0) was located in Newark and Alstom-Siemens (case study 5.0) in 
Lincoln.  Both companies provided the main employment for their communities 20 years ago.  
However in the twenty-first century they have both faced shrinking workforces, due to global 
competition, the strength of the pound sterling and pressure to make higher margins.  Added 
to these pressures, clients required higher quality, reduced costs and tighter delivery 
adherence.  At RHP-NSK the sales and marketing team were targeted monthly by automotive 
customers’ differing QCD systems (4.6.4).  Alstom-Siemens placed emphasis on customers’ 
QCDS expectations (5.2.2).  
 
Mentzer et al. (2001) classified supply chain management into three phases; a management 
philosophy, implementation and a set of processes.  The research revealed that both 
companies were heavily focused on the implementation phase.  In both case studies there was 
very little evidence of supply chain management as a philosophy and thus less strategic 
emphasis; both companies had made considerable effort in implementation and had gained an 
increasing awareness of the need to focus on business improve supply chain implementation.  
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6.2  Cross case analysis 
 
Cross case analysis was undertaken to answer the research objectives. This provided 
understanding and evidence from the literature and case studies to complete the study.   
 
6.2.1 The ways in which the management of the supply chain had changed 
 
In the twenty-first century, a change for both companies was that senior management had to 
think and act more strategically about supply chain management.  This meant they needed to 
consider global supply chain management, planning and policy review and external factors 
which impacted their company, including product and market positioning.   
 
Alstom-Siemens’ management had the scope to pull supply chain management principles 
through its suppliers due to its global positioning, market share and spend.   This began with 
the creation of the commodity manager role. RHP-NSK was constrained by smaller volumes. 
Nevertheless, for many of their strategic suppliers, RHP-NSK was their key customer. It was 
felt that RHP-NSK had greater potential to leverage suppliers through consolidating volumes 
across sites, but the strategic focus was frequently reactive.   
 
The 2 manufacturing companies showed very little evidence of strategic supply chain 
management taking place, despite having a global presence.  Both companies were taken over 
by foreign competitors and little change was imposed through the new head offices.  RHP-
NSK’s Japanese head office management team simply came and reviewed the site’s progress.  
They did not recommend any tools or techniques to be implemented, despite the widely 
publicised Japanese quality management approaches.  Alstom head office was the only one 
which introduced six sigma training through its head office across all the sites worldwide.   
 
Throughout the five company name changes at the gas turbine company, each head office left 
the local senior management to develop their company supply chain as they saw appropriate.  
Overall the takeovers were weak at introducing new ideas and concepts to under developed 
sites.  The exception was Siemens who purchased Alstom in 2003.  For a period of 18 months 
there was a great emphasis on the balanced scorecard, process alignment, standardising 
systems, stretching targets for cost reduction drive and financial/quality reporting.  Siemens 
emphasised more regular communication and reporting, and re-introduced an employee 
survey. 
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The research showed that many managers operated functionally at the expense of the total 
process or ‘whole system’ and lacked consideration of supply chain management. This was 
evident from the vignettes and case study research, such as the purchasing department 
making price reduction decisions which affected the shelf life of components of the gas 
turbines in the field, which would cause additional labour, transportation and parts 
replacement.  Overall there was a lack of communication and sharing of information across 
all functions in both companies.  This was particularly found between the sales, 
manufacturing and purchasing divisions.  At its worst, RHP sales had seven-year agreements 
with customers and six-month forecasts of demand, yet only passed a 12-week forecast to the 
manufacturing division.  A longer-term forecast of information shared with purchasing would 
have been very advantageous for material flow and control and to provide suppliers with 
more visibility rather than the monthly spot ordering process. In 2006 a significant change to 
RHP-NSK was that all low-cost commodity bearings were manufactured in China, where 
they were cheaper to make and buy.  The entire strategic focus was shifted to ‘precision 
bearings’, which were high technology and priced to compete.  
 
To review the transition of how things had changed in supply chain management, both 
companies were reviewed from the beginning of the research to the current day, capturing 10 
years of supply chain management developments.  To compare a high-level strategic 
overview of the companies, a matrix was produced summarising high-level supply chain 
development.  Table 28 identifies these key changes in supply chain management. 
 
Table 28:  High-level company cross case analysis 
Key factors RHP-NSK  
1996 
RHP-NSK 
 2006 
Alstom-Siemens  
1996 
Alstom-Siemens  
2006 
Ownership Japanese Japanese French German 
Supplier tier  
to customers 
3rd tier 3rd tier 1st tier 1st tier 
Strategic  
Approach 
Hoshin  
kanri and  
Visual Mgt 
Hoshin  
kanri and  
Visual Mgt 
No high level  
strategic approach  
visible 
Balanced  
Scorecard 
External  
Customer 
Pressure 
Quality 
Cost Delivery 
Quality 
Cost Delivery 
Quality Cost  
Delivery Reliability 
Quality Cost  
Delivery Reliability 
Drive Cost Cost Quality Cost and Quality 
Costing  
System 
Standard  
Cost 
Standard  
Cost 
Standard Cost in  
Finance, Quality  
Costs in Quality 
Standard cost  
and quality cost  
system in Finance 
Policy DeploymentQCDS QCDS 30% over 3 years  
Cost Reduction  
10% a year 
20% Cost  
Reduction  
Annually 
Source: Case study findings   
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Table 28 shows that, at a high strategic level, RHP-NSK remained fundamentally unchanged.  
The case study research revealed a heavy focus on the implementation phase (6.2.2). RHP-
NSK had a consistent focus on annual targets and visual management using QCD measures 
(Figure 10). This provided benchmarking, targeted focus and performance review.  It also 
maintained a common language of development across sites.  For example, one Japanese unit 
had used the same QCD measurement system for over 30 years and continued benchmarking 
using the same high-level measures. 
 
Table 28 shows that the external customer pressures continued to focus performance in the 
same areas.  However, the internal focus changed at Alstom-Siemens due to the change in 
ownership and senior management priorities.   Both companies had little deployment of 
customer systems within their supply chains, except for differing QCD systems which were 
measured and reported at the sales function at RHP.   
 
At Alstom-Siemens the policy system went through dramatic changes.  At the beginning of 
the research, the vision, strategic aims and objectives were unclear to managers.  The 
executive management team kept the strategic aims strictly private and confidential. Only a 
small proportion understood what the company was trying to achieve. At the beginning of the 
research, Alstom-Siemens had the basic measure for a manager to keep control by ‘staying 
within budget’.  This was emphasised by a quote from the Head of Customer Support: 
 
No one can ever tell whether you’re doing a good job or 
not as they only ever look at your budget costs.  
Head of Customer Support (2003). 
 
Managers who did not have a budget had no means of being measured by the company and 
no expectations were placed on them.  This culture existed for four years.  At the end of each 
year senior management issued redundancy notices to achieve their plan.  This short-term 
focus meant employees had a much greater degree of uncertainty, which heavily affected 
morale and motivation.  This short-term emphasis was damaging to supply chain 
management, as employees who were made redundant would often be recalled to the 
company when orders increased, creating a high degree of uncertainty.   Alstom was taken 
over by Siemens in 2003, and immediately Siemens made 99 employees redundant.  Once the 
head office in Germany saw the impact this had on morale and motivation, all further 
redundancies were stopped and the focus was shifted to reducing all other overhead costs.   
 
Siemens made strategic management changes which included the introduction of a Balanced 
Scorecard which considered financials, processes, employees and customers.  The site MD 
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was measured on his profit and earning before interest and tax (EBIT) and reported quarterly 
on the Balanced Scorecard progress of the site to the German head office.  The Balanced 
Scorecard company targets were agreed annually and cascaded down to every function.  Each 
department in turn then produced their Balanced Scorecard to run their department.  The 
policy deployment system was introduced over 18 months across the entire supply chain. 
RHP-NSK and Siemens both used a performance measurement system across their entire 
global business to compare units’ performance.  This was extremely powerful for strategic 
decision making and to compare different units’ supply chain management development.   
 
Lee and Dale (2000) reported that policy deployment cascaded from corporation to division, 
from division to function, function to team and finally the individual.  In RHP-NSK the 
manufacturing, quality, sales and marketing operations carried out a full cascade. In 
purchasing they were initially excluded entirely and were measured on price reduction only.  
For Siemens the cascade was introduced top down across the whole supply chain and it 
became the way departmental managers were measured.   
 
A common factor was that both companies adopted performance measures across 
departments which were visible and deployed down to departments and teams. In four 
departments – manufacturing, engineering, purchasing and sales – these targets were 
deployed to individuals.  An immediate change at RHP-NSK was that purchasing became 
integrated into the policy deployment process (Figure 26). At Siemens policy deployment 
went down to individual buyer and commodity.     
 
Lee and Dale (2000) reported that to achieve the full value of policy deployment effectively it 
should include everyone for optimisation of the supply chain.  Brewer and Speh (2000) found 
that many managers saw supply chain management and the Balanced Scorecard as separate 
tools.  Those who understood the integration had a greater likelihood of leveraging the supply 
chain as a source of competitive advantage.   
 
Lee and Dale (2001) found that policy deployment was largely unreported.  RHP-NSK and 
Alstom-Siemens appeared to show evidence that they were quite advanced with policy 
deployment compared with other manufacturing companies in the UK.  In the research  the 2 
main manufacturing companies and 4 supplier companies lacked business planning and 
reacted on a day to day basis.  Pascale (1990) found that short termism was common in 
western management.  However through the influence of Japanese and German management 
approaches both companies had become more organised and had a longer term focus.  RHP-
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NSK and Siemens had included all functions, teams and many individuals which helped 
realise the value of policy deployment to leverage supply chain management.   
 
Table 28 showed that when Siemens took over Alstom-Siemens the annual cost reduction 
targets and pressure to improve doubled.  Siemens put greater focus on quality, as the cost of 
poor quality was reported but no action had been taken by Alstom-Siemens. Siemens 
integrated the quality reporting system into the financial system.  This gave the quality costs a 
high degree of robustness and imbedded them into the company financial system.   
 
Over the past 60 years Alstom-Siemens has been heavily focused on engineering and the 
technological development of a complex engine and has aimed for product leadership. This 
means Alstom-Siemens appeared to aspire to be the best in the market at the technology of 
the product and invested huge amounts of funding in technological development.  It was the 
first company to use tree pulp to power turbines overseas.   It was my perception that this 
continual focus on product leadership alone had put Alstom-Siemens out of touch with its 
customers needs.  The customer needs had changed to a ‘total service solution’ and therefore 
great emphasis was on supply chain management.  Alstom-Siemens faced an era of change 
where it was attempting to move away from product leadership to operational excellence, 
which increased when Siemens took over.   To understand how the management of the supply 
chain had changed the research focused on how people were allocated to priorities in the 
supply chain.  This is summarised in Table 29. 
 
Table 29: High level resource changes 
Unit RHP-NSK 
1996 
RHP-NSK 2006 Alstom- 
Siemens 1996 
Alstom- 
Siemens 2006 
Site Turnover £40m £52m £300m £350m 
Supplier Spend £19m £22m £180m £220m 
Number of Buyers 18 1  40 40 
No. of Senior Buyers 2 3  10 10 
Purchasing  
Managers 
2 0 7 
1 Director 
3 PM’s  
12 Commodity Managers  
2 Directors 
Number of Suppliers 5000  3000  1700 300 
Designated  
Spend levels 
Manager  
£150k 
Senior  
Buyer £25k 
Buyer £10k 
No spend  
level. 
Spend  
allocation  
set in annual 
budget 
Manager  
uncapped, 
 Senior Buyer 
£75,000, 
Buyer £50,00 
Manager capped 
Designated  
spend policy.  
Second signature  
from Germany.   
Director  
£75,000 
MD £120,000 
Source: Case study findings  
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Table 29 shows that Siemens managers’ designated spend levels were strict and managers 
had to justify why they wanted investment. Therefore the German head office held greater 
control and reporting.  Under the category of purchasing manager, many further management 
roles had been created to focus improvements on supply chain management.  These new roles 
in particular were commodity managers who reported to the site and the head office.  The 
commodity managers had to target global procurement, consolidating a particular commodity 
by liaising with other sites and negotiating high volume contracts.   The commodity managers 
had a huge impact on reducing the supply base by 82%.  These roles were clearly targeted 
and measured monthly to deliver supply chain improvements.       
 
Siemens had always had many employees in management positions; this was evidenced in the 
case of the boat-race poem (Figure 29).  A director expressed that the race was lost because 
there were ‘too many managers steering and not enough rowing’.  The new senior roles of 
commodity manager were different because they were measured and reviewed for 
deliverables. This was a significant change to previous management roles where they were 
not measured or driven to improve the supply chain. 
 
At RHP-NSK using existing employees for strategic procurement took four years to establish. 
It was a dramatic change for purchasing to become fully integrated by handing over all 
purchasing operational responsibility to manufacturing and breaking up the purchasing 
department.  In 1996 a vignette from the Engineering Manager expressed his earlier 
frustration with interfacing and communication problems: 
 
Purchasing is so busy obtaining the cheapest price they 
order parts that cannot meet our required lead times.  I was 
involved in a grinding improvement and the whole 
programme was held up by three months because we had 
to wait so long for the grinding wheels. There were also 
poor conditions negotiated with no consideration for 
maintenance, when I tried to enhance these I got into 
trouble with the purchasing manager.   
Engineering Manager (1996). 
 
Regular comments were made in manufacturing including ‘they sit up there in their ivory 
tower and never get involved in what’s really happening’ (4.3.1).  Purchasing staff were seen 
as being focused on their own price agenda with no consideration to the other functions in the 
company.   
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The lack of focus on material flow and planning was emphasised by the store manager: 
 
Purchasing buy material without asking anyone in the 
factory what they need.  They buy great quantities that 
don’t even fit in my stores. I then have to struggle to get 
my people to transport the items outside the stores.   
 
This can also be a health and safety hazard as we cannot 
use the crane or fork lift truck in some tight areas on the 
second floor.  
Store Manager (1996). 
 
Within a year the purchasing manager did not just consider price but thought more about the 
supply chain and as a starting point expressed the need for closer relationships with 
manufacturing: 
 
As a continuation of the drive to improve service levels, 
lead time to customers and manufacturing output it is vital 
that the purchasing units reporting to manufacturing are 
given the full support of all concerned.  
 
 
They have an extremely important part to play in QCD 
improvements and this unit has a dual role of closer 
working relationships with manufacturing and 
involvement in supplier improvements driven by the 
strategic unit.  
Purchasing Manager (1997). 
 
These vignettes captured the changes over time.  In 1996 RHP-NSK had 22 employees in 
purchasing with a total spend of £19m, producing paper orders for all products, which were 
printed and posted.  In 2006 one buyer procured the total spend of £22m and was part of the 
operations team reporting to the operations director.  A significant change was that at the 
beginning of the research all ordering was one-off and paper based, 10 years later all 
purchasing was carried out electronically by one buyer and included vendor schedules.  Table 
30 summarises supply chain development over 10 years. 
 
Table 30: 10 years of supply chain development 
Key   
Factor 
Areas RHP-NSK – NSK Alstom-Siemens – Siemens 
Strategic 
approach 
Aims and  
Objectives  
Hoshin kanri  Introduced Balanced  
Scorecard 
System 
 
Technology 
 
Oracle to MRP MRP moved to   
SAP-ERP 
Operations 
 
Structure,  
Activities 
Deep hierarchy 
TPM Operational  
Purchasing Manu.  
Hierarchies reduced in  
operations. 
Deep hierarchies  
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Led to Purchasing  
being integrated into 
Manufacturing. 
elsewhere 
Process 
 
Improvements TPM  
(included Lean) 
TPM to Lean Manu.  
and  Six Sigma 
People 
 
Senior  
management 
Employees 
Policy deployment  
Targets 
Balanced Scorecard  
Measures 
Customers 
 
Expectations  
and  
Communication 
Performance  
systems with sales  
and marketing  
Communicated with board, 
quality, sales  
and strategic development. 
Suppliers Targets Measures Sup. Dev. Measures and cost down 
Source: Case study findings 
 
Researching the history of RHP-NSK and Alstom-Siemens it was evident that 10 years ago 
both had a high number of employees who were functionally structured. At the beginning of 
the research, emphasis was on production and technological developments at both companies.  
The companies gave little consideration to the supply chain management and the need of 
every department to be integrated, to increase the flow of products and services to customers.   
The research findings appear to show there is still a weak customer service drive in both 
companies as there is little appreciation of customer expectations and priorities.   
 
Functional structures remained and any functions away from the sales and marketing team 
were removed from customer involvement and feedback.  The emphasis in both companies 
was heavily functional with no real need to change.  This was highlighted heavily by RHP-
NSK’s sales manager’s attitude to sharing information.  The sales manager would not allow 
any copies of information to be taken, despite Nissan’s supplier development programme 
being well documented in the public domain. The sales manager would not even allow RHP-
NSK performance figures to be captured or taken away internally to develop the supplier 
base.  This appeared to illustrate a traditional attitude and unwillingness to share information 
for supply chain development.  The primary customer-facing function would get customer 
feedback and deal with customers accordingly. At Alstom-Siemens only when a customer 
complaint became extremely high risk would the executive management team cascade 
feedback to their supply chain via the Managing Director.    During the research this revealed 
that more often the communication would be on negative customer feedback only. 
 
During 10 years of research, change had taken place in both companies.  The change in senior 
management thinking had created some consideration for the needs of the whole system and 
the supply chain.  There had been big changes in the management of the supply chain 
resource allocation, structure, roles and prioritisation but there were much greater 
opportunities to be achieved by both companies working with the ‘whole system’ in mind.   
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RHP-NSK had made a lot of progress in terms of structure by fully integrating purchasing 
and manufacturing.  This took four years to happen and further changes could have been 
missed such as reducing the suppliers.  In 2006 RHP-NSK still had 2000 production suppliers 
on their system.  Siemens had made the most strategic cost savings through its commodity 
focus and supplier rationalisation.   
 
 
Summary 
 
The evidence revealed over the period of the research that there was significant managerial 
effort aimed at change which contributed to the development of the supply chain.  This was 
manifest in the number of initiatives and the range of tools and techniques being adopted.  
However the research has revealed that whilst there have been some significant changes in 
the management of the supply chain, the changes were less than hoped for in view of the 
literature available  (Hines 2000). Both companies were not as strategic with supply chain 
management as they might have been and implemented it partially, as it affected some areas 
of the supply chain more than others.  
 
One problem was that the initiatives were placed on top of existing structures, functional 
operations and a traditional managerial mindset.  The company also had long lead times and 
long product development cycle times which enabled the pace of change to be slow; it was 
felt that this could encourage ‘sleepy’ companies with a slow drive to change.  These factors 
contributed to making the changes insufficiently strategic and less focused on the supply 
chain as a whole. 
 
6.2.2  Analysis of how new ideas have been implemented 
 
The hardest challenge for both manufacturing companies was the implementation of new 
ideas.  Firstly understanding the tools and techniques and how to apply them and secondly 
sustainability through continual focus on improving the objectives.  The teams had very 
broad objectives such as ‘RHP-NSK reducing the supply base’ and for Siemens ‘reducing 
margin erosion on the plant in three months’. Their senior management and employees 
struggled to understand how to break these objectives down so that they could become 
achievable.  Projects needed more focus and this could simply be through SMART 
objectives; specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and time bound (Count 2000).  Both 
 170 
companies also implemented new ideas that were adopted in the supply chain at the 
beginning of the research without appreciating their customers’ expectations and priorities. 
   
In 2006 both companies used TPM.  The tools and techniques used included: the fishbone 
diagram (cause and effect), five whys, eight steps to problem solving, 5Ss housekeeping, set-
up reduction and seven wastes (Womack & Jones 1999, Bicheno 2002).   At Siemens TPM 
was introduced by the trades union and had little senior management commitment, 
understanding or buy in.  When the new operations director was appointed in 2002 he 
introduced the business to Lean and he had a completely different approach to leading (5.3.2).  
His approach included sharing his vision and aligning it with his group managers, sharing his 
values and behavioural traits, communicating regularly with his entire workforce of 800 and 
getting his group managers to create their own improvement plans which were used daily and 
reported monthly.  A significant change in the tools and techniques was the more frequent 
adoption of value stream mapping (Hines et al. 2000). 
 
In 2002 six sigma was also enforced by the French head office and began with executive 
workshops (Table 21).  Due to projects being too large and unmanageable it took a year to 
secure £1m through 35 projects, in the same year lean secured £4m.  The difference in bottom 
line financial savings could possibly be due to head office imposing a six sigma culture.  This 
meant there could be less management commitment to it as it is not something the local 
management has instigated.  The operations director introduced lean and aligned his senior 
management team to commit and support it.  Supply chain management had become a daily 
part of the manufacturing team’s culture.   
 
The RHP-NSK quality manager reported to the MD and introduced TPM.  However the 
emphasis was focused on manufacturing and a few days a year for other operations.  In 2006 
NSK still used TPM as the banner for supply chain development.  Siemens used six sigma 
globally and manufacturing at Lincoln still used Lean. 
 
In both case studies, employees were confused by the language used, which involved terms 
such as ‘Process Re-engineering’, ‘Continuous Improvement Teams’, ‘Total Preventative 
Maintenance’, ‘Total Productive Manufacture’, the most current label ‘Lean’ (waste removal) 
and ‘six sigma’ (reducing process variation).  In essence these were all business improvement 
approaches, which was a key factor identified in the literature of supply chain management.  
However, when investigating how ideas had been implemented, the senior management 
commitment, management of change and acceptance of employees was given very little 
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attention.  In practice the research revealed that these factors heavily affected the overall 
results.   
 
Gattorna (2006) found pressure to change, a clear shared vision, capacity for change and 
actionable steps fundamental to achieving sustainable supply chain management. This was an 
extremely useful visual model but there were a lot of factors to consider.  
 
In practice there was pressure to change from the external environment, these pressures being, 
social, technological, environmental, economic, political, legislation and ethics.  Both 
companies had limited information and communications taking place. Customer needs were 
poorly transferred, unless customers were extremely unhappy with the service.   
 
In RHP-NSK, when TPM was introduced the team leader positions were lost and employees 
had to re-apply so that management select the right skill set and competencies for the role.  In 
Alstom-Siemens, cell manager and facilitator roles were created.  Both companies used a full-
time team to obtain implementation benefits quicker.   Both companies experienced team 
leaders and management lacking the knowledge of the softer skills needed for effective 
implementation.  These skills included motivation, influencing, coaching, delegation, 
communication and managing change as well as the understanding of the tools and 
techniques.  The customer focus, management outlook and culture were also found to heavily 
impact the effect of supply chain development implementation at the supplier locations.  
Table 31 shows the high-level supplier findings. 
 
Table 31:  High-level supplier action research findings 
Company Senior 
management 
outlook 
QCD  
Culture 
Action Outcome 
Desford Positive Existed £250k throughput annual saving.  £500k 
prevention, no need for new plant.  
Rolled out across the whole site. 
Mansfield Positive Existed  
but not used 
Set-up times reduced, £160k saving.   
Rollout taken to UK group. 
JRD Negative Was  
introduced 
Full process map of bottlenecks.  
No action taken. 
Synthotec Negative Was  
introduced 
Set-up times reduced by 70% in the  
activity observed. Engineers implemented  
procedure on machine. No further action. 
Source: Case study findings 
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Table 31 shows the research undertaken at the companies, where those that already had a 
culture of working in teams and collecting data, supported by a positive committed senior 
manager got sustainable results and further site or group benefits.  This was evident in 
Desford and Mansfield.  Those that had a senior management team with a negative outlook 
and did not have a culture where they saw the value of using data for decision making, did 
not continue implementing improvements from the five-day implementation activity.  JRD 
and Synthotec had a culture of ‘we are unique’ and were not willing to hear new ideas or 
appreciate and understand the benefits of supply chain development, they maintained 
‘business as usual’. 
 
The Mansfield Production Manager was relieved to see the data analysis being used:                        
 
We have been collecting this data for many years. It is 
good to see it being put to practical use to get the benefit 
from it. MA Production Manager (1997) 
 
When the supplier development took place four months into the programme the suppliers said 
that they were very apprehensive as they thought there was a hidden agenda by RHP-NSK.  
This was largely due to strategic suppliers being previously managed in a traditional purchasing 
way and then RHP-NSK changing its focus without thinking about how to manage change with 
suppliers (Macbeth 1994, Gattorna 2006).  Hines (2000: Table 7) found four phases to supplier 
coordination; external accreditation, reactive problem solving, systematic development and 
network development.  RHP-NSK had moved their approach with suppliers from phase one 
(obtaining goods and supply) to phase three and four (mutual gain and competitive advantage 
for suppliers) without considering the shift in relationship development.  This way of working 
with suppliers was a significant change, which left suppliers feeling apprehensive. 
 
An opportunity which remained in both companies was the lack of supplier involvement in 
development and improvement. In RHP-NSK the four action research case studies were a 
pilot. For all other suppliers it was price reduction.  I found Hines matrices a useful way of 
visualising the findings to summarise case study results. Hines’ (2000) supplier development 
maturity matrix was used to summarise findings to reveal the level of supply chain 
development in both companies.  This was achieved by the case study results.  Table 32 
shows Hines’ (2000) maturity grid for supplier development with the results of both 
companies.    
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Table 32 shows that buying criteria and supplier purpose were basic price for RHP-NSK and 
lowest cost for Siemens, both were to supply goods. Despite suppliers working with both 
companies for over 10 years the relationship was still at arms length as they were not engaged 
regularly into the processes by being asked their opinions and ideas. Both companies 
managed suppliers through a quality control system and basic supplier rating systems which 
looked back at past performance. 
 
 Table 32: Maturity grid for supplier development 
 
   Stage:  1  2  3        4 
Strategy/ External  Reactive Systematic Network 
Characteristics Accreditation       Problem Solving Development Development 
   Programme 
Buying criteria Lowest price Lowest cost Maximum mutual Maximum 
   benefit network benefit 
Purpose of To supply goods To supply goods To improve continually  
Supplier                                                                               mutual                          Customer does not
                                                                                             technical and/or          make competitive 
                                                                                             competitive                  advantage 
                                                                                             advantage 
Relationship Adversarial Arms-length Close Strategic 
Relationship Short/variable Variable Long Lifetime 
Customer Small Some, purchasing Frequent, many Continuous and 
involvement with  and quality functions multi-functional 
supplier 
Quality Product Quality control Quality TQM spread to 
requirement specification  assurance of TQM own supplier 
Delivery Standard lead Standard lead Customer involved True JIT 
requirement times time in shopfloor lead 
   time reduction 
Cost Lowest market Lowest cost SIEM Stable/reducing Target costing, 
requirement price RHP-NSK  product cost share savings 
Product design Customer Some joint input Significant joint Integrated design 
requirement specification or  input capability within 
 catalogue product  network 
Technology None Limited (mainly Frequent with Frequent within 
sharing  customer two-way flow network 
  technology) 
Reliance on None or external Some reliance on Heavy reliance on Some reliance on 
grading  reactive scores reactive and predictive scores 
   predictive scores 
Data interchange Limited, Limited, mainly Detailed, often Detailed at both 
 operational only operational operational and operational and 
   some strategic strategic level 
Number of High and unstable High, relatively Low and  SIEMENS    Very low     
suppliers stable   stable        RHP-NSK  stable 
Frequency of Infrequent Infrequent, Frequent Continuous 
interaction  scheduled and proactive and 
  reactive reactive 
Source: Hines et al. 2000, 325 
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Hines’ (2000) matrix shows overall that both companies had reactive problem solving and 
were overall in stage two.  There was a huge opportunity to develop the supply chain to move 
to stages three and four.  Siemens supplier development was more advanced with a lower 
number of suppliers, a greater focus on cost and joint technology undertaken for new product 
development.  However, its full-time supplier development team was focused on problems 
and therefore reacted to supplier delivery and quality issues.    There was a need to take more 
time to understand suppliers’ capabilities in both companies.  In interviews with 13 suppliers, 
47% disagreed slightly that Alstom-Siemens always invest time to understand its suppliers’ 
capabilities (Table 23). 
 
Comparing the literature research with the implementation of supply chain management, it 
was found that both companies still struggled with the basic implementation to realise 
business benefit and optimise supply chain management.  The companies also struggled to 
look holistically (Gattorna 2006) and were still operationally structured in a function with 
deep hierarchies (Hines 1994) which continued a silo mentality and caused interface 
problems, rather than an alignment of the ‘whole system’  (Christopher 1992, Tan 1998, 
Simchi-Levi 2000).   
 
A key factor was the attitude and commitment of senior management and the effect this had 
on employees and business results in the supply chain.  A further factor was the level of 
evolution of the company culture and the environment of each company.   
 
In both case studies, despite new concepts for consignment stocking, scheduling and long-term 
planning with suppliers, there was poor planning and control of materials, which was reactive.  
This was highly evident in the brief analysis of the Ford bearing line which produced a steady 
production demand of 20,000 a month; however, the seal supplier’s product demand was in 
high peaks and troughs ranging from 0 to 95,000 instead of a regular 40,000 seals a month.   
 
The functions which gained the most impact from implementing new ideas into the business 
were the manufacturing operations of both companies.  The fundamental reason for their 
common development was that the operations senior management team implemented new 
ideas as part of their daily responsibilities having a business improvement culture.   
 
In 1998 the RHP-NSK business improvement in the supply working with suppliers in RHP 
manufacturing a team took a 76 foot assembly like an altered it into a U-cell for increased 
flexibility, which also halved the floor space used.  This production approach was later on 
transferred to three additional lines which were moved from another area closer to the 
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grinding process.  By adopting the U- cell layout, additional floor space was also released.  
Performance measurement sheets were adopted on the line.  The data analysis was given to 
the team leader who had not had to analyse performance data before.  A separate team was 
also established to carry out a full 5Ss housekeeping activity. RHP-NSK also replaced the 
written operating procedures with photographs explaining each activity visually instead.  The 
operators found visual standards useful and they were referred to regularly.   
 
RHP-NSK utilised this approach over the remaining twelve assembly lines and re-located 
these lines to the grinding areas.  This was completed in nine months.  The supplier 
development methodology had an astonishing impact in RHP-NSK manufacturing and the 
management commitment was focused on improving processes further.  The Engineering 
Manager and Total Quality Manager gained board approval to reorganise the factory to 
release eight senior engineers full time onto an improvement activity team to continue to 
develop improvements in operational areas effectively (4.4). 
 
In Alstom-Siemens the operations director led by example, flattened his significantly deep 
hierarchy of 40 layers, set the need to change, made his vision known, shared his personal 
values and established an action plan framework for every cell across the factory.  He also 
created a cell manager role and a facilitator role as well as establishing a full-time team of 
business excellence resource.  He realised £11m for the company and continued to focus on 
cost reduction.  He made sure he regularly communicated and got his senior management 
team to do the same. The Balanced Scorecard went down to every notice board in every cell 
and all the operators understood their components costs and how they contributed to the end 
product and knew who their customers and suppliers were. 
 
Through the evidence and case analysis of the two companies and four suppliers, it is 
apparent that new ideas on supply chain management had been implemented.  All the 
companies used the tools and techniques publicised in the literature (Bicheno 2002) for 
supply chain development.  However the case study analysis revealed that senior 
management commitment and attitude significantly contributed to employee engagement and 
the outcome of the implementation.  
 
To attempt to keep up with the competition, both companies continued to go through periods 
of rapid change, where new initiatives were introduced by senior management.  The case 
studies revealed that ideas for implementation were poorly communicated, employees 
struggled with implementation and there was never sufficient time to gain the full benefit of 
the implementation. Therefore supply chain management was sub-optimal at both companies. 
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This is common in other manufacturing companies which frequently do not leave change in 
place long enough to achieve the full benefits and many companies continue to work with 
suppliers in a traditional way.  This is often due to the short-term outlook of senior 
management. To highlight this, in seven years Siemens changed ownership six times and 
different business improvement approaches for supply chain development were repackaged 
and refocused.  Uncertainty and confusion were created across the supply chain.  Due to the 
repackaging and different terms used by senior management, employees became confused. 
They felt senior managers kept changing their focus and lacked commitment and support for 
existing initiatives.   
 
Senior managers did not appreciate and understand enough about the concepts to be able to 
communicate with employees clearly and enable them to understand the value and benefits.  
Hines et al. (1997) found most of the new management recipes over the last 10 years had run 
their course without having a lasting impact on the bottom line. Employees waited for 
managers to lose interest and move to the next initiative. Hines’ (1997) research was 
produced nine years before my research, yet in manufacturing this was still experienced in 
practice. 
 
At RHP-NSK improvements in supply chain management were fragmented.  There was 
continuity focused on TPM in RHP-NSK manufacturing, in particular, value added was 
always the focus of the visits by representatives of the Japanese head office (4.2.3).  The rest 
of the supply chain appeared to operate more traditionally and functionally. Manufacturing 
worked on improvement activities in teams whilst other operational departments, such as 
purchasing, carried out individual roles and traditional transactions, including spot order 
placing on suppliers, who had provided products for over 15 years (4.2.3).  That was until the 
purchasing operations became fully integrated into manufacturing. 
 
Senior management and employees still struggled to understand and implement tools and 
techniques, as was evident through large-scale projects which were poorly scoped and long 
delivery times for project closure.   
 
This has been observed in other companies.  For instance, the trainees on a lean six sigma 
programme in a power plant selected large projects which were approved by senior 
management, yet there was only three months to complete them. Every project needed 
significantly broken down to become achievable.  For example, a project manager wanted a 
three-month project to ‘re-design the site product development process’ for a site that had 
10,000 employees and a budget of £130m for this process.  In addition to the size of the 
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project, when the trainees learnt about different tools and techniques they became so 
absorbed with the tools and techniques (what they meant, the history, the analysis) that each 
and every one totally lost sight of why they were using the tool in the first place, to resolve a 
specific business problem.   
 
The management change process, engaging employees and being fully committed to 
supporting implementation, were key factors which management needed to understand more 
fully.  (Hine 97, Gattorna 2007).  This was a prerequisite to achieve successful and 
sustainable implementation of ideas for supply chain management.   
 
Summary 
 
Through the analysis into how ideas had been implemented for supply chain management, it 
was evident that both companies had made considerable implementation efforts and had 
gained cost benefit during the 10 years of study.  
 
At the beginning of the research there was a high degree of fire fighting, chaos and reaction 
to day to day problems.  Senior management tried many new ideas for implementation but 
often did not embed the approach long enough to reap the benefits.  The hardest challenge for 
both companies was the implementation of new ideas; firstly understanding the tools and 
techniques and how to apply them and secondly keeping focused on the objective.  At 
Alstom-Siemens the regular change in ownership heavily affected the implementation focus 
with different initiatives being introduced to improve supply chain management. 
 
Hines (2000) model illustrated that both companies were overall reactive and problem 
solving.  This was evident through RHP-NSK loading suppliers for material in high peaks 
and troughs when the end use was for a flat constant demand every month to the end 
customer.  This was also evident when an RHP-NSK automotive customer emphasised that 
people were starving other departments of information which affected the overall supply 
chain management performance particularly for their customers and suppliers.   
 
This fire-fighting, reactive day to day chaos was typically found in other manufacturing 
companies evident from the Manufacturing Advisory Service programme and the Lean 
Learning Academy where companies struggled to create business plans and market products 
and services, let alone devise a vision, establish a strategy and carry out policy deployment.  
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Both supplier bases were keen to become more involved with their customers on 
technological development and process innovation.  Both companies had further 
opportunities to become ‘systematic’ and ‘networked’ (Hines 2000). However, through 
successful implementation there had been a significant reduction in suppliers, which were 
continuously being reduced.  Both companies had also reaped cost benefit gains through 
business improvement, by the implementation of projects.  Towards the end of the research 
there was an increasing drive for both companies to improve continuously.  Manufacturing in 
both companies had made the most significant implementation gains as supply chain 
development had naturally become part of their day to day culture. 
 
The senior management and employees had made step changes in improving the management 
of the supply chain, by simplifying and controlling processes and establishing aligned 
objectives and measures as part of the unit’s policy deployment.  It was found in both 
companies that the senior management commitment and company culture were two key 
factors which heavily affected the successful implementation of ideas.  This was effectively 
demonstrated in the action research case studies on suppliers. 
 
6.2.3 Identify factors that inhibit and enable supply chain management 
 
The primary area of interest was identifying and understanding the factors that inhibit and 
enable supply chain management.  The factors could be identified through my case study 
research.  This meant identifying specific facts that helped and hindered the implementation.  
This would help industry to implement new themes in supply chain management, understand 
the pitfalls and barriers, by reducing risks to implementation.  Companies could also better 
appreciate the important infrastructure to support, encourage and drive the enablers of supply 
chain management which will release longer-term cost benefits.  
 
If this could be understood more clearly in practice and theory there would be a greater 
chance of taking full advantage of the benefits of supply chain management and implement 
ideas accordingly.  A weakness in the research reported in the current literature was the lack 
of appreciation of key factors and of the impact senior managers had on supply chain 
management business results.  Senior management could also have an impact on optimisation 
by the change in emphasis and focus of supply chain management.      
 
The findings of the two case studies for inhibitors and enablers followed the findings of the 
survey which was undertaken with 150 managers, asking about their experiences.  Also a 
validation was made with 20 managers from different industry sectors to compare results with 
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their company experiences.  This was a two-hour business network focus group which 
revealed that the results were common.  
 
The most significant inhibitors and enablers of supply chain management were revealed 
through the case study research.  This were summarised into the five key inhibitors and five 
key enablers to enable focused implementation on the key contributors for supply chain 
management. Inhibitors which were revealed but were not included in the main five were 
traditional purchasing and quality methods and fear of failure, and an enabler which was not 
used was trust.   
 
The results for each inhibitor and enabler were drawn from the thoughts and opinions of 
managers, customers, suppliers and employees.  These were captured from the case study 
findings, the supply chain survey feedback, vignettes and business network feedback.  The 
five inhibitors and five enablers identified for supply chain management were the main 
contextual factors from the research case studies. Each of the inhibitors and enablers will be 
analysed in sections 6.2.4 and 6.2.5.   
 
Figure 32 visualises the inhibitors and enablers revealed from the supply chain management 
case studies.   
 
Figure 32: Inhibitors and Enablers of supply chain management  
 
 
Source: Researcher’s own findings 
 
 
 
 Inhibitors Enablers 
1 Lead by example 
2 Performance 
1 Lack of management commitment  
 
 
2 Lack of clear strategy and policy 
 
 
3 Lack of understanding 
 
 
4 Lack of clear communication 
 
 
5 Negative attitude 
3 Accountability and responsibility 
 
 
4 Incentives 
 
 
5 Open honest culture 
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Figure 32 shows the five main inhibitors and enablers in order of importance, as selected 
from research repeatability in findings and supply chain management impact. The five main 
inhibitors of supply chain management were; negative attitude, lack of management 
commitment, lack of clear strategy and policy, lack of understanding and lack of clear 
communication.  The enablers of supply chain management in order of importance were; lead 
by example, open honest culture, performance management, incentives and accountability/ 
responsibility. Each contextual factor will be explained. 
 
6.2.4 Inhibitors of supply chain management 
 
Lack of management commitment 
 
There was poor commitment from the top management and a lack of change management 
leadership. After senior management agreed to sponsor projects, when their priorities 
changed they would move on to other things and leave resource on issues they were no longer 
committed to. This was often the case with project work and larger longer-term projects.  For 
example, a lack of management commitment to six-sigma projects at Alstom-Siemens and 
lack of supplier development support by purchasing management at RHP-NSK. 
 
At a basic level managers found it difficult to allow employees time off from their day to day  
duties to spend time in workshops and be involved in business improvement.  This was 
evident with part-time project work and team activities in all functions, including the part-
time facilitator roles at RHP-NSK, which had to be cancelled due to lack of department 
managers’ commitment.   This was except for both companies’ manufacturing functions. A 
fundamental difference between manufacturing and other functions was that in both 
companies the manufacturing operations saw business improvement as part of their role and 
culture.   
 
Some managers wanted to keep control themselves and not empower employees to carry out 
improvements.  At JRD, one of RHP’s suppliers, many pricing and material decisions were 
just kept in the Managing Director’s head.  The management of this company was not keen to 
put this information into a process and wanted to keep control, despite the risks, even when 
the MD was due to retire. 
 
The worst example of lack of senior management commitment was that of the Alstom-
Siemens senior executive team who stated, in June 2000: “Save us £6m pounds by August or 
350 of your jobs will go”.  This letter was briefed to senior managers to communicate with 
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their teams.  It was not from a member of the board but the whole senior management team. 
No leadership, action plan or cost data was used, no training or education was provided to 
enable employees to work with data to analyse and recover costs.  There were significant 
doubts about where the £6m of cost reduction could come from, as no explanation was given 
for where the cost reduction opportunities could come from in two months, as no further 
information was provided.  This announcement made employees very complacent as they 
knew redundancies were inevitable, and from being poorly treated and disrespected, they 
took no pride in performing well for the company.  The employees were made redundant and 
this threatening territorial management approach highlighted poor leadership, no commitment 
and a total lack of thought into the impact of this communication and no consideration to the 
‘total system’ and improvement of supply chain management.   
 
Lack of clear strategy and policy 
 
 
A lack of clear strategy and policy affected supply chain management.  The companies 
became more reactive and day-to-day driven as it was difficult to see the company strategy 
and policy.  Both RHP-NSK and Siemens were more involved with using policy deployment; 
however, it was fragmented and not consistent across the whole system.   
 
It was difficult in some functions to see how one’s function, team or individual role 
contributed to the good of the company.  This was the case for purchasing, measuring price at 
the expense of other performance measures and internal customer requirements.  In 1997 at 
Alstom-Siemens, unless the function was product development or sales and marketing, it was 
unclear how the function, team or individual contributed to the company strategy, which was 
product and marketing based (5.2.3).  Many employees felt that the objectives and goals were 
unclear.  There were unrealistic objectives and expectations, and lack of clarity meant that 
employees worked on too many activities.  
 
 Lack of understanding 
 
 
There was a lack of understanding by senior managers and employees particularly for change 
to happen and appreciation of how to implement fully ideas on supply chain management.  
Process mapping and pareto were poorly understood techniques, along with change 
management skills for both companies.   
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There was a long-held belief at director level that processes equated to functions.  At Alstom-
Siemens there were over 700 processes.  These processes were produced functionally by each 
department, with each department setting its own inputs and outputs to the process and not 
consulting their customers or suppliers or working cross functionally (5.2.3).  A senior 
manager summarised the process. 
 
Smash the plate, sometimes it is better to start again with 
a new plate than to put the pieces of the old plate together.  
Too many of our systems and processes are pieced 
together.  Current systems lead to rubbish in and rubbish 
out.  Senior Manager (2003:188) 
 
All the processes were developed using the existing systems and making a couple of changes.  
There was poor capability to link day-to-day activities to customer deliverables.   
 
This emphasised that the research on systems theory is still highly applicable in the twenty-
first century. Senge (1990) found the focus was on parts of a system in isolation and as a 
consequence the root cause of a problem may not be achieved. Sixteen years since this 
research was published, both companies still focused on parts of a system in isolation.  This 
was experienced with process development and creation in both companies, where functional 
departments had not considered communicating with their customers or working cross 
functionally to develop a system.  In both companies, further effort was being made to work 
aligned and not isolated.   
 
When RHP-NSK was keen to help JRD Mouldings carry out process mapping to improve the 
layout of the facility, the Director did not choose to listen in order to try to understand:  
 
I can’t see how this will help us; we know our business 
and we have just outgrown this facility. 
     Director from JRD (1997: 136). 
 
It was dangerous not to listen to the customer and try out new ideas.  RHP-NSK managers 
also lost focus and understanding to improve the business as a whole and concentrated their 
efforts on their own functions.   
 
The functional outlook could often be at the expense of developing the whole company.  
Functional managers were not accountable for the supply chain and would concentrate on 
their specific areas often at the expense of another part of the supply chain.  This was the case 
when purchasing was focused on price reduction and the business was driving quality, cost, 
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delivery and people improvements (4.6.1).  The staff in the purchasing department at RHP-
NSK were also very traditional and protective of their suppliers and lacked strategic 
purchasing understanding and did not consider the value of engaging technical experts to 
communicate together directly from both companies  product development and competitive 
advantage.   
 
There was a lack of understanding in both companies regarding supplier capability and the 
additional expertise and support suppliers could provide to their customers.   This was evident 
through the analysis, in particular the comment from Mansfield, who were not seen as 
strategic within RHP-NSK but were its second largest spend, and were currently over 
specifying packaging to despatch bearings, when a lower graded plastic would provide the 
same function a half the price.  The supplier regularly informed RHP-NSK of this but they 
continued to carry on in the old manner.  Mansfield’s management team had many cost 
reduction ideas they wanted to discuss with RHP-NSK and never felt they had the 
opportunities for this to happen.   The supplier development positioning matrix (Table 32) 
showed that both companies reacted to problem solving with suppliers and also through the 
supplier value statements and interviews at Alstom-Siemens (Table 23). 
 
There was a lack of understanding and knowledge of individuals, customers, personal values, 
poor appreciation that everyone had an input and lack of understanding for the soft skills of 
effective leadership, communication, coaching and influencing.   
 
At Alstom-Siemens there was a history of management theories; ‘Double the Business’, 
‘Liberating the Workforce’, Total Productive Manufacture (TPM), ‘Kanban’ and ‘Continuous 
Improvement Through Teamwork’ (CITT), ‘Stretch 30’ (cost reduction), ‘Lean’, ‘Six Sigma’ 
and ‘Value Generation Programme’ (VGP cost reduction).  The cynicism was stronger when 
employees did not feel part of the change or understand why they had to change, and they 
were overwhelmed with jargon and acronyms within the company.  This lack of 
understanding left a lot of cynicism amongst employees across all functions of Alstom-
Siemens.   
 
Lack of clear communication 
 
In RHP-NSK the communication was often last minute, too late and the purpose was often to 
communicate bad news. Where managers had their own plans they were not often 
communicated.  During all the changes at Alstom-Siemens it was only Siemens management 
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that successfully communicated.  For the other things, employees found things out primarily 
through the company grapevine and externally to the company through the internet and 
newspapers.  Communication between management and employees regarding changes was 
poor (4.6.1). 
 
Negative attitude 
 
The negative attitude of senior management was the greatest inhibiting factor to developing 
the supply chain. Senior management attitudes heavily impacted traditional methods, 
communication, interface problems and outlook on utilising key performance indicators (4.6).  
If a senior manager had a negative attitude, it allowed the employees to do the same. 
 
The strategic supplier workshops achieved different results due to the senior managers’ 
attitudes.   At two supplier companies to RHP-NSK, JRD and Synthotec, the senior managers 
were negative towards the changes and chose not to listen to their customer.  They both felt 
their businesses were ‘unique’ and customers did not understand.  The strong personalities 
and fixed individual opinions were highlighted further from the shop floor foreman: 
 
This is all theory and fluffy sky thinking.  We are working 
in the injection moulding business and none of this talk is 
relevant to us. The S Foreman (1997) 
 
The foremen chose not to listen or learn from RHP-NSK and the application of best practice 
tools and techniques to Synthotec.  Instead the foremen chose to believe that these approaches 
were not relevant to them.  The MD expressed his opinion: 
 
I have highly qualified specialists running my business 
they are the experts in their field and are left to get on with 
what they know.  
S MD (1997). 
 
At RHP-NSK, and at the beginning of the research at Alstom-Siemens, senior managers 
focused on their product and did not think in terms of processes, they were not convinced of 
the benefits. Therefore the attitudes of senior management affected any progress of 
development. 
 
There was a negative attitude and resistance to change and an overall fear of trying out new 
ideas.  A tradition existed where ‘it has always been this way’ and a culture existed that ‘if it 
isn’t broken, don’t fix it’. A high inhibitor was the attitude, behaviour and emotions of senior 
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management, which affected the behaviour of employees, which heavily affected supply chain 
management.  
 
 
Inhibitors of supply chain management – summary 
 
To summarise from the case study research, five main inhibitors of supply chain management 
were found. Supply chain development and implementation was affected by a lack of senior 
management commitment and support.  A lack of clear strategy and policy established by the 
senior management team and deployed for teams and individuals made it difficult to focus 
implementation.  Implementation was affected by a lack of understanding of the tools and 
techniques and priorities of the company.  Senior management and employees’ negative 
outlook and lack of communication also affected supply chain management.   
 
6.2.5 Enablers of supply chain management 
 
The supply chain management enablers were; leading by example, performance management, 
accountability and responsibility, incentives and open honest culture. Each of these overall 
enablers was explained through links to case study findings and literature research. 
 
Leading by example 
 
To develop a continuous improvement culture, senior management would need to lead by 
example.  If the executive management team and senior management led by example, their 
behaviour would breed like behaviour and would create a better working environment for 
employees.  If senior management engaged their people and made them feel involved in 
business changes, greater productivity would result.  
 
If management took the time to inform employees and communicate, employees would start 
to feel valued and would begin to feel understood and respected.  If managers led by example 
by setting a standard of what they expected in terms of openness, honesty and trust, the 
culture could slowly be reformed.  Senior management needed to define high-level processes 
and demonstrate cross-functional links.  Directors should lead business planning as a basis for 
locally developed plans supporting the high level planning.   
 
Good leadership needed to prevail to prevent initiative overload and improve 
communications upwards and downwards.  The champion had to have a vision and 
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communicate messages of the vision.  The best practice evidence of this was from the 
operations director at Alstom-Siemens who demonstrated conviction in his approach with his 
leadership, vision, measures, communication and review.  The commodity manager also had 
the ability to develop rapport with employees to gain support and management buy-in for 
their purchasing decision. 
 
At the two supplier companies to RHP-NSK, Desford Tubes and Mansfield Amalgamated, 
senior management led by example.  Both senior managers were very positive and welcomed 
changes to their businesses and supported the teams in carrying out the improvements. Senior 
managers at Desford Tubes and Mansfield Amalgamated encouraged not only the 
implementation of long term ideas and to sustain results from the workshop, but they also 
rolled out improvements to other areas of the business.  The MD of Mansfield Amalgamated 
also passionately took this approach to his UK group (4.4.5, 4.6.1).  
 
Performance management 
 
The key to performance management was to have clearly defined measures and objectives. 
This included employee involvement and giving people responsibility for their own work.  
Employees should be provided with the opportunity to take charge of their own development.  
People needed to know what they were expected to do or achieve and understand.  They 
would also need established feedback and review.   
 
When Siemens took over, managers were set annual objectives and monthly targets and 
measures to improve the company, which were frequently reviewed with the relevant line 
manager.  This was also the case for RHP-NSK and Siemens when policy deployment 
became more fully integrated.  The company needed to become customer-orientated and 
build customer confidence, both externally and internally. Decisions and performance 
management should be based on fact and the use of strategic measures.   
 
Employees’ performance would include realistic strategic objectives and the ability to meet 
targets.  Performance improvement would impact greater efficiency, productivity, output, 
reduced cost of poor quality and delivery on time.  Only then could the company meet 
customer, supplier and employee expectations. Employees would continue to carry out step 
changes to improve performance continuously.    
 
Greater focus and prioritisation of objectives and publishing completed and finished actions 
was required.  Senior management and employees needed to be more disciplined so that they 
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could deliver commitments.  There would be much greater opportunities in supply chain 
management if employees were empowered and performance was managed by clearly 
defined measures, which are mutually agreed and regularly reviewed. This could also enable 
senior management to be less traditional and listen to their employees’ ideas and not always 
use their own ideas, and to hold less control and decision making power (Pascale 1990,  
Oakland 2000). Instead they should delegate, using the commitment and competence of 
employees.  
 
Accountability and responsibility 
 
Senior management needed to encourage accountability and responsibility for action and 
completion.  Adair’s (1991) research also supports this. He found that if subordinates were 
fully involved in decisions that affect their work they would be committed to carrying them 
out.  Adair also emphasised that senior managers cannot lead without winning employee 
commitment.  Managers need to empower employees to have a greater sense of ownership 
and accountability. Individuals could then take the authority and ownership to make 
decisions.   
 
Employees’ accountability meant they would need to determine acceptable levels of work 
and drop activities which make their workload excessive.  Big tasks needed to be broken 
down into individual manageable bite-sized pieces, with understanding of limits, realistic 
targets and priority setting.  For example, at RHP-NSK and Alstom-Siemens, targets went 
down to individual level and this included monthly targets on individual buyers in purchasing 
which contributed to the team and department strategic objectives.  The same applied to 
engineering and sales, where targets went down to engineers and account managers. 
 
Incentives 
 
To make change happen a company needs to motivate employees through praise and 
recognition.  For example, recognition could be for milestone achievement and visible 
rewards clearly linked to success. Employees should also be praised and recognised for 
having a ‘can do attitude’ until it becomes a natural part of the culture.  In the employee 
survey of Alstom-Siemens, lack of praise and recognition had came up consecutively over 
five years.    If this could be turned into an enabler it would offer a great opportunity.  At 
Siemens the financial bonuses for commodity managers, senior managers and the executive 
management team were linked to their balanced scorecard targets, likewise for RHP-NSK 
with their policy deployment for senior management and the executive management team. 
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Open and honest culture 
 
In an honest and open culture, senior managers and employees will feel comfortable to 
communicate clearly and not feel fear. This culture will respect people’s values and beliefs 
and operate ethically.  In this culture nobody will feel that they can improve themselves out 
of a job. RHP-NSK had a no-redundancy policy for continuous improvement on the shop 
floor. When the line was re-balanced it removed the need for four operational roles, the 
operators were excited about moving into new areas as it meant they had new opportunities.    
 
Enablers of supply chain management – summary 
 
The supply chain management enablers were leading by example, where managers make their 
vision and values clear by operating in a professional leadership manner which embraces 
employees.  Performance management was the establishment of targets and measures with 
regular reviews, then making employees accountable and responsible, incentivising and 
working in an open and honest culture. Good examples of this were two directors at the 
supplier companies, who were committed and had a positive outlook and embraced change, 
and the operations director at Alstom-Siemens who made his vision and values deliverable 
and clear. 
 
The researcher felt there was significant value in the identification of inhibitors and enablers 
as it provided the key factors that would help and hinder supply chain management.   This 
provides considerable explanations for understanding the implementation of supply chain 
management through six case studies, a survey asking 150 managers and a network of 20 
different industry sector managers. By pre-empting what could happen and building this into 
the appropriate stages of implementation meant that risk could be minimised and there would 
be a greater degree of successful implementation and sustainable supply chain management.   
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7.0   Conclusion  
 
7.1 Conclusions about the research  
 
Supply chain management was viewed as a single process which depended on strategic 
decision making.  It is a shared objective of practically every function in the chain and 
impacts overall costs and market share.  It calls for a different perspective on inventories and 
a new approach to systems (Houlihan 1998). 
 
The investigation into supply chain management implementation in the manufacturing sector 
showed 2 companies increasing challenging pressures to compete.   In the UK many 
companies have closed down due to lack of competitiveness and other companies are 
outsourcing processes or establishing full manufacturing operations overseas for lower labour 
and material cost advantages.  This shift in focus has closed many UK manufacturing 
production lines and sites and companies have fully relocated overseas. UK manufacturing 
faces a continual need to improve business performance and be more innovative. To reap 
competitive advantage, manufacturing companies needed to be more strategically aware of 
their supply chain management philosophy, implementation and processes (Mentzer 2001). 
 
To explore and explain this further, three objectives were studied: the ways in which the 
management of the supply chain had changed, how new ideas on supply chain management 
had been implemented, and the contextual factors that inhibit and enable supply chain 
management.  Inhibitors are factors that prevent, hinder or stop implementation of supply 
chain management.  Enablers are factors that would encourage, support and drive efficient 
and effective implementation of supply chain management. 
 
The critical review of the literature revealed that there was no common agreement on what 
supply chain management was and what it covered.  Added to this confusion was an attempt 
by practitioners and researchers offering different interpretations to clarify the factors and 
scope.  Through careful analysis of the literature a conceptual framework was produced 
which captured the main themes in the publications. The review revealed a large number of 
matrices and techniques (Hines 2000).  Bicheno (2000) saw that improving the supply chain 
meant extending the principles of Lean and Six Sigma to all participants in the supply chain. 
Only two authors discussed the need for management in supply chain development (Hines 
1997, Simchi-Levi 2004).  There was far too little published research in supply chain 
management about management and engaging employees, there was an overall lack of detail 
about what happened, in particular, effective implementation outside high- volume 
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companies.  The case study research particularly focused on automotive, aerospace, 
computing and retail sectors.  The existing case studies also had very little on the inhibitors of 
supply chain management.   
 
A weakness in the current literature is the lack of appreciation of the impact senior managers 
has on supply chain management business results, and thus the impact that senior 
management can have on optimisation of supply chain management for competitive 
advantage. There is also a lack of alignment between strategy, leadership, infrastructure and 
implementation.  Also, despite the widely published benefits, there still appears be a slow 
uptake in the UK.  
 
From the literature, supply chain management research factors were built into a conceptual 
model to be used when studying the companies.  The common factors identified in the 
literature included; policy deployment, management support, employee involvement, 
business improvement and suppliers. Further themes identified in the literature which were  
not utilised in the case studies, were having an integrated philosophy, enterprise, strategic 
decision making, information technology and innovation (Table 2.  In the published research 
and investigation of the 2 case study companies these themes appeared to have minimal 
coverage.  In both companies’ studies, there was very little focus on these themes.  This may 
be due to the 2 case study companies’ stages of transition and their supply chain management 
emphasis was reactive.   
 
For example, in interviews at Alstom with 30 key senior managers, 48.5% felt creativity and 
innovation was not encouraged (Table 22).  With suppliers there were frequent examples of 
poor communication and lack of utilisation of supplier capabilities.  There was a need to take 
more time to understand suppliers’ capabilities in both companies.  At RHP-NSK there was 
very little proactive project work.  At Alstom-Siemens, in interviews with 13 suppliers, 47% 
disagreed slightly that the company always invests time to understand its suppliers’ 
capabilities.  This meant both companies had a long way to go to be innovative within their 
supply chains.  This should make it clear that the researcher appreciated the value of the 
additional themes found in the literature, but found they did not significantly contribute to the 
presented case studies.   
 
The research revealed that there was significant managerial effort aimed at supply chain 
management.  There was also evidence of significant implementation changes which had 
taken place.  This was manifest by the business improvement factor in the number of 
implementation approaches and initiatives and the range of tools and techniques implemented 
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for supply chain management.  The applied business improvement tools included 
housekeeping (5Ss), set-up reduction, process mapping and the seven wastes (Hines et al. 
1998, Womack & Jones 1999, Bicheno 2000).  
 
Whilst there have been some significant changes in the management of the supply chain in 
the 2 companies researched, the changes were less than hoped for, as they were not as 
strategic as expected during the time period.  The implementation was also partial as it 
affected some areas of the supply chain more than others.  The implementation was less 
strategic in both companies, where senior managers gave poor consideration to strategy, 
systematic development and networking, with weak emphasis on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the ‘whole system’ to remain competitive.  (Hines et al 1997)  Instead, in 
both companies, management development was too functionally focused on their own areas 
of responsibility rather than for optimisation of supply chain management. Part of the 
problem of lacking focus on the whole system was that managers were only responsible for 
certain parts of the company, and would therefore focus on their area of responsibility and 
have little concern for or even disregard other areas of the business.  This was also the case 
with executive board members who were functional specialists such as product development, 
strategy, HR, law and finance.  
 
There was very little emphasis on strategic supply chain management, despite both company 
having a global presence.  In both companies, when they were taken over by foreign 
competitors there was little change made through the head offices.  For RHP-NSK, the 
Japanese head office management team simply came and reviewed progress. They did not 
recommend tools or techniques to be implemented, despite the widely publicised Japanese 
quality approaches. (Oakland 2000, Bicheno 2000).  Alstom introduced six-sigma training 
(Bicheno 2000)  through its head office.  In the five company name changes at the gas turbine 
company, all the head offices left the local management to do as they saw fit.  Overall the 
takeovers were weak at introducing new ideas and concepts to under-developed units.  The 
only adoption from the head offices was policy deployment to collect high-level measures on 
performance from NSK and Siemens. 
 
The exception for influencing change was Siemens, which brought Alstom.  During 18 
months there was a great focus on the balanced scorecard (Kaplan and Norton 1996), process 
alignment, standardising systems and stretching targets for cost reduction with 
financial/quality reporting.  Siemens emphasised more regular communication and re-
introduced an employee survey.  Siemens made phenomenal strategic development during the 
first 18 months, however, the speed of achieving objectives was so fast that it meant issues of 
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morale, motivation and pressure on managers and employees became greater than ever.  It is 
important to achieve the appropriate balance of supply chain development to prevent fatigue 
and stress from too much implementation activity at once, which heavily constrains resource, 
behaviour and time management. 
 
Initially both companies took a short-term view, evidenced by the exclusive emphasis on 
price reduction by purchasing, transactional functional processes, traditional methods, fire 
fighting and poor communication.  An example of this was the purchasing division heavily 
over-ordering packaging materials to gain a price reduction on volume, which was so much it 
did not even fit into the stores and created one year’s worth of stock.  
 
There were some good examples of implementation and considerable effort was made, but in 
particular functions or pockets of the company.   Five excellent examples of supply chain 
development were:  
 
1. RHP-NSK turning all its assembly lines into U cells within one year as a consequence of 
the supply chain development programme which was coordinated as a pilot in the purchasing 
division.  The tools adopted were line balancing, housekeeping, visual management and 
standardisation.  Once one assembly line was implemented in manufacturing, with the 
supplier development team and suppliers, manufacturing took ownership and drove the 
implementation across the remaining lines.   
 
2. Two action research projects at two strategic suppliers were highly successful. The set-up 
reduction implementations enabled Mansfield to save £150k annually and Desford £250k 
annually and an additional £500k saving by not purchasing a new plant.  
 
3. RHP-NSK’s purchasing division became a strategic team and operations being responsible 
for all operational procurement transactions which were fully applied using e-business and 
supplier forecasting, by one buyer with a spend of £22m.  At the beginning of the research 
there was a team of 20 buyers spot ordering with a £19m spend. 
 
4. Alstom-Siemens established 12 commodity manager roles, who reported to the site and the 
head office in Germany.  The commodity managers had to target global procurement, 
consolidating a particular commodity by liaising with other sites and negotiating high volume 
contracts.   The commodity managers had a huge impact on reducing the supply base by 82%.  
These roles were clearly targeted and measured monthly to deliver supply chain 
improvements.       
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5. Alstom-Siemens operations business rolled out lean (Hines 94, Bicheno 2000), beginning 
with the operations director significantly reducing his 40-tier hierarchy to communicate 
effectively, setting a vision with his group managers, sharing his values, and reviewing 
blockers and enablers to rolling lean out into the supply chain.  The management team 
established new positions to embed the continuous improvement culture.  They created cell 
manager roles, lean facilitators for every area, and a full-time improvement team.   In one 
year £4m was secured in supply chain development improvements. 
 
Gattorna (2006) advised that implementation of supply chain management should not be 
drawn out as this could provide employees with the opportunity to resist and rebel, in part or 
in full.  This was often the case in both companies. The implementation at Alstom-Siemens 
was more drawn out, which meant employees were found to be negative and to resist or rebel. 
Gattorna (2006) suggested that the faster the implementation, the greater the chance of 
achieving the desired outcome. In both companies, implementation was not fully planned to 
be completed fully to reap the cost benefits.  This meant many projects were not properly 
closed out and continued, with very little return.  
 
This was evident in the investment of 35 green belts (project leaders in six sigma) at Alstom-
Siemens, which had little support and follow up and the projects were ongoing.  This meant 
that 35 teams would become disengaged as something was not finished.  Primarily this came 
down to lack of management commitment to continue the projects and equally lack of 
understanding by the project leader to be able to take the project forward for successful close 
out.  The greenbelt staff attended a five-day course and after running for up to one year would 
forget what they have been taught as it had not been applied through implementation much 
sooner following training. 
 
This lack of project closure contributed to the negative resistance that was particularly 
evident in Alstom-Siemens with constant changes in initiatives and company ownership.  
Employees felt strongly that things never got finished. This was also evident in RHP’s 
supplier rationalisation, where the team was disbanded after a year as nothing happened. 
 
The five-day kaizen (Bicheno 2000) implementations in manufacturing and suppliers did 
have better outcomes.  Gattorna (2006) recommended fast implementation to prevent 
employee rebellion.  However 50% of the supplier outcomes were not sustained due to lack 
of management commitment, attitudes of management and employees and lack of 
understanding which prevented full scale implementation at Synthotec and JRD.  
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Through the analysis into how ideas for supply chain management have been implemented, 
both of the 2 case studied companies had made considerable implementation efforts during 
the 10 years of study. At the beginning of the research there was a high degree of fire 
fighting, chaos and reaction to day-to-day problems.   
 
Senior management tried many new ideas for implementation but often did not embed the 
approach long enough to reap the benefits.  The hardest challenge for both manufacturing 
companies was the implementation of new ideas; firstly understanding the tools and 
techniques and how to apply them and secondly keeping focused on the objective.  At 
Alstom-Siemens the regular changes in ownership heavily affected the implementation focus 
due to senior management changing the business improvement approach to improve supply 
chain management. 
 
Hines’ (2000) model was extremely useful to bring together the case study findings by 
illustrating both companies’ supply chain development.  This quickly showed that both 
companies were overall reactive and problem solving.  This was evident through RHP-NSK 
loading suppliers for material in high peaks and troughs when the end use was for a flat 
constant demand every month to the end customer.  The sales division also had an additional 
three months of data which they did not share with anyone, although the manufacturing and 
purchasing divisions could have found this information very useful for planning. This was 
also evident when an RHP-NSK automotive customer emphasised that people were starving 
other departments of information which affected the overall supply chain management 
performance particularly for their customers and suppliers.   
 
Senior management and employees made step changes in improving the management of the 
supply chain.  Both companies struggled strategically with supply chain management but had 
attempted to make considerable changes through the implementation. 
 
From the case study analysis it was found that the change management process and the 
engagement of employees and team members were key factors which management needed to 
understand more fully.  This was a prerequisite to achieving successful and sustainable 
implementation of ideas for supply chain management.   
 
It was revealed in the analysis of suppliers that the outcome of the improvement activities 
was affected by the management, the culture of the company and how engaged the employees 
were. 
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This fire-fighting, reactive, day-to-day chaos was typically found in other manufacturing 
companies, as was evident from the Manufacturing Advisory Service programme and the 
Lean Learning Academy.  
 
Despite the focus in the literature on improvement emphasising the voice of the customer 
there was little drive for customer service evident in the main case studies.  Although the 2 
main companies used policy deployment there was a lack of alignment focused on the ‘whole 
system’ and policy measures and targets used to manage performance.  There was a lack of 
ownership and accountability which meant that the implementation of new ideas was often 
very slow.     
 
The results for each inhibitor and enabler were drawn from the thoughts and opinions of 
managers, customers, suppliers and employees.  These were captured from the case study 
findings, the supply chain survey feedback from 150 managers, vignettes and business 
network feedback of 20 business managers across industry sectors.  
 
This framework would assist industry to implement new themes in supply chain management, 
by understanding the pitfalls and barriers in order to reduce the risks associated with 
implementation and reap cost benefits through the enablers.  If the inhibitors and enablers 
were more clearly understood in practice and theory, companies could have a greater chance 
of taking full advantage of the benefits of supply chain management and implement ideas 
accordingly.   
 
To make the findings and understanding focused and manageable, five main factors were 
identified for each.  Further factors which were revealed from the research were; traditional 
purchasing and quality methods, interface problems, an absence of key performance measures 
and fear of failure by managers and employees. 
 
The most significant inhibitor to supply chain management was senior management having a 
negative attitude.  Managers’ positive or negative outlook meant the difference between 
successful implementation and failed implementation.  Lack of management commitment 
closely followed as an inhibitor.  The worst thing uncommitted managers did was to leave 
their resources involved in projects to which they were no longer committed, as they now had 
different priorities.  This meant the resources became unnecessarily drained and the culture 
became poor at closing-out supply chain implementation.  This was highlighted in the six 
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sigma projects, where implementation had begun but they were not regularly reviewed by the 
agreed sponsors or executives.   
 
Lack of clear strategy and policy by the company was the next main inhibitor and included 
defining the company vision, plan, strategic outlook, targets and policy deployment.  Alstom 
was very poor in letting managers and employees know what they were trying to achieve. It 
was then difficult to know on which business improvement implementation to concentrate.   
 
Lack of understanding by senior managers and employees of the concept and effectiveness of 
implementation was the third inhibitor.  There was an overall lack of understanding of how to 
apply the concepts and focus on supply chain development, despite the well publicised 
research into the tools and techniques.  More detailed case studies such as this research could 
support a deeper understanding of implementation.   
 
Lack of clear communication by senior managers and employees continues to be poor. This 
was highlighted by executive communication often communicating negative news to 
employees, such as poor performance and redundancies, and not communicating positive 
news of success such as completed projects, new business, and praise from customers.   
 
Negative attitude and outlook by senior management and employees was extremely 
damaging. It caused two failed supplier development activities and created poorly performing 
cultures and ingrained attitudes.  This inhibitor was heavily present in Alstom-Siemens, 
where the employees had been in their jobs for many years and knew the history of bad 
experiences. A deep understanding of the inhibitors and lessons learnt by the 2 manufacturing 
companies would support managers during implementation, by understanding potential 
inhibitors to ensure that successful implementation prevails in the supply chain.    
 
If the negative barriers were overcome, the enablers would provide a more positive 
enthusiastic environment which was open to embrace change.  The main enabler found was to 
lead by example, with management displaying the qualities they want the employees to 
display in their work, clearly communicating the company vision, strategy and targets and 
engaging their employees.  This was evident in Alstom-Siemens operations director and the 
two suppliers, Mansfield and Desford. 
 
Performance management was having clearly defined measures and objectives for employee 
involvement and giving them responsibility for their own work.  This meant managers letting 
go of some control and making employees accountable and responsible for their actions, with 
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incentives and an open and honest culture. This was evident from the commodity managers 
positions created at Alstom-Siemens. 
 
Both companies had embarked on supply chain management and had reaped cost benefits 
through the successful implementation.  However, there were many supply chain 
management implementations which had failed and were very slow to implement changes.  
Managers needed to work more holistically, with the whole system in mind, to gain 
significant supply chain development opportunities.  Both companies would benefit from 
more executives and senior managers leading by example, incentivising employees through 
performance management and making them accountable for supply chain development, to 
continue to grow and develop an open and honest culture. 
 
7.2 Implications for Theory and Practice 
 
Implications for Theory 
 
Supply chain management theory was widespread in the literature and is taught as a subject at 
many universities.  There has been a great deal of research into the definitions, matrices and 
benefits. The most common publications were on quality management tools and the 
techniques of business improvement and approaches which had originated with the Toyota 
production system.  In the 2000s the business improvement concepts were primarily known 
as Lean and Six Sigma  (Hines et al 1998, Womack and Jones 1999, Bicheno 2000).  Despite 
the published matrices (Hines 1994, 1998, and 2000) and multi-point plans (Macbeth 1993, 
1994), which appear simplistic, the theory was weak in case study research, which had 
primarily focused on high-volume industries including automotive, aerospace and retail 
(Womack and Jones 1990, 1996, Gattorna 2006).   
 
There was little literature on policy deployment.  However, the 2 main case studies adopted 
policy deployment and it was investigated as part of the implementation research.  Outside 
Japan, the significance of policy deployment has gone largely unreported (Lee and Dale 
1999, Witcher and Butterworth 2001).  In the mid 1990s, Cox (1996) found that the exposure 
given to supplier development within the academic and professional literature remained 
fundamentally and disappointingly unchanged. Hines (1998) found the spread of knowledge 
and expertise in the west had until recently been very limited.  Temple (2001) found 40% of 
UK firms said they were not doing lean and did not plan to, despite the British government’s 
heavy investment to support supply chain development. From all the published material, I 
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found only one recent publication, by Gattorna (2006), had successfully aligned behaviour 
and culture with supply chain management. 
 
From this study, researchers should now be able to extend their range of supply chain 
management models beyond those which currently exist.  This is because the case studies 
provided research into four small and medium-sized supplier companies, a third-tier bearings 
company and a first-tier, very low-volume, high-value capital goods manufacturer of gas 
turbines.   
 
In the current supply chain management literature there appears to be little published on the 
implementation, and the contextual factors – primarily the impact of senior management – 
have been greatly undervalued.  Only two authors have discussed the role of management 
(Hines 1997, Simchi-Levi 2004). Management commitment and attitude can have a 
significant impact on supply chain management. Another supply chain management inhibitor 
is lack of clear strategy and policy, which is imperative to ensure that the implementation is 
aligned to the company’s needs and through successful implementation will deliver the best 
value for the company. Other inhibitors are a lack of understanding by senior managers and 
employees, particularly of the business improvement tools and techniques – despite a large 
number of publications on the subject –, lack of clear communication and the impact this has 
on the supply chain, and the negative attitude of senior management and the impact this has 
on the attitude of employees.   
 
The literature also largely overlooks the enablers of supply chain management: leading by 
example by senior management in the way they conduct themselves and work in the 
company; performance management through clearly defined targets, measures and reviews; 
accountability and responsibility, so that employees understand what is expected of them and 
what ownership they do have for deliverables; incentive by praise, recognition and financial 
rewards; and an open, honest culture. 
 
Overall there has been little published on implementation studies which provide valuable 
insights particularly into the inhibitors and enablers which might pre-empt factors which 
potentially affect implementation.  This could enable potential problems to be avoided by 
appreciating the lessons learnt through the inhibitors of supply chain management and to 
minimise risk and implementation time. By understanding the enablers the right environment 
and company culture can be encouraged.  This will support employees to embrace the 
changes and senior management to drive supply chain management with the ‘whole system’ 
in mind. 
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These case study findings provided deeper understanding of supply chain management 
implementation and would assist a researcher in developing further understanding and 
theories.   Researchers could replicate the methodology in other companies for further 
analysis of strategy by case study.  Overall researchers can more fruitfully pursue unanswered 
questions and explore new questions from this additional theoretical knowledge. 
 
Implications for practice 
 
A significant practical benefit would be for senior management to recognise their impact on 
supply chain management.  With the wrong attitude, unclear vision, poorly defined objectives 
and few targets, sub-optimisation of the supply chain is inevitable. In contrast, with a positive 
outlook focused on ‘the whole system’, identifying the need to change, establishing and 
developing a ‘shared vision’, identifying the appropriate policy deployment and empowering 
employees to carry out actionable results, a culture of supply chain  management can flourish.  
 
In practice, learning from the case studies, practitioners could prevent the pitfalls and 
strategically plan and make decisions to improve their supply chain management.  They could 
recognise particular inhibitors without waiting to experience them in their own supply chain.    
By utilising the case study findings, when practitioners implement supply chain management, 
they have applied examples which show how to establish a policy deployment system, 
proactively establish their own supplier development programme and partnership agreements 
and carry out their own supply chain development implementation.  Senior management will 
also have a greater understanding of their effect to supply chain management implementation 
and the impact their behaviour has to sustainable results and employees’ motivation.   
 
Overall a practitioner can significantly reduce their learning curve and implementation time 
by understanding the inhibitors that could face them and focusing positively on the enablers 
to optimise supply chain management. 
 
 
7.3 Limitations of the research 
 
Limitations of this research were presented in section 3.9 in the chapter on methodology.  
There were only two main cases, both situated in a similar regional area of the East Midlands.  
They were both engineering companies which had been taken over by foreign companies and 
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had been established over a long period of time.   There were four mini cases which were 
RHP-NSK’s suppliers.  These were useful to answer how ideas were being implemented.   
 
To study the implementation of supply chain management, focus was placed on the 
identification of themes from the literature research.  A common theme in both companies 
was business improvement, which was evident through the companies’ different initiatives 
and tools and techniques.  I found this was a key theme necessary for the implementation of 
supply chain management.  Both companies may have been more focused on business 
improvement and not supply chain management in the broader ‘whole system’ sense.  
 
A further limitation was the time taken to complete the research and the locations, in two 
market town communities.  There was focus on two main organisations and four supplier 
companies, all in the manufacturing sector. All the companies were well established, the two 
main organisations were 60 years old, two of the supplier companies were established in the 
1950s and the other two supplier companies were established in the 1970s.  
 
The length of time taken to complete the case study research supported fulfilment of the 
authenticity of the research objectives. However, added to the length of time was the effect of 
companies’ changing dialogue with the external environmental and impact this had on how 
the companies operated.  All these factors could have an impact on the outcome of the 
research.  However they were considered minor and were identified prior to the research 
which meant authenticity was built into the research methodology to prevent limitations from 
occurring. 
     
7.4   Implications for further research  
 
Due to the breadth and scope of supply chain management, there are many angles to be taken 
for further research. Further research could be made into each of the conceptual themes 
highlighted from the literature research.  Further research could be made into each of the 
contextual factors identified from the research aims.  Research could be undertaken in the 
service industry, a different industry sector, or generically across all industry sectors.    
 
  7.5  Conclusion – Summary 
 
This research has provided useful evidence of significant implementation changes in two 
manufacturing companies in the management of their supply chain and four mini case studies 
of supply chain development.  It has also revealed a greater consideration and appreciation of 
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the impact senior management commitment and attitudes can have on supply chain 
management implementation.  During the time period of the research, the implemented 
changes in the case studies were less than I had hoped, as implementation was not as strategic 
as it might have been, and it was partial as it affected just some areas of the supply chain.  
This may be due to the longer product life cycle and as a consequence slower need to change.  
Senior management gave poor consideration to the strategy, systematic development and 
networking of supply chain management.  Senior management were also very weak on the 
competitive impact of an efficient and effective ‘whole system’ for supply chain 
management.   
 
Nevertheless through the existing research conceptual themes were identified to examine in 
the case studies.  An historical analysis of both case studies provided a greater understanding 
into how the companies’ supply chain management had changed. The cases revealed an 
excellent range of examples for how supply chain management ideas had been implemented.  
The inhibitors and enablers of supply chain management were found and analysed to produce 
the five main contributing factors, which would provide focus for supply chain management 
implementation.   
 
Through this in-depth case study analysis into low-volume manufacturing this research has 
provided clarity as to some of the key contextual factors of supply chain management.  
Further work is needed in this field for researchers and practitioners to simplify the 
complexity of supply chain management.   
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Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms 
 
This glossary of terms has been established to assist the reader with any company 
phrases, jargon and abbreviations.  The main majority of definitions are working 
definitions found within the companies investigated.   
 
Expression 
(Acronym) 
Definition  
Added Value An activity or process that people carry out which is what the 
customer is willing to pay for our a contribution to physically 
changing the form of shape of a product. 
Benchmarking Improvement process in which a company measures its 
performance against that of best-in-class companies and uses 
the information to improve its own performance. The subjects 
that can be benchmarked include strategies, operations, 
processes, and procedures.  
Capability The ability of a product or a process to produce / supply 
consistently to a previously defined quality/satisfaction level.  
Cells Also known as cellular manufacture, it is a physical area 
where all the machines needed to produce a product are all 
located together on the shop floor.  
CITT Continuous improvement through teamwork. 
Consignment Stock Stock held on the customer’s site that is the suppliers until 
the customer uses it.  At this point in time the supplier is then 
paid. 
Contingency Stock A buffer of extra stock to support what if situations. 
Corrective action Action taken to eliminate the causes of an existing 
nonconformity, defect or other undesirable situation in order 
to prevent recurrence (ISO 8402).   
Corrective Action 
Plan 
A plan that is established to get to the root cause of quality 
problems. 
 Costs of non quality 
(CONQ) 
The total cost of products/services not achieving the 
Customer requirements specified.  Costs incurred through 
internal failures (scrap, rework, modification), failure of 
externally supplied products/service and the additional 
actions taken and loss of value adding performances of both 
resources and equipment.  
Cross-functional team Team of people with difference skills from different 
disciplines.  Such as financial, production, technical, 
manufacturing, engineering, project and purchasing. 
Corrective action Disposition of an existing nonconformity by repair, rework or 
adjustment (ISO 8402) (See also ‘preventive action’). 
Customer Satisfaction The perception of your customer who is receiving the product 
or the service. 
Defect A non fulfilment of quality from a process or a part.    
EDI (Electronic Data 
Interchange) 
The inter company, computer to computer communication of 
standard format that permits the receiver to perform the 
  
intended transaction. (Sokol, 1989). 
E-purchasing tools   Methods using electronic data processing from purchasing 
requisition of order eliminating paper from the system. 
ERP Enterprise resource planning, the latest manufacturing 
production method.  
Frame Agreement A joint agreement produced between the customer and 
strategic supplier to generally outline their operating 
principles and performance expectations. 
Gap reduction Activities made in order to improve performance to a level 
that equals an indicator assessed. 
Gate review A number of checkpoints within a process that ascertain that 
key criterion have been fulfilled before moving to the next 
stage of development. 
Integration The linking or interfacing of parts or processes. 
Interfaces Point where the processes of different organisations 
converge: some inputs or outputs are shared. There must 
work together people of different processes or organisations. 
ISO 9000  Certification of a quality system, performed by an 
internationally recognised and independent organisation, e.g. 
QS 9000, BS5750, EAQF.  
Kanban A pull system, which pulls, required materials for a buffer 
stock or the previous operation. 
Key commodity Strategically important or vital purchased part. 
Key supplier Supplier supplying key commodities. 
Kits Small batches of different parts and components, which will 
be assembled together and are delivered together on the 
assembly line. 
Materials management 
policy 
The definition & objectives of how products & materials are 
co-ordinated into production and transferred for final delivery 
to the Customer 
Milestone 
 
Key stages positioned in a project processes that target when 
key objectives or deliverables need to be achieved before a 
Gate Review. 
Non-conformity Non-fulfilment of a specified requirement (ISO 8402). This 
requirement may be a product, procedure or process. 
Partnership policy A policy aiming to develop the use of partnerships with 
supplier. 
Pilot suppliers The initial supplier used to supply products / parts / materials 
/ services. May be used on a long term basis but could be for 
just initial trails or production. 
Policy Overall intentions and direction of an organisation, as 
formally expressed by top management (ISO 8402). 
Policy and Strategy Mission, values, vision, direction  
Potential Suppliers Suppliers proposed by Sourcing, which could be able to 
design or manufacture Products.  
  
Preventive action Action taken to eliminate the causes of a potential 
nonconformity, defect or other undesirable situation in order 
to prevent occurrence (ISO 8402). 
Procedure A written or documented procedure usually contains the 
purpose and scope of an activity; what shall be done and by 
whom; when, where and how it shall be done; what materials, 
equipment and documents shall be used; and how it shall be 
controlled and recorded. (ISO 8402). 
Process Set of inter-related resource’s and activities which transform 
inputs into outputs. Resource’s may include personnel, 
finance, facilities, equipment, techniques and methods. (ISO 
8402). 
Process Development Reviewing every single task in the company network of 
activities to seek continuous improvement of these tasks. 
Prototype Model of a product, manufactured with a non-industrialised 
process and so non-representative of the series, but used to 
validate design concepts before volume production. 
Purchase Order The contractual document used to order parts, materials, 
services 
Purchase order 
acknowledgement 
The notification of receipt of an order document 
Purchasing card A visa or barclaycard used to procure materials or services. 
Quality Totality of characteristics of an entity that bear on its ability 
to satisfy stated and implied customer needs.   
Quality Assurance 
(QA) 
All the planned and systematic activities implemented within 
the quality system. 
Reliability Ability of a product to perform its intended function under 
specified conditions without failure for a given period of 
time. 
Set up Reduction See SMED 
Short term A period of time shorter than 1.5 years 
Short term Business 
Plan 
A schedule that details actions and objectives to be made 
within a short period. No longer than 1.5 years 
SMED Single Minute Exchange of Die also refered to as set up 
reduction which concentrates on reducing set up time by 
breaking all activites down and then seperating them into 
external and internal activities.  Internal activities are jobs 
which have to be carried out why the machine is switched off 
and external which can be carried out while the machine is 
running. 
Sourcing department Department responsible for the selection, negotiation and 
follow-up of suppliers (as former Purchasing departments), 
but that also must share responsibilities with other functions 
involved in the supply chain for the control of the total 
Sourcing cost. (Stretch 30). 
Sourcing Reviews A regular review of Suppliers performances (QCD, technical, 
legal, confidentiality) to check the continued suitability of 
suppliers to meet ALSTOM requirements. It is lead by 
  
ALSTOM Sourcing department and involves Engineering, 
Manufacturing and Quality departments 
Specification Documentation stating requirements.  Notes:  1.  A qualifier 
should be used to indicate the type of specification such as 
‘Product’, Specification, Test specification.  2.  A 
specification should refer to or include drawings, patterns or 
other relevant documents and indicate the means and the 
criteria whereby conformity can be checked. (ISO 8402) 
Sourcing Policy Defines what is expected from the Sourcing organisation in 
executing the business strategy. It must be in line with the 
overall strategy and its main criteria.  For example 
shareholders’ value, commercial focus.  it will indicate the 
relative importance of each of the key dimensions of 
Sourcing performance and fix clear targets for the most 
important ones  
Strategic intent A driving force compelling leadership toward its vision. 
Strategic supplier Supplier supplying strategic commodities. 
This status may be different for every ALSTOM units. 
Supplier Organisation that provides a product or service to a customer. 
Supplier award An award given to a Supplier who has made an outstanding 
improvement, contribution or performance.  Awards can 
congratulate suppliers on different periods: ‘supplier of the 
month award’, ‘supplier of the year award’, etc. 
Supplier back up plan Measures performed to minimise the risk of not being 
delivered parts by suppliers (e.g. warehouse stocks, 2 
suppliers, etc). 
Supplier Classification  Class applied to Suppliers, indicating their performance level 
and based on a rating and assessment system.  The suppliers 
could be graded in numerical or alphabetical levels A or 1 
being ‘Preferred Suppliers’. 
Supplier conference Meeting or convention held with all the Suppliers to 
communicate ALSTOM expectations and requirements in 
fields of quality, productivity, etc. Usually done after 
organisational or process changes that affect Suppliers, or at 
the launch of a new product. 
Supplier Performance 
Rating System 
Regular measurement of supplier performance.  Frequent 
performance measures used include quality, cost, delivery 
and technology. 
Supplier portfolio List of all the suppliers known by ALSTOM and which 
buyers are authorised to deal with (buying to or only 
consulting). 
Supplier quality  Agreement with the Supplier stating the expected level of 
quality (e.g. parts per million levels), volume etc. This is a 
means to follow-up objectives and measure progresses. 
Supplier Quality 
Assurance (SQA) 
The process that helps assure QCD criteria is achieved by the 
Supplier. 
Supplier review  A regular meeting with suppliers’ to review performance. 
  
The ship to line Parts and/or materials directly delivered to the manufacturing 
area without any inspection. 
TPM Total preventative maintenance.  A system to plan and 
control maintenance, develop flexible working and 
autonomous teams. 
Traceability Ability to trace the history, application or location of an 
entity by means of recorded identifications.   
Validation Confirmation by examination and provision of objective 
evidence.  
Values The worth, desirability, or utility of a thing, or the qualities 
on which these depend. One’s principles or standards; one’s 
judgement of what is valuable or important in life. Values 
describe the Company’s preferred way of doing things.  For a 
value to be a value it must consistently drive behaviour. 
   
  
Appendix 2: Supplier Development Policy Statement 
 
1  RHP PURCHASING 
 
The RHP purchasing mission is to continuously meet agreed customer requirements at the lowest 
total cost, whilst actively pursuing environmental goals. 
 
2 SOURCING POLICY 
 
The RHP policy is to source long term with at least one technically approved supplier for each 
strategic product. 
 
3 SUPPLIER DEVELOPMENT MISSION 
 
To build long term relationships with our strategic suppliers, by developing and maintaining a 
cost effective supply chain built on trust and mutual gain. 
 
4 SCOPE OF SUPPLIER DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITY 
 
To proactively share and transfer continuous improvement techniques with RHP’s selected 
strategic suppliers.  RHP’s initial focus will be on Manufacturing activities and seek to improve 
Quality, Cost, Delivery and People (QCDP) performance.   
 
5  RHP ORGANISATIONAL SUPPORT 
 
RHP’s central Purchasing Department will be responsible for controlling the supplier 
management system. The supplier development activities will include relevant people who add 
value to the team. 
 
6 STRATEGIC SUPPLIER SELECTION 
 
The criteria for selecting and reviewing strategic suppliers will be based on the following: 
 
♦ Relationship development attitude 
♦ Importance of product 
♦ RHP spend and contribution to supplier turnover 
♦ Level of Performance measured by RHP 
♦ Product / Process Innovation 
♦ Technological development (IT/R&D) 
♦ Strategy and Business Plans 
 
7  SUPPLIER DEVELOPMENT  PERFORMANCE MEASURES  
 
RHP shall select strategic suppliers for development based on business priorities.  RHP will carry 
out perception surveys with purchasing, quality, engineering and Manufacturing.  Selection will 
be annually and internal quarterly progress reviews will be carried out. 
 
8   SUPPLIER DEVELOPMENT  PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
 
RHP will support selected strategic suppliers with deployment of a QCDP philosophy.  This is 
essential for providing a focus for improvement activities, by measuring where we are, where we 
want to be and assigning jointly agreed improvement targets 
 
Typical performance measures include: 
 
♦ Right first time 
♦ Delivery schedule achievement 
♦ Manufacturing people cost 
  
♦ Stock turns 
♦ Overall equipment effectiveness 
♦ Value added per person 
♦ Floor space utilisation 
 
9        SUPPLIER DEVELOPMENT TRAINING WORKSHOPS  
 
RHP use a range of continuous improvement skills.  For example, 5 S’s, waste removal, Total 
Productive Maintenance (TPM) and visual management.  A joint workshop with RHP and the 
selected strategic supplier/s will be carried out focusing on the relevant improvement skills 
needed to fulfill the particular focus of development (project objective).  The workshop will 
include practical application and will be delivered by NSK-RHP. 
 
10    MANAGEMENT AND COMMUNICATION  
 
RHP and selected strategic suppliers shall undertake agreed monthly reviews.  This will ensure an 
ongoing   supplier development continuous improvement philosophy to be deployed. 
 
11  CONFIDENTIALITY  
 
Any information shared within the projects that is identified and recorded as confidential shall 
only  be exchanged following the signing by all parties who receive the information of an RHP 
Confidentiality Agreement.  
 
12  CAPITAL INVESTMENT 
 
Where investment is made in technology or tooling an individual agreement is made and signed 
between both parties. 
 
13  JOINT BUSINESS PLAN 
 
RHP and the selected strategic suppliers will jointly establish a focused five year business plan 
aimed at continuous improvement and cost reduction targets. 
 
14  SUPPLY CHAIN DEVELOPMENT 
 
RHP will work with selected strategic suppliers to continuously seek new ways to more 
effectively manage and develop the supply chain.  We the undersigned agree in principle to the 
supplier development policy outlined above. 
 
.............................................................. 
Managing Director 
 
.............................................................. 
Purchasing Manager 
  
Appendix 3: Supply Chain Manager Survey  
 
Name:     Position:   Sex: 
 
Age:     Length of Service: 
 
 
 
Based on your experience what are your inhibitors to effective performance in 
supply chain management? 
 
 
1.   
2.   
3.   
4.   
5.   
6.   
7.  
 
 
Based on your experience what are your enablers for effective performance in the 
supply chain management? 
 
 
1.   
2.   
3.   
4.   
5.   
6.   
7.  
 
